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Foreword
Asakawa Kan’ichi’s Legacy

A century has passed since Professor
Asakawa Kan’ichi ﬁrst took up the lectern at Yale University in
1907. His rise to a position of such prominence in American
society was a feat unmatched by the thousands of his generation
in Japan who went abroad to study, to make a mark for themselves, and to help their ﬂedgling nation pull itself up by its
bootstraps to stand alongside the major powers of the world. In
America, Professor Asakawa found a country and a people that
he loved. He made a comfortable and distinguished place for
himself at Yale University, the very pinnacle of American
academia—and my own alma mater. Yet, his life was torn
between the love of his mother country and his adoptive
country. He reconciled this conﬂict by championing closer
friendship between Japan and the United States, by tirelessly
explaining Japan to Americans and America to the Japanese,
and, ultimately, by giving each country insights into itself.
Professor Asakawa’s resume would show him to be a historian, a legal scholar, author, and a sometime interpreter and
diplomatic adjunct. Yet his legacy is much greater—one of a
visionary of unrivaled dimension. Early on, in the exuberant
days of Japan’s coming of age after its victory in the Russo-

ix

x

foRewoRd

Japanese war, Professor Asakawa penned Japan’s Crisis in 1909.
It was a warning to Japan that its foreign policy designs would
one day lead it to war with the United States. In essence, he laid
out the course of events and wrote the history that was to occur
over the next 30-plus years. e clarity of his observations in
Japan’s Crisis remains instructive today. I consider myself to be
one of Asakawa’s students.
Alas, despite his unﬂagging eﬀorts to the contrary, his warnings went unheeded as he painfully endured decades of the
inexorable playing out of his predictions. If he had a fault, it was
in his idealism, his conﬁdence that others could see with the
same clear eye.
Today, 60 years after his passing, we celebrate Professor
Asakawa even more for his other vision, the one he never got to
see come true. at was the vision of Japan and the United
States, in an alliance of friendship and goodwill, that work
shoulder-to-shoulder toward the ideals that Professor Asakawa
had envisioned for the whole world.

Ryozo Kato
Former Ambassador of Japan

Abbreviations and Acronyms
adb

Asian Development Bank

afta

asean Free Trade Area

amf

Asian Monetary Fund

apec

Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation

asean

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

bis

Bank for International Settlements

boJ

Bank of Japan

CA

California

cbsg

Central Bank Study Group

cefp

Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy

clo

Cabinet Legislative Oﬃce

cmi

Chiang-Mai initiative

DC

District of Columbia

dpJ

Democratic Party of Japan

dsp

Democratic Socialist Party

eac

East Asian Community

eeZ

exclusive economic zone

epa

economic partnership agreements

EU

European Union

fsa

Financial Services Agency

fta

Free Trade Agreements

fy

Fiscal Year

ga

[UN] General Assembly

gatt

General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade

xi

gdp

gross domestic product

hsbc

from Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

ibRd

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ifi

international ﬁnancial institution

iip

indices of industrial production

IL

Illinois

ilo

International Labor Organization

imf

International Monetary Fund

Jama

Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association

Jasso

Japan Student Services Organization

Jcp

Japan Communist Party

Jda

Japan Defense Agency

JetRo

Japan External Trade Organization

Jnsc

National Security Council of Japan

ldp

Liberal Democratic Party

lng

liquiﬁed natural gas

MA

Massachusetts

meti

Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry

meXt

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Technology

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

miti

Ministry of International Trade and Industry

mmd

medium-sized multi-member districts

mof

Ministry of Finance

mofa

Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs

nafta

North American Free Trade Agreement

NJ

New Jersey

NY

New York

oda

Overseas Development Administration

xii

oecd

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

oecf

Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund

ppp

purchasing power parity

pR

proportional representation

pRc

People’s Republic of China

saco

Special Action Committee on Okinawa

sdf

Self Defense Forces

sdpJ

Social Democratic Party of Japan

smd

single-member district

sntv

single non-transferable vote

tse

Tokyo Stock Exchange

ufJ

Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

undp

United Nations Development Program

unicef

United Nations Children’s Fund

unsc

United Nations Security Council

US

United States

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

vie

voluntary import expansion

wfp

World Food Program

wto

World Trade Organization

wwi

World War I

wwii

World War II

xiii

PART I
Japan, en and Now

1
Japan and the World:
An Analysis of Japan’s Place in World Aﬀairs
In Honor of the Memory and Legacy of
Asakawa Kan’ichi
Masaru Kohno
Frances Rosenbluth
Japansitsatopdynamictectonicplates
notonlyinageologicalsensebutinageopoliticalsenseaswell.
Since the 7th century (or perhaps even earlier), Japan’s legal,
political, social, and cultural systems have been constructed,
deconstructed,andreconstructedundertheinﬂuenceofearthquake-likeshocksoriginatingontheneighboringAsiancontinent. In the modern era, with technological advancements in
commerceandcommunication,Japanhashadtosituateitself
between the East and the West. Japanese polity, society, and
lifestyleshaveallevolvedfromtwodynamicforcespullingfrom
distinctdirections,onefromtheAsiansideandtheotherfrom
theEuropean-Americanside.
Insomeways,thegeopoliticalsituationsurroundingJapan
hasnotalteredverymuch.Today,Japan’sgargantuanneighbors,
ChinaandRussia,arecapableofcausingenormousearthquakes
politicallyandevenmilitarily.Foratimeduringthecoldwar,
Japan and the rest of the world shivered at the thought of a
possibleglobalconﬂagrationbetweenthecommunistandanticommunist camps. Now, without communism to unite them,
ChinaandRussianeverthelessremaincolossalpowers,casting
ashadowovertheentireJapaneseterritory.
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Japan,ofcourse,hascausedplentyofearth-shakingevents
ofitsowninthemodernperiod,evenifinanticipatoryreaction
toperceivedthreatsfromtheneighboringgiants.Japanfought
manydevastatingwars:againstChinain894–95overinﬂuence
inKorea;againstRussiain904–05overKoreaandManchuria;
and taking on China and the Allied Powers in the 930s and
940s over Manchurian resources and Southeast Asian oil
supplies.
OneofthegreatestchallengesforscholarsofEastAsia,and
indeed for concerned citizens of the region, is to understand
thecausesofwartoavoidrepeatingthedisastersthatconsumed
EastAsiainthe9thand0thcenturies.isvolume,written
intributetothelateAsakawaKan’ichi,takesupﬁrstthelifeand
workofthisremarkablescholarwhowassuchanastuteobserver
ofhistimes.eJapanofAsakawa’sdaywasbentonregional
domination,howeverinsistentlythegovernmentjustiﬁeddominationondefensivegrounds.Asakawawarnedagainstdefensive
aggression because of the reactions he knew it would elicit
fromJapan’sneighbors,greatandsmall.isissageadvicefor
hegemonsofanyera.But,ifAsakawahadbeenwritingabout
Japan’s contemporary foreign policy environment, he would
have noticed two radically diﬀerent factors that would have
inﬂuencedhisadvice.First,Japanisnowademocraticcountry
inwhichthemilitaryissubjecttociviliancontrol,shiftingthe
spotlight from the hubris of generals to the decision-making
capacityofthevotingpublic.Second,theinternationaleconomic
integration that had just begun in his day has now vastly
increasedthecostsofoutrightmilitaryconﬂictforthecountries
oftheregion,andthestakesarehigherthanever.Asakawawas
a historian of Japan’s deep past who understood that new
circumstancesrequirenewprescriptions,anditisinthisspirit
thatwehonorhislegacy.
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Asakawa Kan’ichi:
Lineage of His ought on Peace and Diplomacy
Acenturyago,whenAsakawaKan’ichi,aprofessorofJapanese
economic history at Yale, wrote as a concerned citizen about
Japan’s foreign policy, East Asian geopolitics was particularly
volatile.ecenterofgravityinworldpolitics,ashesawitin
904, was moving from the club of rich colonizers that had
triedtocarveuptheworldamongthemselves,tothefreeﬂow
oftradeandinvestmentthatwouldunderwriteprosperityfor
all.AlthoughthisbeliefsurelyqualiﬁesAsakawaasaliberal,he
had a realist’s view of why liberalism would prevail. e oldstylepowers,suchasRussiaandFrance,wouldbebalancedby
thenewcomers,suchastheUnitedStatesandJapan,thatwere
disadvantagedbytheoldspheresofinﬂuence.e“jealousyof
the powers” had broken apart the system on which colonial
imperialismrested.
Writing in 904,1 Asakawa harbored hope for a world of
freetradeandinternationaljustice—aworldorderthatlooked
strikingly Kantian.2 By forcing Russia out of Manchuria, he
believed Japan had become a “midwife” for this new order in
which Japan would help to police the territorial integrity of
bothChinaandKorea.By909,however,whenhewroteJapan’s
Crisis, Asakawa had become disillusioned with the Japanese
government’sforeignpolicydesigns.egovernmentshowed
nointerestinsettingupatimetableforreturningtoChinathe
LiaotungPeninsulathatJapanhadacquiredfromRussia.Japan
hadturnedouttobeafoxguardingthechickencoop,butthe
other foxes would have none of it, and eventually the world
went to war. Unfortunately, there are many ways that cartels
canfail,somelesspeacefulthanothers.
Intheﬁnalyearofhislife,Asakawamarveledattheability
ofcountriestomisunderstandnotonlyeachother,butthemselves. In his own words, “I ﬁnd, once again, how little the
unconscious habits of the mental workings of nations are
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understoodtooneanother,indeed,howlittleeachisawareof
its own.”3 If only the Japanese government had been able to
foresee the price tag on its territorial ambitions, they would
havechosenthepeacefulcoursethathehadurgedfortyyears
earlier. But making these calculations requires two processes:
discerningwhatothercountriesarelikelytodoundervarious
scenarios and weighing the possible options with respect to
domestic politics. e opportunities for miscalculation are
myriadatbothlevels.
HadAsakawabeenapoliticalscientist,hemighthavetheorized about the way diﬀerent domestic political institutions
shapethedecisionmakingenvironmentmoresystematically.A
large body of literature, originating in Kant’s philosophy and
nowknowncollectivelyasthe“democraticpeace”theory,posits
thatdemocraciesarelesslikelytowagewarbecausethedecision-makingpublicinternalizesthecostsofﬁghting.UntilJapan
became afull-ﬂedgeddemocracyafterWorldWarii,theargumentgoes,itremainedathreattotherestoftheworldbecause
afewmenwhodidnotthemselvesbearthecostsofwarmade
thedecisionsaboutthebloodthatotherswouldshedandthe
sacriﬁces that others would bear. e military leaders who
seizedthereinsofgovernmentin93plungedJapanintoawar
thattheJapanesepublicwouldnothavewanted,hadtheybeen
givenaccesstothefacts.
UnlikeinAsakawa’sday,sincetheendofwwii Japanhas
become a full-ﬂedged democracy, with a long-established
record of elections, parliamentarism, and civilian control of
the military. Asakawa, if he were alive, would likely be more
optimisticaboutJapan’sforeignpolicyconduct.Intoday’sworld,
ChinaandNorthKorea,notJapan,maintainregimesinwhich
governments are not accountable to the public in any meaningful sense. Asakawa would likely conclude, in his Kantian
intuition,thatJapanislesslikelytobeaprimarysourceofinternationaltensionandconﬂictintheregionthantheseautocratic
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 eighbors.Hewouldlikelyfocusonthewaysthatdemocratic
n
politicscanalsogoawryandseektoshoreupJapan’scommitment to peace through international economic and political
exchange.
Kant himself, the grandfather of the “democratic peace”
theory,wasnot,infact,asenamoredofmajoritariandemocracy
as he was of representative republicanism. Kant shared the
classicalview,expoundedbyucydidesinhisdescriptionof
thePeloponnesianWar,thatuncheckedmajorities(asinAthens)
couldbewarlike,excitable,andpronetomakingbaddecisions.4
Kantthoughtthatitwasnotdemocracypersebutrepresentative
government,whichseparatedinformation-gatheringfromdecision-makinganddecision-makingfromexecution,thatwould
inject appropriate doses of caution into decisions about war
andpeace.
Since the time of Kant, political theorists have come to
considermoresubtlewaysthatdemocraciescanvary,including
thewayselectoralrulesshapetheaccountabilityofpoliticians
to their voting publics. It is possible to make more nuanced
predictionsaboutJapan’sfuturecourse,takingintoconsiderationsomeofthemajorinstitutionalchangesthathaveoccurred
in recent years. For example, now that Japan has changed its
electoral rules—since 994—to a largely majoritarian system,
Japan’s foreign policy decision-making is in some ways more
problematic in ways that would cause Kant and Asakawa to
worry.Forexample,theremaybeinsuﬃcientchecksinthenew
systemtoavoidthepitfallsofill-informedandﬁcklemajorities.
Ontheotherhand,partiesareforcedtoappealtothemedian
voter,whichpushespublicpolicytowardsmoderatepositions
in the political middle (even though the disappearance of a
strongleftmayalsoweakentheresistancetohawkishleadership).Moreover,Japanhasbecomeintegratedintointernational
economic institutions and norms that set the stage for a
constructivegive-and-takebetweenJapanandtheworld.Inthe
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followingchaptersofthisvolume,wereturntothesesubstantive
questionsthatwouldhavefascinatedAsakawa.

Japan’s Challenges: Past and Present
Inthestcentury,Japancontinuestofaceanenvironmentin
whichtherawmaterialsofAsiaandthemarketsofChinaare
vitaltoitsprosperity.enewelementinthepictureisChina’s
spectacularriseasapowerinitsownright,unseatingJapan’s
longstandingpositionofregionaldominance.
AncientChina,thoughamagniﬁcentdynasticempireanda
constantsourceofculturalinspiration,wasneveraterritorial
threat to Japan. Japanese rulers kept an eye on the Korean
peninsulaagainstthepossibilityofChineseencroachment,and
the Mongols of the 3th century were thwarted by “divine
winds,” while Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s ill-fated invasion in the
th centuryprovednotonlyunsuccessfulbutunnecessary.
Inthe8th century,whenwesternpowersforciblyopened
EastAsiatotradeandinvestment,China’sfeeblepoliticalsystem
disintegratedwhileJapan’sMeijileadersbuiltJapanintoaworld
classpower.etablesturned,ofcourse,whenwwii leftJapan
prostrate,butAmerica’sfearofworldwidecommunismensured
Japan’ssecurity,atleastuntilJapangotbackontoitsfeet.e
diﬀerencenowisthatChinaiscontinuingtogrowwhiletheUS
andJapannolongerhaveanticommunismasareasonfortheir
militaryalliance.
Japanese businesses welcome and prosper from China’s
growingbuyingpower,tobesure.Astheliberaltheoryofinternational relations predicts, actors with an interest in another
country’sprosperityarereliablevoicesforpeace.5 But,asinternationalrealistspointout,China’sgrowingmilitaryshadowis
unsettlingnonethelessbecausecapabilitiescan,intheory,inﬂuence intentions. If bargaining power comes from the relative
costs and beneﬁts of using force, China is clearly gaining an
advantage.eJapanesefeelingofuneaseisampliﬁedbyChina’s
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persistent nettling on the history question and its implacable
opposition to a more prominent role for Japan in the United
NationsSecurityCouncil.
So, today, Japan once again faces a thorny foreign policy
environment, albeit one diﬀerent from the world Asakawa
inhabited. China, no longer a helpless victim of predatory
powers, is asserting a leadership role grounded in resources
accumulated from remarkable economic achievement. Japan,
meanwhile,hasonlyrecentlybegunpullingoutofanextended
economic malaise, after the collapse of asset markets inﬂated
byyearsofprotectionistregulationandundulyoptimisticmonetarypolicies.
esourceoftensionbetweenChinaandJapancentersnot
so much on economic philosophies and policies but on the
morenebulousissueofwhichcountrywillberegionalleader,
willbedeferredto,andwillinﬂuenceoutcomesbigandsmall.
Unlikeinthepostcoldwarperiod,theUnitedStatescannotbe
countedontotakeJapan’swell-beingasseriouslyasitoncedid.
Japan now has the enormously complex task of balancing US
goodwill,stillneededbutlessassured,againstChina’sinexorable
increase in global clout. e majoritarian cast of Japan’s new
electoral rules forces greater attention on issues with broad
appeal, and creates new domestic accountability mechanisms
that shape foreign economic and security policies. Japan is
entering some uncharted geopolitical waters as a democratic
nation,anditisimportanttounderstandhownewlystructured
political parties will navigate the shoals of national pride and
prudence.

e Plan of the Book
ebookthatfollowshastwoprimarygoals.eﬁrst,presented
inPartI,celebratesthelifeandintellectuallegacyofAsakawa
Kan’ichi. Born in 874 in Nihonmatsu in northern Japan,
Asakawa was the son of a samurai in a “rebel” province that
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initially deﬁed the Meiji leaders’ overthrow of the Tokugawa.
Asakawamayhavebeendisaﬀectedwithdomesticpolitics,or
perhapshebecameawareofthepossibilitiesforlearningoverseasthathadlongbeenclosedtoJapanese.Inspiredbywhatever
combinationofincentives,thisbraveyoungmantraveledalone
to the United States where he mastered English, eventually
became the ﬁrst Japanese to earn a Ph.D. from Yale, and, in
903,becametheﬁrstprofessorofJapanesehistoryatYale.
Inchapter,AgawaNaoyukiwritesof“AsakawaKan’ichi’s
AmericanJourney:ItsTimeandPlaceintheHistoryofJapanese
ForeignPolicy.”Agawapointsoutthat,ifwebreakthe50years
oftheUS-Japanrelationshipintothree,50-yearperiods—from
853through898,from898through95,andfrom95tothe
st century—Asakawa’s life straddled much of the ﬁrst and
secondperiods.Asakawa’spersonalstruggletounderstandand
interpretJapan’sroleintheworldprovidesalensthroughwhich
to view Japan’s geopolitical challenges and compare the challengesofthattimewiththoseJapanfacestoday.Asakawa’s909
book, Japan’s Crisis, criticized Japan’s aggressive policy in
ManchuriaaftertheRusso-JapanesewarandurgedthatJapan
continuetorespectChina’ssovereigntyandterritorialintegrity.
Today, the tables have turned and Japan feels threatened by
Chinaasneverbefore.HowJapandealswiththesenewfeelings
of insecurity in the face of China’s rise to power will have
profoundconsequences,notonlyforJapan,butalsofortherest
oftheworld.
Inchapter3,KambayashiRyoandHamadaKoichidiscuss
Asakawa’s primary area of scholarship, medieval Japanese
economichistory,whichplacesJapan’seconomicandpolitical
development in comparison with that of the west. Asakawa
provides a model of the comparative historical method. His
thesis,thatJapan’smulti-tieredpropertyarrangementsreﬂected
peasants’bargainswithoverlordsforprotectioninexchangefor
aportionofharvests,isatoddswiththeMarxistinterpretation
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ofJapanesehistorythatstressedoppressionandpeasantmisery.
Asakawa’sview,thoughderidedorignoredbypostwarJapanese
historians for several decades, has now become in its key
elementsthestandardviewofJapaneseeconomichistory.
Inchapter4,YabukiSusumuprovidesaseriesofvignettes
ofAsakawa’slifeandwork.Yabukigivesusaglimpse,oftenin
Asakawa’sownwords,ofhisspiriteddebatewithhisJapanese
detractors, as well as Asakawa’s ongoing conversations with
governmentoﬃcialsandothersaboutJapaneseforeignpolicy
choices.YabukimakesthecasethatAsakawaplayedacentral
but little known role in the Portsmouth Treaty negotiations
that ended the Russo-Japanese War. He did so by inﬂuencing
thethinkingoftwoYaleprofessorswhosememototheJapanese
negotiatingteamprovidedkeysettlementprovisions.Asakawa
remained bitterly disappointed, until his death in 948, that
JapanfailedtohonorChina’sandKorea’ssovereigntyaspledged
inthePortsmouthTreaty.
Parts ii and iii of the book turn to Japan’s contemporary
challenges, both economic and military. Part ii examines the
eﬀects of global economic integration on Japanese political
economy,makingthecasethatJapanhasbecomeharnessedto
internationalinstitutionsandnormsinawaythatfurthersthe
prospectsofapeacefulworld.Inchapter5,LeonardSchoppa
argues that international engagement has caused values to
change so that Japan has shifted its foreign economic policy
fromaneomercantilistictoalargelyneoliberalone.Beginning
inthe970swhenJapanbeganrunningchronictradesurpluses,
Japan endured decades of pressure from its trading partners,
principallytheUnitedStates,toopenJapanesemarketstotrade
and investment. Since the mid-990s, Japan’s political and
economicelitehasadvocatedeconomicliberalizationwithout
pressurefromabroad.ischapterdocumentsthetransformationofJapan’seconomicideologythroughtheprocessofaccommodatingtoforeignpressure.
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In chapter , Jennifer Dwyer argues that the discipline of
theinternationalmarketwillhelpJapanmaintainitscommitmenttoresponsiblemonetarypolicymakingdespiteshortterm
domestic political pressures to undo liberalizing reforms. She
examinestheﬁrstdecadeaftertheadoptionofthe997Bankof
JapanLaw,whichgavethecentralbankindependencefromthe
government and removed Ministry of Finance inﬂuence over
monetarypolicy.echapterexamineswhytheBankofJapan
hasbeenabletoretainitsindependencedespitemanypolitical
andeconomicchallengesandarguesthatbothdomesticinstitutionalrestructuringandinternationalideationalandﬁnancial
market trends may provide support for the bank’s continued
independence.ischapteremphasizesthattheslowtransformation of Japan’s political economy is shaped by not only
domestic concerns, but also global economic integration,
competitivemarketpressures,andthedevelopmentofinternationally accepted norms and standards regarding eﬀective
economicmanagement.
Chapter7,byPhillipLipscy,explainsthecuriousfactthat
JapanhasalargervoiceintheWorldBankthantheimf,despite
Japan’s status as the second largest donor behind the United
States to both institutions. Lipscy argues that Japan (or any
countryotherthanperhapstheUnitedStates)isconstrainedin
its individual exercise of power by its need to maintain the
globalintegrityoftheveryinstitutionitwishestochange.e
WorldBankgivesJapanavoicecommensuratewithitsﬁnancial
contributionsbecauseJapancould,ifrebuﬀed,takeitsmoney
outoftheWorldBankandsupportaidinitiativesthroughthe
AsianDevelopmentBankorotheroutlets.Incontrast,theimf
givesJapanlessbargainingleveragebecauseofthepublicgoods
nature of the international monetary system: Japan cannot
beneﬁtfrominternationalmonetarystabilitywithoutaninstitutionthathastheglobalreachoftheInternationalMonetary
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Fund (imf). Japan needs the imf more than it needs Japan,
whereasthereverseistrueinthecaseoftheWorldBank.
OnemightconcludefromthesethreechaptersthatJapanis
constrained by an interlocking web of international rules and
normsinawaythatadvantagesnotonlytheworld,butJapan
itself.
erestofthebook,inPartiii,focusesonthechallenges
Japan faces regionally and globally. In chapter 8, Kent Calder
describesJapan’sandChina’sstrategiccompetitionforenergy
resourcesandconsidersitsimplications.ChinaandJapanonce
had largely complementary economies, with China supplying
Japan with raw materials and labor intensive manufactured
products,andJapansupplyingChinawithhightechnologyand
high value-added products and services. Now that China has
undergoneextensiveindustrialization,JapanandChinaincreasinglyﬁndthemselvescompetingforthesamescarceresources
to fuel their economies. Conﬂict over resources has become
chronicandrequiresastutepoliticalmanagementonbothsides,
whichisoftenlacking.
In chapter 9, Gregory Noble provides a window on the
Japanesebusinesscommunity’sviewofSino-Japaneserelations.
is chapter pits realist theories of international relations
(focusing on power and resources) against liberal ones (that
considerbusinessincentives)byexaminingtheevolvingstance
of Japanese business executives and organizations towards
China.CompetitionwithChinahasincreasedinthemanufacturing sector as well as in competition for resources, but on
balance, the proﬁts that Japanese companies earn in their
ventures in China are powerful inducements to keep SinoJapanese political relations on an even keel. As in the period
beforeWorldWarii,Japanesebusinessesareworriedaboutthe
eﬀectsofrisingnationalisminbothcountriesonthebilateral
relationship.
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Inchapter0,FrancesRosenbluth,SaitoJun,andAnnalisa
Zinn take up the question of Japanese nationalism and ask
whetherJapan’sneighborsoughttofearsignsofitsrise.Inthe
eyes of Japan’s neighbors, Japan shows a shocking lack of
remorseforthedepredationsofWorldWarii.Textbookrevisions,visitstotheYasukuniShrinetothewardead,andtalkof
revising Japan’s “peace constitution” signal to them a callous
disregardatbest;atworst,theyareharbingersofrisingnationalism that may once again become aggressive. e authors
concludethatthereislessreasonforconcernthanthesestraws
inthewindmightsuggest.AlthoughtheJapanesepublicincreasinglyfavorsanactiveforeignpolicy,thereisnoincreaseinfeelingsofnationalprideorsupportforthegovernment,rightor
wrong.Instead,theriseingeneralinterestinforeignpolicyis
on account of Japan’s new electoral rules, adopted in 994,
whichgivepoliticiansincentivetoappealtovotersonthebasis
ofpublicpolicyissues,inbothforeignanddomesticpolicy.But
the geopolitical constraints on Japan are real, and the public
recognizesthatJapanhaslittlechoicebuttoretainUSgoodwill
whileexploringforeignpolicyindependenceatthemargins.
Intheﬁnalchapter,MargaritaEstévez-Abe,HikotaniTakako,
and Nagahisa Toshio explain the causes and consequences of
increasedprimeministerialpoweroverforeignpolicyinJapan.
Inrecentyears,beginningwithPrimeMinisterKoizumi,Japan’s
primeministerhasbeguntoexertmoreinﬂuencethaninthe
past on the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Was
thistheresultofKoizumi’spersonalcharismaandeﬀectiveness,
ordoesitreﬂectamorefundamentalchangeinJapan’spolitical
decisionmaking?ischapterbringsevidencefrompartyand
electoralpoliticstobearonthisquestion,andarguesthatthe
electoralrulechangeof994givespartyleadersmorecontrolof
resources,suchaspartynominations,withwhichtocontrolthe
party platform. e consequences are interesting to contemplate,butitremainstobeseeniftheprimeminister’sforeign
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policy control provides an avenue for the public to hold the
governmentmorecloselyincheck,givenhiselectoralvulnerability,orifhewillbeabletomanipulatepublicopinionmore
easily than before. Democratic politics includes elements of
bothphenomena,andcompetitionbyaviableoppositionseems
crucialtoensuringthestrengthofapopularcheck.
Taken together, the chapters in Part iii ﬁnd that regional
and global challenges that Japan faces are real, but Japanese
preferences are complex, and many important industries are
determined to keep the relationship harmonious. Moreover,
the recent willingness of Japanese political elites to discuss
foreignpolicyinpublicisareﬂectionofnewelectoralincentives
ratherthanevidence,forexample,thattheJapanesecitizenryis
itchingtoinitiateconﬂictwithChina.Amodern-dayAsakawa
wouldnotworrythatwarmongeringelitescouldrisetopower,
letaloneprovokeanengagedbutultimatelymoderateelectorate
todemandwar.

Conclusion
Japan has become politically majoritarian and economically
neoliberal, giving Japan more structural resemblance to the
United States and the United Kingdom than was true in its
mercantilistpast.Japan’seconomyisreorganizingaroundmore
ﬂuid capital and labor markets and is beginning to shed its
predatory image. ese structural changes would have given
Asakawa cause for optimism. At the same time, Japan is
confrontinganewgeopoliticalchallengeespeciallyintherise
ofChinaasaregionalandglobalpower.Althoughthedangers
ofresurgentJapanesemilitarismareminimal,itisalsopossible
thatpopulistmajoritarianisminJapanandelsewheremayentail
amoresubtlethreattopeaceinAsiabyraisingthetemperature
ofdomesticdebatesaroundforeignpolicyissues.Onbalance,
astheseessayscollectivelysuggest,vigorousdemocraticdebate
andcompetitionwithinJapanwillbeimportantcontributorsto
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regionalandworldpeace.ButJapan,likeallmajoritariancountries,woulddowelltoembeditselfininternationalinstitutions
andtreatiestorestrainpotentiallyvolatilemajorities.

Notes
 e Japan-Russia Conﬂict.
 ImmanuelKant(inPerpetual Peace,794)heldouthopethataworld
oftradingnationswouldbepeacefullyinclined,becausetradegives
exporters an interest in the prosperity of importing nations. is
early statement of the “liberal peace” echoed Montesquieu’s views
aboutthepacifyingforceof“doux commerce.”
3 AsakawalettertoStokes,948.
4 JohnFerejohnandFrancesRosenbluthforthcoming,“WarlikeDemocracies,”Journal of Conﬂict Resolution.
5 isideaisatleastasoldasMontesquieu’slogicof“doux commerce”
(Spirit of the Laws, 75) and Immanuel Kant’s prescription for
perpetualpeace(Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,795).

PART ii
e Life and Work of
Asakawa Kan’ichi

2
Asakawa Kan’ichi’s American Journey:
Its Time and Place
in the History of Japan-US Relations
Agawa Naoyuki

is chapter will place Asakawa Kan’ichi in a historical context. More speciﬁcally, it will trace
Asakawa’sAmericanjourneyandtheevolutionoftherelationship between Japan and the United States for the ﬁrst one
hundredyearsofitsexistence.ItwillalsocompareAsakawa’s
backgroundinJapanandhisexperiencesinAmericawiththose
ofhiscontemporariesandreﬂectontheircollectivememories.
Dr. Asakawa Kan’ichi, the ﬁrst Japanese professor at Yale
University,isrememberedtodayasagreathistorianandprophet
whoforesawandwarnedagainstthedeteriorationofJapan-US
relationsandtheeventualclashbetweenthetwopowers.His
bookpublishedin909,Japan’s Crisis,1 criticizedJapan’spolicy
inManchuriaaftertheRusso-JapaneseWar.IturgedJapanto
continuetorespectChina’ssovereigntyandterritorialintegrity
aswellastoadheretotheprinciplesoftheopendoorandequal
marketopportunitiesinChina.
However, as the New Testament states, “No prophet is
accepted in his country.” (Luke 4:24.) Asakawa’s warning was
notheeded.HispleaforJapantoundertakealessselﬁshand
moreprincipledChinapolicydidnotresonateamonghisfellow
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Japanesecitizensandhadlittleimpactonthefuturecourseof
Japan’sforeignpolicy.
Worsestill,AsakawafeltincreasinglyisolatedatYaleinhis
personallife.Bornasonofasamuraishortlyafterthecollapse
ofShogun’sregime,heembarkedonhisstudiesatDartmouth
andYaleasapromisingyoungscholar.Heseemeddestined,on
hisreturnhome,tobecomeafutureleaderofayoungJapan.At
thetime,thebilateralrelationshipbetweenJapanandtheUnited
Stateswasstillataninnocent,romanticstage.
By the time Asakawa decided, for a variety of reasons, to
stayonintheUnitedStates,however,hefoundhimselfcaught
betweenthetwocountriesthathadalreadyceasedtobetrusting
friends.Rather,theyhadbeguntoperceiveandtreateachother
assuspiciousneighborsandpotentialenemies.Lateinhislife,
Asakawahadtowitnesshisprophecyproventobealltooaccurate.Fromadistance,hewatchedashishomecountryattacked
Pearl Harbor and was heavily bombed, including two atomic
bombsdroppedonHiroshimaandNagasaki.HesawJapanin
totaldevastationwhenthewarwasover.
Asakawaobservedandanalyzedthecourseofhistoryand
theforcesbehinditinanimpassionateandobjectivefashion.
At the same time, however, Asakawa was a product of that
history.AsakawabecametheAsakawaweknowtodaybecause
ofwhereandwhenhelivedinthehistoryofthebilateralrelationship.Hetriedtoovercometheinevitablecourseofhistory,
butwasalsoboundandlimitedbyit.
Andyet,Asakawawasnotamereprisoneroftheforcesof
historythatinitiallycausedthetwocountriestocontacteach
otherandeventuallyledthemtowar.Hewasneitherpowerless
norresignedtoit.Hetriedto,andbelievedthatwecouldtranscendthediﬀerencesanddiﬃcultiesbetweenthetwocountries
andachievesomethingmorelasting,moreuniversal,andmore
principled than the mere ﬂow of events might dictate. It is
preciselybecauseofhisguardedoptimismthatwecontinueto
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learnlessonsfromhisthoughtssixtyyearsafterhispassing.We
rememberthemaswetrytomaintainandimproveourbilateral
relationship in a global context. is is why his American
journeyisstillrememberedandcherished.

Asakawa’s American Journey and Japan-US Relations
Asakawa’slifeparallelstheﬁrstonehundredyearsofJapan-US
relations.OﬃcialJapan-USrelationsbeganwiththearrivalof
Commodore Perry and his East India Fleet in the Edo Bay in
53. Hence, the year 2003 was the 50th anniversary of that
visit.ese50yearsofthebilateralrelationshipcanbebroken
roughly into three ﬁfty-year periods: the ﬁrst period is from
53through9,thesecondfrom9through95,andthe
thirdfrom95through200.erelationshipcanbesaidtobe
initsfourthﬁfty-yearperiodatthepresenttime.
Asakawa lived through most of the ﬁrst two ﬁfty-year
periods. He was born in 4 in the town of Nihonmatsu,
Fukushima, approximately 30 miles north of Tokyo. It was
twentyyearsafterCommodorePerry’ssecondvisittoEdoBay
andtheconclusionoftheTreatyofKanagawa,theﬁrsttreaty
JapanenteredwithanyWesternpower.
He arrived in San Francisco in 95 for the purpose of
studyingatDartmouthCollege.ItwastheyearinwhichChina
cededTaiwantoJapanasaresultoftheSino-JapaneseWar,and
three years before Spain ceded the Philippines to the United
States as a result of the Spanish-American War. Because of
these respective territorial acquisitions, Japan and the United
Statessuddenlyfoundthemselvesphysicallyfacingeachother
acrossarelativelynarrowstrait,arealitythattransformedthe
natureofthebilateralrelationship.usbeganthesecondﬁftyyearperiod.
AsakawamarriedanAmericanwomanin905,theyearof
theBattleofTsushimaandJapan’svictoryintheRusso-Japanese
War. Two years later, he started teaching at Yale. He died in
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94,twoyearsaftertheendofthePaciﬁcWarandfouryears
beforeJapanregainedindependencetousherinthethirdﬁftyyearperiod.
Asakawa’s life began during the ﬁrst half of the ﬁrst ﬁftyyear period of Japan-US relations. is was a period during
whichJapanandtheUnitedStatescontinuedtodealwitheach
other in a manner that was mostly cordial and friendly. He
cametostudyintheUnitedStatestowardtheveryendofthis
ﬁrstperiod.
HeﬁnishedhiseducationatDartmouth,studiedattheYale
graduateschool,andreturnedtoDartmouthtoteach,allatthe
beginningofthesecondﬁfty-yearperiod.Whenhesubsequently
begantoteachatYale,heobservedandworriedthatAmerican
public opinion toward Japan had quickly turned from being
very favorable before and during the Russo-Japanese War to
being rather negative after the war. is was, he accurately
analyzed,becauseJapanhadtriedtomonopolizeManchuria.
Duringthisperiod,helosthisAmericanwife,failedtogeta
teachingpositioninJapan,andwasfrustratedthathewasnot
promoted to a full professorship at Yale, which did not come
until93.Hetriedtoavertthecomingwarbetweenthetwo
countriestonoavailbydraftingaletterfromPresidentRoosevelt to Emperor Hirohito in November 94. He saw the war
fromadistanceanddiedbeforethethirdﬁfty-yearperiodhad
started.
Inshort,Asakawapersonallywitnessedtheevolutionand
deterioration,successesandfailuresofthebilateralrelationship
duringtheﬁrstonehundredyearsofthebilateralrelationship.
Moreover,theseupsanddownsintherelationshipwereclosely
linkedtohispersonallife.

e Civil War of 1868–1869 and the Fate of Rebel Samurai
In this connection, it is important to note that Asakawa’s life
andhisAmericanjourneyweregreatlyimpactedbythethree
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wars that occurred during the ﬁrst one hundred years of the
bilateral relationship. ey are the Civil War of 6–69 in
Japan, the Russo-Japanese War of 904–905, and the Paciﬁc
Warof94–945.
esigniﬁcanceforAsakawaofthelattertwowarsrequires
no explanation. e Russo-Japanese War marked a turning
point in the history of the bilateral relationship. Asakawa
attendedthePortsmouthPeaceConferenceasanobserverand
seemstohaveplayedasigniﬁcantroleinformulatingthepeace
treaty,accordingtoDr.YabukiSusumu’sstudies.Itwasalsothe
aftermathofthiswarthatmadeAsakawadeeplyworriedover
thefuturecourseoftherelationship.ePaciﬁcWarwasthe
endresultofeverythingthatAsakawahadfearedbackin909
mighthappenbetweenhishomecountryandhishostcountry.
It is, however, the War of 6–69 in Japan that eventually
inducedandenabledAsakawaandmanyotheryoungJapanese
oftheperiodtocomeandstudyintheUnitedStates.
e arrival of the black ships led by Commodore Perry
destabilizedthepoliticalsituationinJapan.ealreadyweakenedShogungovernmenteventuallycollapsed.elastShogun
returned sovereignty to the emperor in 6. However, the
samurai from the south, who both supported and were supportedbytheemperor,hadnotyetbeguntoﬁght.Manywere
descendantsofthesamuraiwhohadfoughtagainstandlostto
the Tokugawa troops in the battle of 600. ey moved into
Edoin6,tookovertheShogun’scastlewithoutaﬁght,and
theredeclaredtheestablishmentoftheMeijigovernment.ey
thenmarchedontothenorth.
Samuraiinthenorth,whohadlongbeenloyaltotheTokugawa Shogunate, refused to surrender and decided to ﬁght
back.eWarof6–69wasthereforeawartodetermine
whetherthenewMeijigovernmentwastosurviveandsucceed
instartingthemodernEmpireofJapan.Intheend,theemperor’s
armyprevailed.eMeijiRestorationwasaccomplished.
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e victory of the emperor’s army in this war against the
troops loyal to the old Shogun regime, like the victory of the
UniontroopsfouryearsearlieragainsttheConfederatetroops
in the United States, meant profound changes in the lives of
thousandsofJapanesepeople.Itusheredinthemodernization
of Japan’s political and social systems. It kicked oﬀ a rapid
industrializationofJapan’seconomy.Itallowedacautiousand
guardedliberalizationofJapan’spolitics,religionsandculture
whilerestoringandreformulatingtheancientImperialsystem.
SamuraifromthefarawayprefecturesofSatsumaandChoshu
rosetothetopgovernmentpositionsinTokyointheirnewlydonnedwesternclothes.
Atthesametime,however,italsomeanthardshipforand
discrimination against those in the north who had fought on
theothersideofthecause.Infact,tothisdatetheirdeadhave
not been enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine. Having fought a
war against the emperor, they were labeled rebels. Like the
SouthernersintheReconstructioneraintheUnitedStates,the
northern samurai suﬀered callous and unjust treatment from
thenewgovernment.Itwasnaturalthattheyclungforalong
timetotheirbittermemoriesoftheWarof6–69.Someof
thosefeelingsstilllingertoday.
Incidentally, samurai in general, northern and southern,
didnotfarewellunderthenewMeijigovernment,exceptthose
whomanagedtoformaneweliteclasssurroundingtheemperor.
eylosttheirprivilegedstatusandidentityassamuraiinthe
newlyarrivedmodernsociety.Lowerclasssamuraiinparticular,
deprived of regular salaries based on the rice harvest, faced
severeeconomichardship.
In fact, many samurai from Satsuma and elsewhere who
fought as members of the emperor’s army during the War of
6–69failedtoadapttothenewsystemandfeltbetrayed.
SomeofthemeventuallyrebelledagainsttheMeijigovernment
and were brutally crushed by the regular army of the new
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regime in 0s. Many of the government soldiers who put
downtheSatsumarebellioninwereformerrebelsamurai,
who had been attacked by the Satsuma samurai eight years
earlier.
erefore, it was a handicap to be a son or daughter of a
poorsamuraiintheearlyMeijiera,especiallyifonewasfroma
former rebel prefecture in the North. ey had little hope of
joiningthenewMeijiestablishmentregardlessoftheirlevelof
educationandintellectualcapability.Naturally,theyhadtoﬁnd
anotherwaytoachievetheirrespectivegoals.Americaprovided
onesuchalternative.

Rebels’ Sons and Daughters Go to America
It is a curious phenomenon that many of the Japanese who
studiedintheUnitedStatesintheearlyMeijierawereindeed
the sons and daughters of those samurais who had fought on
thesideofShogunduringtheWarof6–69.Forinstance,
Sutematsu Yamakawa, who at age twelve was one of the ﬁve
younggirlstheMeijigovernmentsenttotheUnitedStatesto
study,wasactuallyadaughteroftheprimeministerservingthe
Lord of Aizu, a staunch supporter of Shogun. Tsuda Umeko,
who was Sutematsu’s best friend and the youngest of the ﬁve
girlssenttotheUnitedStates(shewasmerelysevenyearsold
whenthemissiondepartedYokohama),wasalsoadaughterofa
samuraiintheShogungovernment.Tsudastayedandstudied
in the United States for eleven years living with an American
family.SheconvertedtoChristianity,andreturnedtoJapanto
foundJapan’sﬁrstChristianwomen’scollege,TsudaCollege.
Nitobe Inazo, who later authored one of the most widely
readbooksonJapanintheUnitedStatesbeforeWorldWarii,
Bushido, e Soul of Japan, was a son of a samurai from
Morioka,aformerrebelprefecture.Oneofhisclassmatesatthe
SapporoAgriculturalCollegewasUchimuraKanzo,alsoason
ofasamuraifromthenorth.BothNitobeandUchimuralater
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went to study in the United States—Nitobe at Johns Hopkins
andUchimuraatAmherst.
Asakawa was a son of a samurai serving the Lordship of
Nihonmatsu,arebelprefecture.Hismother’slatehusband,the
onlysonoftheAsakawafamily,wasasamuraiandamemberof
a large, radical, anti-West group who was killed during an
armed rebellion in 64. His grandfather, the head of the
Asakawafamily,losthislifeﬁghtingtheemperor’sarmyduring
thesiegeoftheNihonmatsucastlein69.Inaprimogeniture
societysuchaspre-wwii Japan,thismeantthattheAsakawa
family would die out. erefore, Asakawa’s father, the second
sonofaseparatefamily,marriedhismotherandadoptedthe
Asakawaname,atraditionalwaytocontinuethefamily.
Of course, young Japanese from the winning side of the
Warof6–69alsowenttostudyabroad.Atthebeginning
oftheMeijiera,theJapaneseasawholewereextremelyeager
tolearnfromtheWest.Manywentabroadtostudy.However,
thosefromtheformerrebelprefectureshadanaddedincentive
togoabroad.
Asstatedabove,formerrebelshadamuchlowerchanceof
entering the new government and being appointed to high
positions.isdoesnotmean,however,theywerebannedfrom
the government. In fact, there were some notable cases of
formerrebelleadersbeingappointedashigh-rankingoﬃcials
intheMeijigovernment.Still,thenewgovernmentwas,forthe
mostpart,saturatedwithsamuraifromSatsuma,Choshu,and
other pro-Imperial prefectures. ey formed powerful and
inpenetratablefactionswithinthegovernment.Forthesamurai
of the former rebel prefectures, receiving a quality education
abroad and returning home with new scientiﬁc, engineering,
medical,andotheradvancedknowledge,aswellastheskillsto
speak and write a foreign language was an alternative way to
seekrewardingcareeropportunities.
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AmericahadsentalargenumberofmissionariestoJapan
to convert many of the samurai to Christianity and seemed a
naturaldestinationforJapaneseChristiansamurai.Infactsome,
likeUchimura,wereterriblydisappointeduponarrivaltoﬁnda
gilded-age America that was materialistic, corrupt, and ﬁlthy.
Hehadthoughthewouldencounterthe“cityonthehill,”aspiritualsanctuaryfullofpioussouls.
Nevertheless, America was a much more open and welcoming society than some European countries for the rebel
samurai’s sons and daughters. Most of the government sponsoredstudentswenttoEuropetostudywheretheyestablished
contacts with the elites of the host countries. Rebel samurai’s
sonshadnosuchcontactsandcouldnotcompetewiththeelite
Japanese students. In America, however, philanthropic Christians often volunteered to assist poor young students from
Japan, ﬁnancially or otherwise. ey did so particularly if the
studentsconfessedtheChristianfaith.NiijimaJo,thefounder
ofDoshishaUniversity,wenttoBostonin6withoutknowing
anybody there, and met Mr. and Mrs. Hardy, wealthy Boston
merchantsandactiveChristianphilanthropists.Impressedwith
Niijima’sdeterminationtostudyChristianity,theypaidforall
hiseducationalexpensesatPhillipsAcademy,AmherstCollege,
and the Andover eological Seminary. Financial assistance
fromAmericanChristianswasagreathelptothepoorsamurai
studentsfromJapan.
Moreover,Japanesestudentswithoutadequateeducational
fundscouldﬁndjobsinAmericatopayforatleastpartoftheir
tuition,fees,andlivingexpenses.KatayamaSen,alaterCommunist who died in Stalin’s Moscow in 933, worked his way
throughvariousAmericancollegesbetween4and96and
publishedabookonhisreturntoJapanentitledA Guidebook
for America.2 In it, he urged young Japanese to study in the
UnitedStatesbecause,ashestated,“Americahassympathyfor
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those poor students who have a strong desire to study.” He
continued:
ose who were born in log cabins and shined shoes
yesterdayarenowcabinetsecretaries.Youstudents,youwho
donotmindhardwork.GotoAmerica!Americawillprovide
youwithanopportunityforstudying.3

is message must have sounded enchanting to the rebel
samurai’ssonswhowerepoor,buteagertostudy.

Asakawa Arrives in the United States
ItiswiththisbackgroundandtraditionthatAsakawaarrivedin
America in 95. His father, a rebel samurai, and his second
mother, a Shinto priest’s daughter (his mother died when he
wasthree),toldhimthestoriesofhisfamilymembers,relatives,
andfriendsﬁghtingagainsttheemperor’sarmy.eyinstilled
in him a classical education and samurai spirit. He became a
persevering,stoical,andhard-workingyoungadult.
HereceivedtrainingintheEnglishlanguagefromaBritish
teacherandconvertedtoChristianitybeforedepartingforthe
UnitedStateswiththeguidanceofYokoiTokio,aYale-educated
minister, himself a son of a famous samurai scholar, Yoko
Shonani.Yokoi’sfriendintheUnitedStates,WilliamTucker,
thepresidentofDartmouthCollege,becameAsakawa’ssponsor
atDartmouthandYale.
Needless to say, Asakawa became a reputable scholar
becauseofhisintellectualabilityandhardwork.Butthathard
workwasrootedinhissamuraitradition.Inshort,hewasaﬁne
exampleofarebelsamurai’ssongoingtostudyintheUnited
States.
Asakawa,however,arrivedintheUnitedStatesalittlelate
to carry out the simple, happy story of a samurai’s son going
eastandcominghomeasuccessstory.Nitobe,Katayamaand
Uchimura had all started their study in the United States in
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4, some ten years before Asakawa. ey tended to have
positiveviewsofAmerica.True,Uchimurawasindeeddeeply
disappointed with the reality of the seemingly materialistic,
gambling,violent,corrupt,andrace-discriminatingAmerican
society in the 0s. But that was partly because before his
arrivalinAmericahehadmistakenlyvisualizeditasaholyland
fullofpiousspirits.NitobeandKatayamaalsofacedtheirshare
ofdiscrimination,suﬀeredeconomichardships,andfeltisolated
whileintheUnitedStates.Nevertheless,theytalkedpositively
about America when they went home. eir experiences in
Americawereoverallfruitful,stimulating,andrewarding.
AsakawafeltpositiveaboutAmerica,too.Hewroteaseries
ofarticlesforaJapanesemagazineabouthisinitialexperiences
atDartmouth.Hepraisedhisphysicallyandspirituallyhealthy
fellow students, appreciating how welcoming they were to a
studentfromanislandkingdomintheFarEast.Helaterlisted
strongpointsofAmericansinhisbook,Japan’s Crisis. Inthat
sense,hewasaproductoftheﬁrstﬁfty-yearperiodofthebilateralrelationshipwhenthetwocountriesandtwopeopleslooked
ateachotherpositively.Racialdiscriminationmayhaveexisted
in some circumstances against Asians, but Americans as a
wholelookedfavorablyandpositivelyatJapanandtreatedthe
Japanesewell.
isgenerallyfavorableenvironmentforJapanesestudents
tostudyandworkbegantochangesoonafterAsakawa’sarrival
intheUnitedStates.iswaspartlybecauseboththeUnited
States and Japan had begun to play much bigger roles in the
internationalpowergameintheFarEast.iswasalsobecause
ofamoreorganizedanti-JapanesemovementontheWestCoast
oftheUnitedStatesthatcenteredontheexclusionofJapanese
immigrants. e two countries were no longer romanticized
andbenevolentstrangerstoeachother,butpotentiallythreateningrivals.us,thesecondﬁfty-yearperiodbegan.
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Asakawa during the Second ﬁfty-year Period
Asakawa was keenly aware of this change in the American
public’sperceptionofthebilateralrelationship.HewaspersonallyinvolvedinaneﬀorttoimproveAmericanpublicopinion
toward Japan in connection with Japan’s going to war with
Russia.Asakawaconductedaseriesoflectures,wrotearticles,
andpublishedabookinEnglish,e Russo-Japanese Conﬂict:
Its Causes and Issues,4 supporting Japan’s position during the
war.HismainmessagewasthatJapanwasﬁghtingthiswarto
protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as
equalmarketopportunitiesforallpowersinChina.Heassured
the Americans that Japan had no territorial ambition and no
intenttomonopolizeManchuria.
Afterthewar,however,thereweresignsthatJapanwasnot
going to keep its promises. Japan began to monopolize Manchuria. American views of Japan changed. is came as very
badnewsforAsakawa.Inhisletterin90toOkumaShigenobu,
his mentor and founder of his alma mater, Waseda, Asakawa
pointed out that “a sudden shift in American opinion toward
Japanisanunbelievablephenomenon,onethathasnoprecedent
sincethebeginningofhistory.”5 Deeplydismayed,hepublished
abookinJapanese,Japan’s Crisis, in909,warninghisfellow
JapanesethatthedirectionJapanwasheadingwasadangerous
pathtotake,onethatwouldeventuallyleadtoaconfrontation
withtheUnitedStates.Asakawa’swarningwentunheeded.
With such a drastic change of mood, he seems to have
becomedisillusionedwithhisexperienceinsupportingJapan’s
decisiontogotowaragainstRussiaonlytobebetrayedbyhis
owngovernmentafterthewar.AccordingtoIgarashiTakashi,
hevoicedhisskepticismaboutvariouseﬀortsbysomeJapanese
intellectuals to regain the trust of Americans and to improve
the American public opinion toward Japan.6 In his letter to
OkumaShigenobuin93,hecategoricallystated:
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Many of the exchange programs [including Japan-US
ExchangeProfessorshipProgram,theJapanSocietyinNew
Yorkand“Ki’itsuKyokai,”aJapaneseprivateassociationdedicatedtotheconvergenceoftheWesternandEasternphilosophyandreligions]areshallowincontent,engagedonlyin
temporary socializing activities, and have extremely weak
foundational principles. True [American] intellectuals will
laughatthem,causingmoreharmthangood.7

Hethuscriticizedothers’eﬀortstoimprovetherelationship
through dialogues, admittedly in a somewhat condescending
manner. He himself, however, decided not to be personally
involvedinpublicdiplomacyanymore.InhislettertoaYanai
Yasushiin92,hestated:
Inrecentyears,afewJapanese(includingexchangeprofessorNitobe)begantodiscusscurrentJapanesesituations.
eydoitbecausethereisnoothertodoit,whichworries
me.Imyself,however,wouldratherthatothersdidit,forI
amintheprocessofconcentratingonmyresearchinaneven
moreaccurateandpurelyacademicmanner.Nomatterhow
hard one tries to deal with current issues, the [American]
listeners would take my presentations with the assumption
that I am not free from Japanese biases. If so, even if such
eﬀortsattracttheattentionofmany,andevenifthatisgood
forJapan,theywillbeoflittleacademicvalue.Beneﬁtsfrom
such undertakings, if any, are of temporary nature and
doubtfulvalue.atiswhatIexperiencedthroughmylectures
and writings during and after the Russo-Japanese War. …
Such speeches and publications are not expected to have a
longtermimpactonJapan-USrelations.8

Coinciding with his disillusionment with Japan’s foreign
policy and his decision to concentrate on academic work,
Asakawa had to face a series of hardships in his personal life
during the second ﬁfty-year period. First, his American wife,
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Miriam,passedawayin93.eyhadbeenmarriedforonly
eightyearsandtheyhadnochildren.Asakawawasleftalone.
Five years after Miriam’s death, he met Sophia Arabella
Irwin in Tokyo and fell in love with her. Bella, as she was
called,wasborninJapanin3.HerfatherwasanAmerican
businessman and her mother a Japanese woman whom her
father met in the early days of Meiji in Yokohama. Asakawa
askedBellatomarryhim,butBelladidnotsayyes.Hedidnot
give up and continued to court her love across the sea until
924whensheﬁnallydeclined.Asakawawasdevastated.
AsakawaactivelytriedtogetajobinJapanwithoutsuccess.
is was perhaps partly because he was lonely after Miriam’s
death and partly because he was willing to move to Tokyo if
Bella said yes. One year after Miriam’s death, when Okuma
becameprimeministerofJapan,Asakawawrotealettertohim
indicating that he would be happy to go home and work for
Japan in whatever ﬁeld if he could be involved in important
nationalmatters.9 Healsowroteaseriesoflettersbetween920
and924tohismentor,TsubouchiShoyo,requestingateaching
position at Waseda.10 Asakawa complained that he had very
fewstudentstowhomhecouldteachJapanesehistoryatYale
andexpressedhisbeliefthathewouldbemoreusefullyengaged
at Waseda. Despite repeated and sometimes desperate pleas,
Asakawa’s request was not granted. He stopped writing for a
teaching position after 924, when Bella ﬁnally refused his
proposal.
AsakawawasalsounhappyaboutthewayYaletreatedhim
as a teacher. He was appointed a full-time lecturer at Yale in
90andpromotedtoAssistantProfessorofEastAsianHistory
in 90. After World War I, Yale faced some serious ﬁnancial
diﬃcultiesand,in92,hissalarywascutinhalf,tolessthan
whatithadbeenatDartmouthbetween902and90.Hewas
hard-pressedﬁnanciallyandunderstandablyeagertomoveto
Wasedaatthetime.HeﬁnallywasmadeAssistantProfessorof
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History in 92 and was promoted to Associate Professor of
History in 930. However, he was then appointed Research
AssociateinHistoryin933.Asakawatookthisasademotion
and in 936 wrote a letter complaining about this decision to
thepresidentofYale,J.R.Angel:
e matter concerns the title Research Associate which
wasgrantedtomesometimeago.Peoplewouldsaythatit
wasapromotionofinsuredpermanencyoftenure.ForthatI
amthankful.IaminﬁnitelygratefultotheUniversity,andto
thiscountryingeneral,…
[Despite my dedication to Yale] I ﬁnd myself, probably
deﬁnitively,adornedwithatitlewhichisspecialandbelongs
toasidecorridor.Iseeitisanhonor;but,inlightofmylong
strivingtobeworthyofaplaceinthemainroster,thetitle
meanstomeanignominiousdefeat….
[N]one[ofmyfellowJapanesescholars]couldescapethe
impressionthatIhadbeenside-trackedorshelved.Andtheir
interpretation?eymayeitherattributethistomypersonal
deﬁciency, which interpretation can be no more than of
personalsigniﬁcance,orascribeittoanenormityinothers,
an interpretation which I should fear to translate in bare
terms.…[A]cordingtothesecond[interpretation],Imight
escapepersonalreproachatthecostofadangerousprejudice
attributedtoquarterswhereitdidnotexist.Andyetthose
who entertained this thought might think that it only conﬁrmedtheinferencethathadgraduallybeenstrengthenedin
theirmindsbysuccessiveeventsthathaveoccurredinother
relations.…11

AsakawaisvaguelyhintingthathisfellowJapanesewould
interpret this decision as an instance of racial discrimination
against a Japanese professor at Yale. Perhaps because of this
letter, he was ﬁnally made Professor of History in 93, thirty
yearsafterhestartedteachingatYale.
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ereisnoindicationwhatsoeverthathewassubjectedto
racialdiscriminationatYale.Infact,Yaletreatedhiminamost
cordialandprofessionalmannertohislastday.However,even
Asakawa may have suspected that there could have been a
racialreasonwhyhewasnotpromotedtoafullprofessorship
forsuchalongtime.
In fact, it appears that Asakawa was sometimes overwhelmedbytheswellingofanti-JapanesefeelingsintheUnited
States,amongboththegeneralpublicandpolicymakersduring
this period. He knew that Japan’s policy towards China was
oftenasourceofthenegativeAmericanpublicopiniontoward
Japan.Forinstance,hewrotealetterin95toPrimeMinister
OkumaandwarnedagainstAmericanreactiontoJapan’slease
intheShandongpeninsulainChina,succeedingtotheGerman
interest there before wwi.12 He was outraged when Japan
submitted a note to China listing twenty-one items of mostly
unreasonabledemandssoonthereafter.
Nevertheless, he seems to have felt that Japan’s policy in
Chinawasnottheonlycauseforagrowingnegativesentiment
towardJapan.Hewrotealetterin92toHaniwaraMasanao,
Japan’sdeputyforeignministerandrepresentativetotheWashington conference, and Hayashi Gonsuke, Japan’s ambassador
to the United Kingdom, and told them that widespread antiJapanese feeling in the West was a result of an international
Jewishconspiracy.
IfImayfreelyexpressmyguess,thispowerfulgrouphas
an objective of expanding its inﬂuence worldwide. Its one
temporary,butimportant,tacticistheexclusionofJapan.In
ordertodoso,itaimsatseveringtheAnglo-Japanalliance
and isolating Japan at the proposed [Washington] international conference. en, it will seek to thwart Japan’s
economicandpoliticalexpansionand,ifnecessary,willstop
foreign investment in Japan. … Which group is it? It is the
Jews.13
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HereferredinaseparatelettertoHaniwaratotheProtocol
of the Elders as translated by Henry Ford.14 Although he
correctlyconcludedthatthiswasafake,heneverthelessstated
that it explained Jewish objectives rather well. Whether he
receivedsomeanti-SemiticinﬂuencefromhisfellowAmericans
at Yale and whether he genuinely believed it, one cannot tell.
Nevertheless,itisshockingtoﬁndthesameAsakawa,whohad
writtenJapan’s Crisis andsocalmlyanalyzedinternationalpolitics,advocatingsuchnakedanti-Semiticfeelings.
Incidentally,itisinterestingtonotethattheJapanesewho
came to America later than Asakawa in the second ﬁfty-year
periodhadamorerealistic,butmuchlesssympatheticattitude
towardAmerica.Forinstance,TaniJoji,apopularwriterwho
spent six years in America between 9 and 924, had very
diﬀerent views on this country. He came to study at Oberlin
Collegeatageeighteen.Hequicklydroppedoutofcollegeand
workedonavarietyofmenialjobs,suchashotelbellboy,sailor,
butler,andwaiter,throughouttheUnitedStates.Intheprocess,
he got to know many Japanese immigrants at the bottom of
Americansociety.WhenhereturnedtoJapan,hewroteaseries
ofstoriescollectivelyentitled,e American Japs,15 inahumorous yet critical fashion. To him, discrimination against barely
English-speaking,poor,uneducatedJapaneseimmigrantswasa
fact of life in the 920s, and something that one had to cope
witheveryday.atwasnotaperspectiveAsakawacouldhave
had.
Inshort,thesecondﬁfty-yearperiodwasadiﬃculttimefor
Asakawa,bothpersonallyandintermsoftheoverallbilateral
relationship. Yet he did not give up the hope that the worst
could be averted. at is why he continued to write to Japan
and volunteered to draft a letter to the emperor in 94 on
behalfofPresidentRoosevelt(whodidnottakeuptheoﬀer).
Hiseveryeﬀortandwarningwereultimatelyfutile.eJapanese
attackedPearlHarboronDecember,94.
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Conclusion
Inasense,Asakawawasluckytobewherehewasduringthe
SecondWorldWar.Hedidnothavetoﬁght,nordidhehaveto
starve.Althoughhewasanenemyalien,hewasnotforcedto
leavetheUnitedStates.Hisfreedomwasmostlyunrestricted.
Hecontinuedtoteach.
AfterAsakawaretiredfromYalein942,hecontinuedhis
quietretiredlifeoncampus.HeheardthenewsthatJapanhad
acceptedthePotsdamDeclarationandsurrenderedtotheAllied
PowersinAugust945.Bythistime,hehadreﬂectedonhislife
andthetumultuousnatureofthebilateralrelationshipthathad
shapedhisownjourney.Heputhisreﬂectionsinhisdiaryin
EnglishonJanuary,946:
Asonereadsawholesettogetherofone’sownpast
records of self-reﬂection, an unavoidable feeling is one
of revulsion from the impression one receives of one’s
having taken oneself too seriously for these successive
years. e erstwhile person appears to have regarded
himselfasademigod,acenteroftheuniverse.16

Asakawaknewthatsometimeshehadbeentoorigid,too
serious,toosamurai-likeinthepast.Hehadalwaysbeenlogical
andpersuasive,buthenowseemedtorealizethatthatwasnot
enough to persuade others to take certain actions. at was
certainlythecasewithBellawhenheaskedhertomarryhim.It
mayhavebeenthesamewithhisfellowJapaneseandAmerican
citizenswhenhetriedtopersuadethemnottoﬁght.
OneofthemostreﬂectivepassagesamongAsakawa’swritingsisfoundinaletterhewrotetoawomanknownasG.W.in
July946:
Nowinthisseasonoftheyear,lateSpringandearly
Summer, I feast my eyes with another marvelous sight
oneverybrightafternoonaroundsixo’clock,whenthe
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sunlight falls nearly horizontally. Shadows of dogwood
treesarecastuponthewallsdirectlybehindthem.ese
trees are not particularly pretty as a rule, but their
shadows!Whatbeautyofeverylineofthem:thecurves
andforksoftrunksandlimbs,theindividualleavesand
their ensemble! ese shadows have opened my eye to
the real beauty hidden in the humble tree itself, and
educatedmedeeplytorespectit.17

Inthisletter,thereisanabsenceofthetonefoundinmany
of the letters and writings of Asakawa—desperately trying to
achievesomething,bothinhispersonallifeandinthebilateral
relationship.eworldcontinuedon.HesoundsliketheTang
dynastyChinesepoetDuFu,whorecited:“enationshattered,
mountains and river remain;/city in spring, grass and trees
burgeoning.”(translationbyBurtonWatson)
WerememberAsakawaasagreathistorianandaprophet.
In these capacities, he was a great man. And yet, it may be
ﬁttingtorememberhimasanindividual,arebelsamurai’sson,
who struggled through diﬃcult times between Japan and the
UnitedStates.Hewasimperfectinmanyways.Hewasclumsy
insomeways.Hemademistakes.Hewassometimespreachy
and condescending, the very negative characteristics that he
oftenattributedtotheAmericans.
And yet, he was sincere. He tried to overcome his weaknesses.Henevergaveuptryingtoovercomethegapbetween
the two countries, on a personal as well as national level. He
neverceasedtobeanoptimist.Hemayhavebeenlonely,but,in
theend,hewascontent.Hedidnotseethebilateralrelationship
regainitsmomentumafterthewar,butdeepdownhemayhave
sensedit.atwashisAmericanjourney.
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Asakawa Kan’ichi as an
Economic Historian of Medieval Japan
Kambayashi Ryo
Hamada Koichi

Modern scholarship has converged on
the views of medieval Japan espoused long ago by Asakawa
Kan’ichi:thatthemedievaleconomywasdecentralized,contractual, and multilayered. is view has not always prevailed. In
the160s,MarxisthistoriansIshimodaTadashiandNagahara
Keijiassertedthattherelationshipbetweenlordsandpeasants
wasthatofanoppressiveserfdom(No-do).1 Nagaharadidnot
citeAsakawa’sopinion,eitherbecauseofignoranceorbecause
heregardeditasevidencethatwascountertohisowntheory.
Meanwhile, the English language literature on medieval
Japan, written during the 160s by John Hall, Jeﬀrey Mass,
EdwinReischauer,andothers,maintainedthatJapanesefeudalism was quite similar to decentralized western European
feudalism,becausetherelationshipbetweenseigniorandtenant
was mutual.2 ey based their analyses in large part on their
understandingofAsakawa’sbooksandarticles.
Asakawahimself,however,maintainedthatJapanesefeudalism was quite diﬀerent from Western feudalism. He pointed
outthatmedievalJapanwasacomplicatedsocietythatallowed
multiplelegalprinciplestocoexistandthatthefeudalsystemin
Japan was transitional and unstable. Asakawa found more
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e galitarian, horizontal relationships by observing the actual
documentsoftheIrikivillage.
Sincethe170s,asareactionagainstMarxisthistoriography,
Amino Yoshihiko, Fujiki Hisashi, and other Japanese scholars
havedevelopedadiﬀerentviewaboutJapanesefeudalism.ey
contend that the feudal system in Japan was basically more
liberalthanhadbeenassumedbyscholars,particularlythosein
the Ko-za-Ha school represented by Nagahara. Amino developedanantithesistotheMarxiantheory,inwhichheshowed
thatmanyfarmers“votedwiththeirfeet”toenterintocontractualrelationswithlandownersormanagerssuchasmonasteries
and noble families. In exchange for protection, farmers paid
theseownersandmanagersaportionoftheirharvests. Inthis
view,Aminoechoedathesisthathadbeenpreviouslydeveloped
inAsakawa’swork.3
Asakawa’sworkhasnowreceivedthepositivereevaluation
thatitdeserves.Inthechapterthatfollows,weprovideasketch
of Asakawa’s view of Japanese economic history and brieﬂy
consider the implications for our understanding of Japan’s
economic roots. We focus on the formation of feudal institutions,themainstaysinJapan’shistory,inparticulartheerasof
HeianandKamakura.eissuesbelowareregardedastopics
ofeconomichistory,but,atthesametime,theyarealsopartof
legal history because they involve the nature of contracts
betweentenants,warriors,andthestate.Fromawiderperspective,theissuesconcerningthehistoryofpoliticaleconomyare
crucialbecausetheyinvolvethediscussionofsocialclassesand
thetotalpoliticalstructureofthemedievalageinJapan.4

Taika Reform and the Land System.
In65a.d.,thesocalledTaikaReformersattemptedtoreorganizeJapan’seconomicandlegalframeworkbasedonseveral
keyinstitutionalfeaturesimportedfromChina.ebasicprin-
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ciplesoftheRitsuryoSystem thenintroducedcanbesummarizedinseveralcomponents.5
1. All the land was owned by the state in the name of the
emperor.
2. Acentralizedadministrativegovernmentwasestablished.
. All farmland was rendered to the state and re-allotted to
theowners(Han-den-Shu-ju).
. Land was organized into hamlets or villages (Sato) with
unitsof50houses.
5. e government created new local governments led by a
governor(Koku-shi)whowaschosennotsomuchaccording
to clan (uji) connections but by political considerations.
usthereformattemptedtoeclipsethetraditionalclans
that had been in power and concentrate power in the
emperorandhis(her)entourages.
ereformsucceededpoliticallyinweakeningtheoldclans
in favor of the emperor. It failed as an economic reform,
however,formanyreasons.
First, the agricultural technology that produced rice and
miscellaneouscerealsduringthemedievalperiodwasundeveloped.Itrequiredrotationfarming,and,becauseoftheuneven
orderofcultivation(Kata-Arashi)orbadweather,aconsiderable
portionoflandwasleftinanunstablecondition.etenants
readilyleftandabdicatedtheirresponsibilities.elandallotmentsmadebytheTaikaReformeasilybecamewasteland.In
short, the rules did not ﬁt well with small-scale farming. Of
course,agriculturaltechnologyprogressedduringthemedieval
period,butthepaceofprogressremainsasubjectofcontroversy.
Second,thecapacityofthegovernmentswaslimited.Not
only the central government but also the provincial oﬃces
lackedsuﬃcientadministrativecapabilitytokeeppacewiththe
changingconditionsoflandandtenants.Althoughthepurpose
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of the reform was to increase incentives for reclaiming the
wastelandratherthanreinvestingintensivelyinthedirectapplication of an economic and legal system from the Chinese
dynasty, the foreign system was not appropriate for the environmentinJapan,anditthereforefailed.

e Development of
Manorial Lands (“Sho, Shoen”) in the Heian Period
AsanaturalreactiontothefailureoftheRitsuryoSystem,the
JapanesemanoriallandsystemknownasSho madeitsmodest
appearance in the 8th century and evolved through the 12th
century.Scholarsdistinguishtwotypesofmanors.
e ﬁrst is Immune Sho.6 Once a piece of land had been
registeredbythegovernment,undertheRitsuryoSystemitwas
directly controlled by imperial, or central, institutions. is
formalpracticedidnotprovidesuﬃcientincentiveforpeasants
to pursue productive activities because of the ever present
possibility that provincial governments would intervene or
conﬁscate their land. In the presence of an excess supply of
tenants,theprovincialgovernors(Koku-shi),forexample,were
motivatedtoabusetheuseoflandforshort-termproﬁt.Accordingly,thegovernmentbegantocollectaﬁrsttaximmunityfor
part of newly cultivated land (Men-den) and subsequently
declared“administrativeimmunity”forapartoftheland.
esecondisSho of private origin.Farmerscouldcultivate
unused land, but it was typically beneﬁcial for them not to
registerthelandwiththegovernment.Withoutauthorization
bythegovernment,however,neighborsandbanditscouldpilfer
cropsandstealtheland.Toprotecttheirland,farmersentrusted
or released partial rights to the land to the patronage of a
personwithinﬂuenceortoaninstitutionthatplayedtheroleof
aseignior(Ryo-ke).is“commendation”ofland(Ki-shin)was
a kind of mutual contract, which transferred partial rights of
landanddeﬁnedtheobligationoftheparties.Asakawapoints
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out, “ey divided and redivided landed interest, it would be
seen,asfarastheydared,andconveyedthemfrompersonto
person with great freedom” (Asakawa 118, 85). For example,
whentheﬁrstpatronagedidnothaveenoughinﬂuencetoward
oﬀinvasionoftherightstotheland,anownerrecommended
partial-partialrightstoapersonofhigherinﬂuence(Hon-ke).
Usually (functionally) divided rights of land are called Shiki
(taskorauthorityinspeciﬁcfunctionsofadministration),and
themaincorpusoftheSho systemwasthecomplicatednexus
ofShiki.
esetwooriginsofSho werelogicallyindependentofeach
other,andSho of private origin wasnotnecessarily“immune.”
Bythe12th century,eachofthesetwokindsofSho accounted
forabouthalfofallJapaneseﬁelds.
Sincefarmershadachoicetoregisterapartoftheirnewly
cultivatedlandwiththegovernmentinexchangeforimmunity,
or with a private institution with speciﬁed assignments to the
Shiki,thedistinctionbetweenthetwooriginsappearedtobea
simpledecision:towhomshouldfarmersreleasetheirrightsto
protecttheirland,toprivatepersonsorgovernments?Weshould
remember,however,therelationshipsconnectingacommendor
andacommendee werelegallydiﬀerentinthetwosystems.On
theonehand,therelationshipinSho of private origin wasunder
bilateralandprivatecontract.Ontheotherhand,theimmunity
wasgrantedbythepublicauthorityofimperialinstitutions.e
scholarshipofJapanesehistory,asexpressedinAsakawa’swork
andintheworkofhispredecessor,NakadaKaoru,insistsitis
importanttorecognizethedistinctionbetweenthetwotypesof
originsandalsothetwotypesofnexusintheSho system.7
e relationship between the government and a seignior
becamecrucialtothemanagementofanindividualSho. Normally
aseigniorhadpersonalservantscalledGe-nin.Asakawastressed
that seigniors used the transfer of Shiki as rewards to servants
(On-kyu)andexplained,“esurrenderofashiki byoneperson
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of a lower station to another of a higher was termed ki-shin,
which may be translated almost literally as ‘commendation’; a
shiki grantedbyahigherpersontoalower,forthepurposeeither
ofthemanagementoroftheeconomicexploitationofthesho,
wasoftenknownason-kyu meaningbenevolentgift,forwhich
weshallusethetermbeneﬁce.Itwillatoncebeobservedthat
therewasawidediﬀerence,intheirinstitutionalorigin,between
commendationandconferringofbeneﬁce”(Asakawa11,11).
IntheHeianperiod,theSho systemhadbeenconstructed
as a network of Shiki often through voluntary divisions and
transfersofShiki, andsometimesbycoercionoftransformation.
us,thereweretwomainoriginsforexchangesofShiki:imperialinstitutionsandprivatemutualcontracts.Inaddition,there
wasanothersub-origin:thegrantingofpersonalrewards.

e Role of Warriors in the Kamakura Period
Generally it is diﬃcult to deﬁne the term “feudal system”
preciselybecausethishistoricalconceptthatoriginallycomes
frommedievalEuropehasbeeninterpretedinmanydiﬀerent
waysandabusedeverywhereintheworld.Ofcoursethereare
deﬁnitionsoffeudalismbyscholarsincludingMaxWeber,Karl
Wittfogel,andothers.Asakawaassertsthatthemainpointof
feudal society is the connection between warriors and land
rights,andheproposesthreenecessaryconditionsofthefeudal
system(Asakawa118,78–7):
1. erulingclassshouldconsistofgroupsofﬁghtingmen,
eachgroupchainedtogetherbylinksofapersonalbondof
mutualservice.
2. edivisionofalltheclasses,includingthewarriorclass,
shouldcoincidewiththeirprivatetenuresofland.
. Inthegeneralpoliticallifeofthesocietyasawholethese
private tenures of land should condition the exercise of
publicrightandobligations;andthesuperiorrightsofland
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shouldfallintothehandsoftheprivatelyarmedmen,who
shouldaccordinglyassumeallthepublicfunctionsofstate.
In Japan, the groups of warriors have been called Bu-shi,
andtheyestablishedtheirown“state”inKamakurain112.e
governanceduringtheKamakuraperiodandinthefollowing
periods when governments were ruled by ﬁghting men or
warriorsareoftencalled“feudalsystems”inJapanesestyle.
eSho-gun retainedvassals,orGo-ke-nin, whoprovided
militaryservice.8 isrelationshipwasoriginallypersonal,onesided,anddemandedalmostunconditionalobedience(Chu-gi).
Itdidnotlogicallyincludeamutualeconomiccontract.Ine
Documents of Iriki,Asakawacomments,“Beforetheprevalence
ofthetrueﬁef,thegroundsforloyaltytoone’slordwasmore
purely personal and moral and less material than in the later
ages” (p. 5). e mutual contractual element in the feudal
systeminJapancameaboutwhenthispatriarchalrelationship
began to utilize the transfers of Shiki to reward the vassals’
service(Go-on-Ho-ko)inpersonalrelationshipsintheseignior
families. e lord-vassal absolute relationship came ﬁrst, and
thenthecommendation-patronageelementssupplementedit.
Atthesametime,becausetheShogunatepossessedoneof
the strongest inﬂuences, some seigniors as well as cultivators
commended their partial rights to ask the Shogunate for its
patronage (Hon-ryo-An-do). In this case, the commendationpatronagerelationshipcameﬁrst,andthelord-vassalrelationshipfollowed.
In short, the patriarchal lord-vassal relationship became
intertwined with the commendation-patronage relationship,
and,asaresult,thefeudalsysteminmedievalJapanemerged.
AsAsakawacomments,“Whensomeofthe[shiki]eventually
passed into the hands of the private warrior—another independentandpartlyillegalproductoftheage–feudaldevelopmentsbecameatlengthpossible”(Asakawa12,).
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e Centralization of Feudal Japan
NotonlyAsakawabutalsoalmosteveryhistorianhasobserved
atrendtowardcentralizationinmedievalJapan.AlthoughShiki
hadbeenfreelytradeableunderapatriarchalrelationship,the
transferability of Shiki became limited during the Kamakura
period, even in cases where the land had originally been
commendedorcontributedbythevassals.
e rights of a vassal as a land steward (Ji-to-Shiki) were
limited. e vassal was not given complete command of the
territory,andthetenantsheldsomepartialremainingrightsto
theland.osevassalswhooriginallyhadbeenpersonalsubordinatesandhadbeensubsequentlygivenShiki didnothavea
strongcommandoftheactualeconomiclifeintheirterritory.
eKamakuraShogunate,theMinamoto-family,wasregionally
based in the eastern part of Japan. After the fall of the Taira
family, many eastern vassals were given Shiki of western
provinces in Japan, but their power as landlords was quite
limited. Irikiin, the source of e Documents of Iriki, was an
excellent example of this kind of territory. Of course, those
vassals who commended their land to a Shogunate generally
hadastrongerinﬂuenceintheirownterritory.
Although the rights of land stewards were limited, they
gradually gathered or centralized several Shiki, which were
relatedtocertaindomainstobuildupthetotalownershipofa
pieceofland(Ichi-en-Chi-gyo).Butthecentralizationoffeudal
Japan progressed slowly. ere were still Shiki-holders who
were subject to social relationships other than the one-sided
lord-vassal relationship. For example, imperial institutions as
wellastheirtenantskepttheirownShiki overtheterritory,and
they were not vassals of the Shogunate. In addition, Japan
encounterednoinvadersfromforeigncountriesexceptforthe
failedMongolianattacks(Gen-ko)attheendofthe1th century.
erewaslittlecompellingneedtoconstructastrongcentralizedmilitaryorganization.
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AsakawanotesthatthecentralizationoffeudalJapanwas
completedbytheendofthe16th centurybythe“uniﬁers,”Oda
NobunagaandToyotomiHideyoshi.9 ereisstillcontroversy
among scholars regarding the timing of the completion. It is
commonknowledge,however,thatfeudalJapanmadeslowbut
steadyprogresstowardcentralization.

Asakawa’s Legacy in
Current and Prospective Studies in Economic History
Asakawa’s views about the transitional nature of feudal Japan
suggestfascinatingavenuesforfutureresearch.
1. ere were two contrasting relationships: one based on
one-sided personal obedience and the other on mutual
economic contracts. Many historians, including Asakawa
himself, assumed that the former dominated the latter
throughoutmedievalhistory.Wasitpossiblethatthebeneﬁt
ofmutualeconomiccontractsoutweighedtheadoptionof
aneﬃcientformofinstitutioninmedievalJapan?Economicsseeseverysocialinteractionthatdevelopsasbasedon
linesthatrationalitydictates.Familyinteractions,criminal
interactions,andevenloveinteractionsfollowthislogic.In
this respect it would be interesting to understand why a
one-sidedpersonalobediencerelationship,whichcouldbe
ineﬃcient,continuedtothriveinmedievalJapan.
2. efeudalsystemandtheintensityofagriculturalinnovationsmaynothavehadunilateralcausality,butitispossible
toconsiderthattheydevelopedsimultaneously.Considerable controversy remains about the degree of agricultural
innovationthatoccurredinthelatterhalfofthe12th century
inmedievalJapan.iswasbeforethewarriorsestablished
theirowngovernment.AccordingtoFurushimaToshioand
KimuraShigemitsu,amongothers,Japanesefeudalismhad
developed because of major agricultural innovations. e
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oppositehypothesismaintainsthatagriculturaldevelopment
wasdelayeduntilthe17th centurybecausepoliticalcentralizationwascrucialforpropertyrights.Moreworkremains
tobedonetosortoutthesecompetinghypotheses.

Notes
1 ForexampleseeKeiji161and10andIshimoda16.
2 ForexampleseeJohnHall166andJeﬀreyMass176.
 “Inthecourseofthenextfourhundredyears,sho sofarincreasedin
numberandinimmunityattheexpenseofthestate,that,attheend
of the twelfth century, their extent probably equaled that of the
publicdomain.”Asakawa118,8.
 Weappreciatethedevotedandpainstakingworkoftranslationfrom
EnglishtoJapaneseofthetwovolumesbyAsakawa;e Early Institutional Life of Japan ande Documents of Iriki,donerecentlyby
Professor Yabuki Susumu. His translations greatly facilitated our
understanding of the contributions of Asakawa Kan’ichi. We also
hopethattheglossaryoftranslatedhistoricalwordsthatfollowsthe
noteswillhelptheunderstandingofthischapter.
5 Ritsuryo means“penalandcivilcodes.”Historiansnamedthepolitical
order, which was “stabilized, statue-based, and aristocratic” and
whichhadbeenestablishedbytheearly700sasaRitsuryoSystem.
SeeTotman2000chapter.ehistoricalconceptsrepresentedby
Japanesewordshavenotbeenfullytranslatedintoanotherlanguage.
FormedievalJapan,Hall18oﬀersausefulcomparisonandglossariesaboutterminology.Fortheconvenienceofreaders,attheend
ofthischapterweincludesometermstranslatedbyHall18.erefore, we do not provide a detailed explanation for each Japanese
conceptinthischapter.
6 iswordwasusedbyAsakawa.SeeAsakawa11,section.
7 Forexample,seeKaoru106.
8 UsuallytheEnglishwords“lordandvassal”areusedtodescribethe
groupsofﬁghtingmenintheEuropeanfeudalsystem.Forsimplicity,
weexpressSho-gun as“lord”andGo-ke-nin as“vassal.”
 Since the 1580s Toyotomi Hideyoshi had collected documents on
landholdingandincomeandrecordedthedataforhisownpurposes.
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Glossary (from John Whitney Hall, 1983)
(InHallthealphabeticalruleofJapaneseexpression[romaji]is
diﬀerentfromtheoneinthischapter.)
Bushi

Classofpersonsperformingwarriorfunctions.

Gokenin

Shogunalhousemanorretainers;apledgedvassalofthe
shogun.

Honke

Guarantororprotectorofashoen.ehighestranking
shoen oﬃceheldbyonlythehighestrankingaristocrats
orgreatestreligiousinstitutions(originalexplanation
fromMass176).Someshoen hadbothahonke and
ryoke,asimilarhigh-rankingproprietor.Insuchcases,
oneofthetwotookthenengu andestablishedcontrol.
Asageneraltermoffamilialrelationship,themain
houseinanextendedlineage,withpowerorauthority
overthebranches(bunke).

Jito

WarrioroverseerappointedbytheKamakurabakufu to
collectshoen taxandsuperviselocalpoliceduties.e
mostimportantlocalﬁgureduringtheKamakura
period,thejito losthisimportanceintheMuromachi
period(originalexplanationfromMass176).

Kenchi

Cadastalsurvey;landsurvey.

Kokushi

UndertheRitsuryoSystem,providentialadministrative
oﬃcialssentfromthecentralgovernment.Originally
includedwerethefourranksofgovernorstatus,but,by
medievaltimes,kokushi referredtothegovernoralone.

Ritsuryo

AtermreferringtothelegalcodesadoptedfromChina
intheseventhandeighthcenturies;byextension,the
bureaucraticsystemofnational,imperialruleestablishedbythosecodes.

Shiki

“Right”or“oﬃce.”Originallyafunctionoroﬃcewith
a ttachedrequisites;latertherighttodesignatedincome
(withorwithoutduties)qualityofshiki eventuallygave
waytoonethatwasprivateandpermanent;postoften
becamehereditary.Severalshiki holdersmightconjointly“possess”anindividualunitofland(original
explanationfromMass176).usasinglepieceof
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cultivablelandhaddividedtenuresanddividedincome
rightsattachedtoit.Eachshiki includedthepowerto
administerataspeciﬁedlevel,andlow-rankingshiki,
suchasthemyoshu shiki,becamesaleableintheMuromachiperiod.
Shoen

Alandedestate.HavingnosatisfactoryEnglishtranslation,itiswelltoleaveitasmuchaspossibleinJapanese.
Indocumentsitappearsas“-sho,”asuﬃxtoaplace
name.Privatelyheld,theshoen hadapublicaspectas
thedominantunitoflocallandadministrationfromthe
lateHeianthroughearlyMuromachiperiods.Shoen
wereheldinproprietorshipbyacentral,absenteeoverlord,butotherlocalrightsweresimultaneouslyheldat
severallevels.Nosinglepersoncouldclaimfullpossessionofashoen inaprivatesense.

Shogun

Aleaderofthewarriorestate;headofthebakufu.
Abbreviationofthetitleseiitaishogun.
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Asakawa Kan’ichi’s View of History
Yabuki Susumu
e Legend of the Asakawa Cherry Tree
Kan’ichi would memorize two pages
of the English-English dictionary daily, then literally
“devour” the pages, a practice in those days not uncommon. When the last pages were gone and only the
covers were left, Kan’ichi buried them at the foot of a
cherry tree on the school campus. e tree was known
as the Asakawa Cherry Tree.
G.G. Clark,
Classmate of 1899, Dartmouth College

e story in the epigram about devouring an entire dictionary provides an early glimpse of Asakawa
Kan’ichi’s intense commitment to scholarship. is remarkable
man lived out a life-long passion for historical knowledge. His
integrity as a scholar was matched by his integrity as a human
being, and throughout his life he dedicated his eﬀorts to
exploring peaceful solutions to the problems of the world in
which he lived.
is chapter begins with some vignettes of Asakawa’s scholarship on medieval Japan and its reception in Japan and elsewhere. Sections  and 4 turn to Asakawa’s vision for peace in
Asia and his unsung role in the Portsmouth Treaty.
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e Reception of Asakawa’s Scholarship in Japan
Asakawa’s scholarship on medieval Japanese history was not
immediately appreciated in Japan. In the ﬁrst place, many
Japanese historians questioned the credentials of a scholar of
Japanese history who had been trained abroad. In 191, in
response to a derisive comment by a Japanese historian on his
analysis of Japanese feudalism, Asakawa wrote a spirited defense:
(1) Overseas scholars have the liberty to think freely, which
might not always be the case in Japan. (2) Overseas scholars
have advantageous opportunities to practice comparative history. () e disadvantage of scant materials can be at least
partly compensated for by intensive analysis and interpretation.
Finally, he proposed, as long as domestic scholars cooperate
with overseas scholars studying Japanese history, we can oﬀer
treasures in Japanese history for the development of humanity.1
To be dismissed by one’s compatriots must have stung, but
Asakawa consoled himself with his motto that “Science will
always prefer the white light of truth to the red glare of a
ﬂame.”2
After World War ii, Japanese historiography was strongly
Marxist in orientation, which provided other grounds on which
to dismiss Asakawa’s scholarship. In 1961, with support from
the Ministry of Education, Professor Nagahara Keiji3 organized
a research team to Iriki, the feudal domain that Asakawa had
studied. Nagahara had undoubtedly chosen the Iriki village
among many villages because he knew Asakawa’s works. After
conducting his own research on Iriki, Nagahara advanced a
conclusion about the oppressiveness of serfdom in medieval
Japan that was at odds with Asakawa’s thesis about the contractual nature of peasant-lord relations.4 Nagahara wrote a book5
in his last years in which he evaluated eminent historians who
had contributed to the development of Japanese history. Asakawa’s name does not even appear in those pages. Many
followers of Nagahara, including liberal scholars, followed his
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lead and ignored Asakawa’s achievements. Only in recent years,
with a new generation of scholarship focusing on social and
cultural history, has Asakawa’s emphasis on peasants’ resourcefulness become fully appreciated. Among economic historians,
Asakawa’s interpretations of medieval land contracts have been
accepted more or less as conclusive.

Asakawa’s Citizen Diplomacy
Although Asakawa was a historian of a rather arcane subject,
he was deeply interested in public policy and international
peace. In the early twentieth century, the growing rivalry
between Russia and Japan captured his attention, not only for
the sake of Japan’s welfare, but because he feared that a
Russian/French cabal could cannibalize China and close oﬀ
much of Asia to vital trade and investment.
In August 190, when the Russo-Japanese negotiations
were deadlocked, Asakawa, then 1 years old, stayed at the
Wentworth Hotel and watched the conference as an observer.
A local newspaper, the Boston Herald, carried an interview
with Asakawa on August 24, 190 in which he was quoted as
saying that the powers owed it to the world to conclude an
early peace. He was of the view that Japan should not demand
more than was necessary to ensure its safety for the future, to
obtain full and free access for it to the markets of Manchuria,
and to secure a dominating inﬂuence over Korea. On the other
hand, Russia should not submit to any terms that would jeopardize its honor or wound its dignity as a nation. “As to indemnity, I am unable to say whether Japan is entitled to one or not.
As I understand her terms, she does not desire to inﬂict any
penalty upon Russia. All she asks is the mere repayment, in
whole or in part, of the costs she has been put to by having had
to wage war.”
Asakawa’s opinions on Russo-Japan treaty negotiation were
not welcomed by the Japanese correspondents who were
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covering the negotiation process. Fukutomi Masatoshi criticized
Asakawa by his pen name, Seison, in his article, “US correspondence, episode on peace talk” in a Japanese newspaper, Tokyo
Asahi Shimbun on October 0, 190.
Asakawa is a graduate from Yale University and now is
teaching oriental politics as a lecturer at some school in the
US. His name card carries “Ph.D. and Lecturer.” He won’t
speak Japanese even to Japanese people and speaks only
English to anybody. He interacts with many white people and
explains peace negotiations, staying in the Wentworth Hotel
in Portsmouth. He argues “Japan deﬁnitely does not want any
indemnity. Although abandoning money seems contrary to
Japanese public opinion, we should neglect public opinion in
the case of a grave international problem of this sort. e
Japanese government should decide according to its own
wisdom.”
(my translation)

Fukutomi went on to suggest that Asakawa could be an
agent of the Japanese government.
Otherwise, how could he stay at a high class  dollar per
night hotel? We Japanese correspondents are quite angry
with him, and would like to bring him down a few pegs.
Unfortunately, he won’t speak Japanese. We are afraid to
quarrel with him in English lest we be overheard and bring
shame on Japan’s honor.
(my translation)

Asakawa was a young lecturer at Dartmouth College at the
time, having completed a Ph.D. in history from Yale University
in 1902. His dissertation was on e Early Institutional Life of
Japan, which examined the political reforms of 64 a.d. Beyond
being a historian of medieval Japan, he was also a knowledgeable
scholar of international relations. Asakawa had published e
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Russo-Japanese Conﬂict; Its Causes and Issues with Houghton
Miﬄin in the United States and A. Constable & Co. in Britain in
1904. His articles, “Some of the Issues of the Russo-Japanese
Conﬂict” and “Some of the Events Leading up to the War in the
East” appeared in the Yale Review in May and August 1904. His
motivation seemed genuinely patriotic to his home country,
Japan, but he had no relations with the Japanese government.
Asakawa could aﬀord to stay in a luxury hotel in Portsmouth
because his accommodations were provided by William J.
Tucker, the president of Dartmouth College, who was Asakawa’s
mentor.
Another actor at Portsmouth was Sakai Tokutarō, assistant
to Baron Kaneko Kentarō who was one of the architects of the
Meiji Constitution. On February 24, 1904, Baron Kaneko left
Yokohama port with two assistants, Sakai and Suzuki, and
stayed in the United States about twenty months. eir mission
was public relations activity in the United States by order of
Marquis Itō Hirobumi, who was then president of the Privy
Council. Ito decided to dispatch Kaneko to the United States
immediately after the declaration of the war against Russia. On
October , 1904, Sakai wrote a letter to his close friend, Anson
Phelps Stokes, Secretary of Yale University, asking for help after
two naval battles at Yellow Sea on August 10 and oﬀ Ulson on
August 14.
Good news continues to come from the seat of the war,
but there is absolutely not the slightest hope for early settlement. What is the feeling or sentiment among the learned
scholars in New Haven as to what terms of peace Japan
should make, etc.? What do you think about it yourself? I
should like to hear it from you sometime. We are in constant
touch with home through wire. Everything there is bright
and cheerful. After the war is over, I thoroughly believe that
Christian work in Japan will make a great stride. …6
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Sakai and Stokes had been classmates at the Cambridge
eological School where they had become close friends. In
addition to their personal friendship, Sakai probably approached
Stokes because the Yale Review had carried Asakawa’s articles
on the Russo-Japan confrontation in 1904.7 Sakai and Kaneko
may have thought that Yale scholars knew about and were
interested in the Russo-Japan confrontation.
In reply to Sakai, Stokes promised to consult with two or
three Yale professors and to get back to him.8 Stokes spoke with
a professor in international law, eodore Woolsey, and an
associate professor in oriental history, Frederic W. Williams,9
asking them to submit their suggestions in writing by adding
that he had a reason to believe that any proposals they cared to
make might have an “important bearing on the result.” Woolsey
replied to Stokes on October 14 190:
Of course we cannot speak for the faculty of the University.
We only give our individual views. Moreover our points of
view are somewhat diﬀerent. But our conclusions are in the
main so nearly identical that after consultation we have agreed
to formulate them as a single draft, which I beg to enclose.

We infer from circumstantial evidence that the Woolsey
and Williams memo was deeply inﬂuenced by the views of
Asakawa. When Asakawa wrote his book Russia-Japan Conﬂict,
Williams contributed a preface. Less is known about the
personal relationship between Asakawa and Woolsey, but there
are many citations of Asakawa’s writings in Woolsey’s lecture
notes on international relations in the Far East.10 We may
assume that both Williams and Woolsey at least were readers of
Asakawa’s analysis of the Russia-Japan conﬂict in the Yale
Review.
Stokes replied to his old friend Sakai within a week.11
Under the proposed terms, given in detail below, Russia
would agree to limit her Asiatic ﬂeet, conﬁrm China’s title to
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Manchuria, transfer the lease of Port Arthur to Japan, allow
Japan to establish “such protectorate or other control over
Korea as the two may agree upon,” and surrender to Japan all
the Russian naval vessels interned in neutral ports at the
close of hostilities. No indemnity is to be required of Russia
(though she would turn over to Japan valuable railroad property) and there would be no cession of Siberian territory.
However, if an indemnity were demanded, Japan might be
expected to hold Vladivostok temporarily as security.12

Although this narrative suggests that Asakawa played a
crucial role in the Portsmouth treaty negotiations, his name has
all but disappeared from the diplomatic record. One reason,
apparently, is that Asakawa asked Stokes not to mention him by
name when, during the war, Harold Phelps Stokes was compiling
Stokes’s writings about Yale’s involvement in the Portsmouth
Treaty.13
Asakawa wrote to Stokes on May 16, 194:
I thank you very much for sending me the pamphlet on
the story of the Yale suggestions as to a place arrangements
between Japan and Russia made in 190. I feel honored to be
included among its recipients of the small number of copies
you printed. I have read the piece with great interest, and
proﬁted from knowing for the ﬁrst time what T.R. [eodore
Roosevelt] wrote to Germany and France at the beginning of
the war. I may have told you that I was present throughout at
the hotel at Portsmouth, where the peace conference was
being held, and after saw the envoys of both sides as well as
the chief news reporters including Cortesi, Sir Wallace, and
Dr. Morrison, that, in a later year, I met T.R. and talked with
him on a phase of the conference, and that, in Japan, I also
brieﬂy interviewed Komura.14

Stokes replied to Asakawa on May 21, 194:
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Of course I hope you realize that the only reason I did not
refer to you by name was that you wrote me during the war
requesting that your name should not be used in connection
of the incident.15

Justice is Born from Jealousy of the Powers
roughout the Russo-Japan war, the US Secretary of State,
John Hay, appealed for the respect of China’s sovereignty and
for equal access to trade with China. e powers agreed upon
these principles, which Asakawa interpreted to mean that the
weakness of China and the mutual jealousy of the powers
became the mother of justice.16 Asakawa thought that Japan
should return the Liaodong Peninsula to China 2 years following the agreements.
Asakawa was hopeful that Japan would make good on its
promises to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbors. In
his book on the Russo-Japanese war, Asakawa wrote:
It is remarkable how little the spirit of Japan’s policy, which
the writer has attempted to express in this sentence, is understood among the people here. A vast majority of people, not
excluding recognized writers and speakers on the East, seem
to ascribe to Japan certain territorial designs, particularly in
Korea. It is not remembered that Japan was the ﬁrst country
to recognize the independence of Korea, the cause of which
also cost Japan a war with China. e present war with Russia
is waged largely on the same issue, for it is to Japan’s vital
interest to keep Korea independent. From this it hardly
follows that Japan should occupy Korea in order not to allow
her to fall into the hands of another power. If Korea is really
unable to stand on her feet, the solution of the diﬃculty does
not, in Japan’s view, consist in possessing her, but in making
her independence real by developing her resources and recognizing and strengthening her national institutions. It is in
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this work that Japan’s assistance was oﬀered and accepted. It
would be as diﬃcult for any impartial student not to see the
need of such assistance as to confuse it with annexation. It
would, however, be entirely legitimate to regard the task as
extremely diﬃcult and dangerously prone to abuse.17

We know, from Asakawa’s 1909 book, Japan’s Crisis, that he
became dismayed with the Japanese government’s failure to
respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and its
refusal to make good on its promises made in 190 to respect
Jay’s principles of open door and equal access in China. When
Asakawa wrote a letter of thanks to Stokes in May 194, he
concluded his letter with these words:
I am interested most of all in the fact that, both in the
account and the conduct of Japan then and afterward, I ﬁnd,
once again, how little the unconscious habits of the mental
workings of nations are understood to one another, indeed,
how little each is aware of its own. Words and acts of each
betray … the sad limitations in both respects, … limitations
that are the root causes of national and international comedies
and tragedies throughout human history. e condition can
improve only with extreme slowness. All my studies of history
during decades have pointed to the single problem of the
process of the formation of each social mind, and of the
peculiar manner of its historical manifestations. e inﬁnite
number of concrete facts is to me but a brush with which to
sweep away the cobweb of the student’s own mind for the
clariﬁcation of the fundamental problem.18

Written only three months before his death in August 194,
this passage captures both Asakawa’s enduring hope for peace
and understanding among nations on the one hand, and his
awareness of the domestic and international roots of war on the
other. To the end of his days, he kept his optimism and realism
in productive tension.
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A Historical Note about Asakawa’s Edited Works
After Asakawa passed away in 194, the Committee for the
Publication of Dr. Asakawa Kan’ichi’s works was organized
under the chairmanship of Matsukata Saburō on February 2,
194. e Ministry of Education promised ﬁnancial support in
May, and Yale University released copyrights in June. Under
these conditions, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
(Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai) agreed to support publication.19
e Committee announced that the English section would be
preserved in its original form. But, regarding the Japanese
section, a committee extensively edited the materials. at is,
besides correcting errors based on original material, it adopted
two policies for editing; (1) it would record all existing Iriki
documents, (2) all documents would be ﬁled under the title of
the possessor, e.g., the Iriki-in, the Terao, the Okamoto, the
Tōgō, the Ketō-in, the Tsuruda, the Taki, and so on. Most casual
readers might believe that these policies created no problems.
Indeed nobody had raised concerns until 200, when I discovered the faults. In fact, the two policies should be understood as
an alteration of the original work and the creation of a new
version. e ﬁrst document that Asakawa selected was the
Order of the head of Go-dai in, 1135. e last documents were
(A) the Memorandum of the Shōgun’s council, 1867; and (B) the
shogun’s memorial to the throne, 1867. Regarding these last two
documents, Asakawa noted that “the editor regrets that he
decided to include (A) and (B) in the present No. too late to
enable him to add their original texts to the Japanese section of
this volume.”20 e Japanese section had already been printed
in Tokyo in 192. erefore Asakawa could not add the two
Japanese texts, when he completed the English section in 1929.
Asakawa regretted this because the last Shōgun’s memoranda
are the very symbols of the end of feudal Japan. e joint letter
of four daimyōs’ proposing voluntarily to yield their hereditary
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domains to the imperial government is not suﬃcient to end the
feudal regime in Japan.
us, it was certainly Asakawa’s intention that the enlarged
Tokyo version should at least include the Shōgun’s two memoranda. Although the volumes of the new edition comprise 2.4
times more pages than the original Yale version, they do not
include the above mentioned two short memoranda by the last
Shōgun. Another defect of the new edition is the order of
arrangement of the documents. First we should check Asakawa’s
method. e reason Asakawa put the Order of the head of Godai in, 1135 on the ﬁrst page is very clear: the key-word Iriki
appeared for the ﬁrst time in all the documents of Japanese
history. erefore he put it in the ﬁrst place. e Documents of
Iriki must start from this document, which contains the name
of Iriki. en what should be placed in the last position?
Asakawa put the four daimyōs’ joint letter in the Japanese
section of the original Yale edition. But as soon as he found the
last Shōgun’s two memoranda, he immediately translated, added
footnotes, and placed them in the last place of the English
section. From the Godai in document to the last Shōgun’s
memoranda, he arranged the documents in chronological order,
so we can read them as the development of feudalism. But the
new enlarged Tokyo edition is not in chronological order.
Rather, it is arranged according to the original possessors, so
readers cannot read it like a story, but only use it as a source
book. us Asakawa’s original intention was severely distorted.
e members of the editing group probably had not read the
original English version, so they could not even recognize their
own mistakes. e enlarged Tokyo version carried three articles
by professors of the Historiographical Institute at the University
of Tokyo, Professors T. Nishioka, K. Hōgetsu, and R. Takeuchi.21
Unfortunately they did not mention even a few words about the
contents of the Documents of Iriki. ey had not yet read the
book. Nor had the members of the committee. After the
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enlarged Tokyo version appeared in 19, some people began to
read the Japanese section. However, no reader opened Asakawa’s
English notes, which Asakawa had regarded as the substance of
the book, as he stated in his Japanese preface. His “substance”
was almost completely neglected until the notes were translated
into Japanese in 200.
At long last, Asakawa’s work has enjoyed resurgent interest
in recent years for at least two reasons. e rise of China as a
massive power in Asia underscores Asakawa’s recognition of
the importance of diplomacy in maintaining peace in Asia. His
work on economic history, too, has stood the test of time,
outliving faddish detours into ideologically driven theory that
held up Japanese academe for years. It is bittersweet that
Asakawa is ﬁnally getting the visibility and recognition that he
always deserved, and that would have served his countrymen so
well in his own time.

Notes:
1 Shi-gaku Zasshi, February, 191. Professor Kuroita Katsumi (14–
1946) compiled Kokushi Taikei, vols. 1–64 in 1929–1964. He also
cooperated with Asakawa to select ‘Gifts of the Yale Association of
Japan,’ located at the Beinecke Library in 194. Asakawa’s original
article appeared in the American Historical Review, vol. 1, no. 1. His
refutation of Kuroita was published in Nihon Hōken-seido no Kigen
ni tsukite (On the origin of feudal land tenure in Japan), Shi-gaku
Zasshi, May 191. In criticizing the political pressures for “correct
interpretations” under which Japanese scholars struggled, Asakawa
was referring to the “Seibun Problem” (正閏問題). In 1911, e
Ministry of Education revised a history textbook for primary schools.
Mr. Sadakichi Kita (11–199), who was then the editor of the textbook in the Ministry, was criticized by the Imperial Diet and left the
Ministry. Asakawa’s close friend, Mr. Sanji Mikami (16–199),
Professor of History, University of Tokyo, also resigned the post of
supervisor. Mr. Kita’s “mistake” had been to write of the Northern
and Southern courts in an even handed way, but the Ministry of
Education’s oﬃcial view was ﬁrst that only the Northern Court had
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legitimacy. Later the oﬃcial view changed to support the Southern
Court’s legitimacy. rough letters from Mikami to Asakawa, it is
clear that Asakawa understood this trouble very clearly.
2 Japan Old And New: An Essay on what New Japan owes to the Feudal
Japan, e Journal of Race Development, vol.  no. 1, July, 1912.
 Professor Emeritus of history, Hitotsubashi University. A popular
historian majoring in medieval Japan. (1922–2004).
4 Chū-sei Son-raku no Kōzū to Ryōshu-sei (e structure of villages
and lord system in the medieval Japan), in his book, Chū-sei no
Shakai to Keizai. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1962, pp. 12–214.
 20 Seiki Nihon no Rekishi-gaku (Historical science of Japan in the
20th century), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 200.
6 Anson Phelps Stokes’s brother, Harold, edited and published his
brother’s memoir on the Portsmouth Treaty. Harold Phelps Stokes,
“Yale, the Portsmouth Treaty and Japan,” 194, mimeograph, pp. 6–,
in Asakawa Papers, Yale Library.
 In 1999, a Japanese historian, Shiozaki described how Asakawa’s
analysis was appreciated among intellectuals. According to Shiozaki,
“e New York Times editorial highly appreciated Asakawa’s article
of the Yale Review in May 1904. His book Russia-Japan Conﬂict was
also reviewed by the New York Times, Nation, Dial, Review of Reviews,
American Sociology, Yale Review, and Outlook. Every review appreciated the author’s objective and fair attitude about researching data
and description by avoiding patriotic sentiments as a Japanese citizen.
… However, these journals were circulated only among intellectuals,
and the number of readers was limited. Asakawa’s argument did not
reach out to ordinary American people.” (excerpt and translation by
author) Shiozaki Satoshi, “American View on Asakawa’s article.”
Newsletter from Asakawa Research Committee, No. , June 1999.
 Harold Phelps Stokes. Yale, the Portsmouth Treaty, and Japan, 194,
p. .
9 Williams was a son of Samuel Wells Williams who served as interpreter for Commodore Perry.
10 A Japanese historian, Yukimi Masui, associate professor of Kei-ai
University, discovered this connection between Woolsey and Asakawa
when going through Woolsey’s lecture notes.
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11 Six letters from Stokes to Sakai are preserved in the Asakawa Papers
in Yale Library, Diplomatic Record Oﬃce of the Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs of Japan and Fukushima Prefectural Library. e title of the
documents is “e case of dispatching Barons Suematsu and Kaneko
to Europe and the United States for enlightening the respective
related nations’ public opinions.” (my translation)
12 On the same day, Stokes wrote Sakai another letter stating that
Woolsey and Williams were of the same view except with respect to
the Russian navy. Woolsey proposed to limit the Russian naval ﬂeet
to a maximum 0 thousand tons. Williams did not think Russia
would accept this proposal. Stokes’s letter to Sakai, October 14, 1904,
in Asakawa Papers, Yale Library; also the Diplomatic Record Oﬃce
of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of Japan.
1 In 199, a Japanese journalist, Shimizu Yoshikazu, wrote about “e
man who disappeared from Portsmouth history.” Shimizu was
intrigued by an episode that had taken place at the home of Anson F.
Stokes on March , 190, when he invited Baron Kaneko and Yale
professors to a dinner party. When Kaneko referred to Russia as
Japan’s worst enemy, some unnamed Japanese guest replied, “Oh no,
Japanese worst enemy is (Japan’s own) swollen head.” Shimizu guessed
that this unnamed guest must be Asakawa, but the curator of the
Yale East Asian Library collection, Kaneko Hideko, found through
research that it was Baron Kaneko’s assistant, Barnaba Tokutarō
Sakai, who had made this comment. Anson’s brother, Harold, edited
and publish his brother’s memoir on the Portsmouth Treaty. Harold
Phelps Stokes, “Yale, the Portsmouth Treaty, and Japan,” 194, mimeograph, pp. 6–, in Asakawa Papers, Yale Library.
14 Collected Letters of K. Asakawa, (Asakawa Kan’ichi Shokanshū).
Tokyo: Waseda University Press, p. 11.
1 Stokes’ letter in Asakawa Papers, Fukushima Prefectural Library.
Unfortunately Asakawa’s letter mentioned here, is not included in
Collected Letters of K. Asakawa.
16 Asakawa Kan’ichi, Nihon no Kaki (Japan’s crisis moment), originally
published by Jitsugyō no Nihon-sha in 1909. Quotation is from a
republished version by Kōdansha Bunko in 19, p. 4.
1 Asakawa Kan’ichi. 1904. e Russo-Japanese Conﬂict, its Causes and
Issues, Introduction, Boston and New York: Houghton Miﬄen;
London: A Constable Co. pp. 2–.
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1 Collected Letters of K. Asakawa, pp. 11–2.
19 Saikan Shidai (explanation for the reprint edition), dated December
22, 19. e Documents of Iriki, Tokyo version, pp. 4–.
20 e Documents of Iriki, p. 9, Yale version.
21 e Documents of Iriki, pp. iii-xix, Tokyo version.
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Gaiatsu, Learning, and
Japan’s Emerging Economic Liberalism
Leonard J. Schoppa

In the 90s and 980s, Japan earned
the moniker “reactive state” for the way in which its foreign
economicpolicytendedtomovemostlyinresponsetostrong
foreignpressurefromtheUnitedStates,knowninternationally
by the Japanese term gaiatsu (Calder 988). Japanese oﬃcials
showed few signs that they recognized that capital and trade
liberalization,deregulation,andothereconomicreformsurged
by the United States might actually beneﬁt the country. ey
were seemingly blind to the fact that the postwar process of
tradeliberalizationhadplayedsuchacriticalroleinfostering
Japan’s own economic success. Japan did remove trade and
investment barriers during these decades, reducing tariﬀs on
many goods and eliminating quotas on beef and oranges. It
seemedtoadoptthesepolicies,however,onlywhenfacedwith
strong pressure from the United States, often giving in at the
lastminuteafterfacingstrongthreats.
Sincethemid-990s,however,Japanhasbeenmuchmore
proactive initsforeigneconomicpolicy.Startingin994,when
Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro refused to budge in the
faceofstrongpressurefromPresidentClintonattheirsummit
meetinginWashington,Japanbegansaying“no”toAmerican
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tradepressureinsectorsrangingfromautostoﬁlmtosemiconductors.Ataboutthesametime,itbeganremovingregulatory
andtradebarriers,supportingmultilateraltradeliberalization,
andnegotiatingfreetradeagreements—allonitsowninitiative.
Although the fact that Japan began taking these initiatives at
thesametimeitwassaying“no”totheUnitedStatessuggests
that its emerging economic liberalism had little to do with
Americangaiatsu,thischapterdevelopstheoppositeargument.
egrowingtendencyofJapaneseelitestoseeeconomicliberalizationasbeinginJapan’sowninterestistheproductofalong
termlearning processsetinmotionbyearliermarket-opening
tradepressure,reinforcedbythe“schoolofhardknocks”Japan
enduredoveritsdecadeandahalfofeconomicstagnation.
Before proceeding, let me clarify what I mean by Japan’s
emergingeconomicliberalism.Iamnot sayingthatJapanhas
completely liberalized its economy and is on an uncontested
path toward free trade. I am saying that Japan’s elite—its
economicbureaucrats,leadingopinion-makers,andsomeofits
politicians—have shifted their beliefs about which economic
policies are likely to produce the best performance for Japan.
Fifteenyearsago,evenintheﬁrstseveralyearsafterthecollapse
ofthebubble,thebroadconsensuswasthatJapan’ssystemof
“convoy capitalism” (lifetime employment; the main bank
system;keiretsu businessgroups;andregulationandmanagement by the government designed to keep this entire convoy
movingsteadilyahead)wasasuperiorformofcapitalismthat
promisedfastergrowthwithmoreeconomicstabilitythanthe
alternativemodelsfoundinEuropeandNorthAmerica.JapaneseoﬃcialssuchastheMinistryofFinance’s(mof)Sakakibara
Eisukeloudlytoutedthismodelinmeetingswithforeignoﬃcials
andwithininternationalorganizations.
Today, in contrast, the conventional wisdom in Japan has
turned against the old Japanese model, as is suggested by the
following passage from the 996 report of the Deregulation
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Subcommittee of the government’s Administrative Reform
Committee:
efundamentalprincipleisconsumersovereignty.What
getsproduced,andhow,shouldbedecidednotbyproducers
andproducerassociationsandbureaucratsbutbythechoices
that citizens make in the marketplace and the responses of
creativeentrepreneurstothosechoices.Ourexistingsystem
isbasedonthefalsepremisethattheinterestsofcitizensare
bestservedifbureaucratsregulate;thattheyshouldtakethe
leadinbalancingdemandandsupplyinordertoprotectand
monitorestablishedproducersandensurestableandorderly
markets.atiswrong.eaimshouldbetopromotehealthy
competitionthroughappropriateandtransparentrules,such
asproductliabilityruleswrittenfromtheconsumer’spoint
of view, thus avoiding the feather-bedding of ineﬃcient
existingproducersandencouragingvigorousnewentrants.
(quotedinDore000,60–6)

ispassage,similarintoneandcontenttoonesthatcan
be found in dozens of advisory council and business group
reports published since the mid-990s (Dore 999), clearly
rejects the idea that the best way for Japan to maximize its
economicwelfareisthroughgovernmentregulationandprotection of existing domestic producers. Instead, what Japanese
government and other economic elites in recent years have
been repeating over and over is that Japan needs to embrace
domesticandinternationalrules-based market competition asa
meansofrestoringeconomicgrowthandcompetitiveness.
Japan’s emerging economic liberalism, however, involves
morethanrhetoricorideas.JustastheGreatDepressionturned
Americansagainstprotectionisminwaysthatwereinstitutionalized atthedomesticandinternationallevels(Goldstein99),
the rejection of the idea that convoy capitalism represents a
superior model for Japan is starting to produce domestic and
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international laws such as the Big Bang ﬁnancial reforms and
thenewWorldTradeOrganization(wto)disputesettlement
systemthatwillhavelong-lastingeﬀectsonthenation’sforeign
economicpolicy.
Inadditiontoadvancingthischaracterizationofwhathas
changedinJapan,thisstudyalsoadvancesaspeciﬁcargument,
builtonconstructivistinternationalrelationstheory,aboutwhy
economicliberalismisemerginginJapan.Economicliberalism
has become the new orthodoxy in Japan, I argue, through a
processofelitelearningthatcanbetracedbacktotheearlier
era of gaiatsu, when American trade oﬃcials lectured selfconﬁdentandskepticalJapaneseaboutthevirtuesoffreetrade
andmarketcompetition.
Muchoftheconstructivistliteratureonsociallearning,or
ideationalchange,hasdescribedthisprocessassomethingthat
goes on within domestic society. Legro (000a), for example,
describes how the process of social learning requires that a
society go through a two-step process that is fraught with
“collectiveideation”problems.First,societyhastocometoan
agreementthattheoldorthodoxyisinadequate,andsecond,it
hastoembraceenmasseaneworthodoxy.Itisbecausebothof
thesestepsarediﬃcultforgroupstonegotiate,heargues,that
orthodoxies tend to be durable once formed. Nevertheless
changeislikely,heargues,whenasocietyexperiencesadisaster
despitehavingfollowedapolicylinesuggestedbytheoldorthodoxyand whenanewsetofideasisreadymadetoexplainthe
pastmistakesandrecommendanalternativecourse.
Legro describes these processes as “endogenous to the
ideationalstructure”andsuggeststhattheytakeplaceprimarily
within agivensociety,illustratingthisargumentbycontrasting
howtheUnitedStatesfailedtomaketheleapfromisolationism
tointernationalismafterWorldWarI,butdidmakethisshift
afterWorldWarii (Legro000b).Akeydiﬀerencebetweenthe
twocases,heargues,wasthattheUnitedStatestriedtofollow

Gaiatsu, Learning, and Japan’s Emerging Economic Liberalism 

policiessuggestedbytheisolationistorthodoxyinthelead-up
toWorldWarii,andgotsuckedintothatterribleconﬂagration
anyway. e presence of a coherent alternative vision for the
nationthuscombinedwiththis“learningexperience”tolaythe
basisforaneworthodoxyintheyearsafterthewar.
AlthoughLegrocorrectlypointsustoanimportantpartof
the learning process—Japan would not likely be shifting to a
newliberalorthodoxyifithadnotexperienceditslongestand
deepest recession of the postwar period—he unnecessarily
restricts our focus to the process going on within domestic
society.Extensiveresearchinsocialpsychologyinformsusthat
individuallearningdoesnothappenmerelythroughindividuals’
experiences of “hard knocks,” but inevitably involves social
processesinwhichthosewhoarelearninginteractwithpeers
andteachers(Checkel00).Weshouldnotbesurprised,therefore,thatlearningrelevanttoforeignpolicysimilarlyinvolves
patternsofsocialinteractionacross borders (Haas990;Finnemore996;KeckandSikkink998).InthisarticleIexplorehow
Japan’s emerging economic liberalism has been inﬂuenced by
Japaneseelites’interactionswithAmericaneconomicoﬃcials
and non-Japanese staﬀ of international organizations. Japan’s
movestowardliberalizationinthe990s,Iargue,havenotbeen
aproductofcoercion,lowertransactioncosts,orothermaterial
factorsemphasizedbyrealistsandliberalinstitutionalists,but
haveinsteadresultedfromelites’social,cross-borderlearning.
Letmeemphasize:Idonotconsiderthislearningtohave
beenapassiveprocessinwhichmeekJapaneseoﬃcialslearned
atthefeetofAmericanteachers.Farfromit!Japaneseoﬃcials
inthe980swereself-conﬁdentaboutthesuperiorityoftheir
model.eyhadbeenhearinglecturesaboutthemagicoffree
marketsfromAmericansfordecades,goingbacktotheOccupation years, but they had stuck stubbornly to the Japanese
model.Nevertheless,evenasyearsofhectoringbytheUnited
Statestradenegotiatorsprovokedtradeoﬃcialsandpoliticians
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tooﬀerheateddefensesofJapanesepolicies,theyexposedthem
to the ideas of neoclassical economics—to arguments about
howconsumers,aswellasproducersandnationalincome,all
suﬀerwhenineﬃcientdomesticproducersareshelteredfrom
foreignanddomesticcompetition.WhentheJapaneseeconomy
turned sour in the 990s, Japanese oﬃcials had plenty of old
“classnotes”toconsultastheysoughttodiagnosetheproblem.
islearningprocesswashelpedalongbyhowJapaneseoﬃcials
themselves used liberal language and ideas, at ﬁrst for purely
defensivereasonsaimedatcounteringAmericantradepressure,
and by their defensive embrace of wto and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) multilateralism.

e Reactive State Pattern
When Japan gained admission to the General Agreement on
Tariﬀs and Trade (gatt) in 9 and the oecd in 964, it
assumedavarietyofobligationsrequiringittoremove,reduce,
or reconﬁgure barriers to trade and foreign investment. Its
admissiontotheoecd obligedJapantoeliminaterestrictions
on foreign direct investment, where under gatt rules, Japan
was,inprinciple,expectedtoreplacequantitativerestrictions
ontrade,whichwereparticularlynumerousintheagricultural
sector, with tariﬀs. ese rules were based on neoclassical
economicideasabouthowcompetition,includinginternational
competitionfosteredbyforeigninvestmentandtrade,improves
economic eﬃciency, enhances productivity, and propels economicgrowth.ereisnoevidence,however,thattheJapanese
wholedthenationintotheseorganizationsdidsobecausethey
shared these ideas. On the contrary, the extended period of
mostly bilateral negotiations required to force Japan, through
the use of threats and deadlines, to comply with these basic
obligations of its membership in gatt, and the oecd helped
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earn the nation its “reactive state” reputation (Kusano 98;
Calder988;Mason99).
einitialnegotiationswhereinJapanresistedUnitedStates
pressuretoliveuptoitsgatt andoecd commitmentssetthe
pattern for a long series of market-opening negotiations,
stretching from the 90s into the 980s. Japan also resisted
UnitedStatespressuretoimproveaccesstomarketsforAmerican semiconductors, auto parts, satellites, supercomputers,
construction, ﬂat glass, paper, wood products, retail stores,
ﬁnancial services, telecommunications equipment, medical
products,tobacco,andlawyers.Ineachofthesecases,negotiationsfollowedasetpattern(Campbell99).eUnitedStates
would raise objections, usually beginning in late March of a
givenyearwhentheOﬃceoftheUSTradeRepresentativewas
required to list outstanding foreign trade barriers. It would
initiate an investigation under US trade law that set speciﬁc
deadlinesayearorsointhefutureandinviteJapantoparticipate
inbilateraltalksaimedat“resolving”thedispute.eJapanese
side would initially deny that there was any problem and
grumble about American unilateralism, but always agreed to
talk(atleastuntilthemid-990s).
Intheearlymonthsofthesetalks,Japaneseoﬃcialswould
insist that the diﬃculties US producers had expanding their
JapanesemarketsharewasnotduetoJapanesebarriersbuttoa
lackofeﬀortontheirpart.eywouldalsoexplainwhychange
was impossible. United States oﬃcials, meanwhile, would
muster statistical evidence showing how US ﬁrms had much
largermarketsharesinneutralmarketsthaninJapanandwarn
theJapaneseabouthowCongresswaslikelyto“goprotectionist”
unless barriers were removed. ey would also add some
lectures about how liberalization would beneﬁt to Japanese
consumersandtheeconomyasawhole.Japanesenegotiators
continuedtodefendexistingpolicy.en,aspressurebuiltin
theﬁnaldaysbeforeadeadline,Japanoﬀeredenoughlast-minute
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concessions to allow US oﬃcials to declare that they were
s atisﬁed.
Japaneseliberalizationinthesecaseswasalwaysgrudging,
oﬀering no more than the minimum policy change to satisfy
American negotiators, often at the very last minute. When
announcingtradedeals,Japaneseoﬃcialsrarelyevenpretended
thatJapanmightactuallybeneﬁtfromtheagreedpolicychanges.
ey listened to the lectures from the Americans about the
beneﬁts of free trade and market competition, but they stuck
stubbornlytotheirbeliefsthatJapan’smodel—withanextensive
roleforthegovernmentinmanagingcompetitionsothatJapan
couldmoveuptheproductcycletodominatethemosttechnologically sophisticated industries—was superior to Americanstylecapitalism(Johnson98;HeginbothamandSamuels998;
Tilton996).WhenJapaneseoﬃcialsconceded,underduress,
toopenmarkets,theymadeitclearthattheyhadagreedtothis
onlybecausethenation’smostimportanttradingpartnerand
allywasdemandingthatitdoso.Tradeliberalizationwassimply
apriceJapanhadtopaytomaintainaccesstotheUSmarket
and to retain the American security guarantee (Calder 988;
Mikanagi996).

e Legitimation of Liberal Economic Views
AnalystsstudyingJapaneseeconomicpolicyhaveoftenasserted
thatnationalelitesweremoreinﬂuencedbytheeconomicideas
ofFriedrichListthanthoseofAdamSmithandDavidRicardo
(Fallows994;Samuels994).Listemphasizedhowlatedevelopingcountriesneededtodevelopeconomiesofscalebehind
protectivetradebarriersbeforefacingcompetitionwithmore
advancedindustrializednations.estatealsoneededtohelp
industries coordinate investment, through cartels and regulations,tospeedthepaceatwhichtheydevelopedscaleeconomies
and technological capabilities. Japanese industrial policy was
long based on these List-inspired ideas. Given Japan’s back-
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wardness,thestateneededtostepintolimit“excessivecompetition,” regulate market entry, and coordinate investment so
that industry could develop the economies of scale and technologyneededtocompetewithlargerandmoretechnologically
advancedforeignﬁrms(Johnson98).Notsurprisingly,given
the predominance of these views, few Japanese elites in the
90s and 980s subscribed to neoclassical views about the
beneﬁtsoffreetradeandcompetition.
Ofcourse,ideassimilartoList’swerealsooncedominantin
theUnitedStates.AlexanderHamilton,inthenation’sfounding
years,hademphasizedtheneedforthestatetoassistindustry
byprovidingtradeprotection.Asrecentlyasthe90s,theidea
thattradeprotectionwasthebestwaytosafeguardthenation’s
economicinterestswaspredominantintheUnitedStates.As
noted above, however, the United States rejected this set of
ideasafterthedisasteroftheGreatDepressionandWorldWar
ii, embracing in its place (embedded) liberal ideas closer to
thoseofSmithandRicardo(Ruggie98;Goldstein99).
InJapan,too,thelearningprocessowedagreatdealtothe
nation’s experience of its “Great Recession” in the 990s, but
learning began in 980s when the nation’s economy was still
outperforming that of the United States. Japanese oﬃcials at
thattimestillbelievedinthesuperiorityoftheJapanesemodel,
but,facedwithagrowingnumberofbilateralmarket-opening
disputesandanimpatientUnitedStatesCongress,theyputinto
practiceatechniqueallgoodschoolchildrenlearn:thebestway
to avoid a teacher’s ire is to tell her what she wants to hear.
Reaganadministrationoﬃcials,manyofwhomwereneoliberal
ideologues, were particularly prone to lecture Japanese about
thevirtuesoffreemarkets.PrimeMinisterNakasoneYasuhiro
was toying with this philosophy himself with his emphasis on
budget-cutting “administrative reform” (Ohtake 994). He decidedthatonewaytogettheAmericansoﬀhisbackwouldbeto
organize a blue ribbon commission that would produce a
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 ocumentloadedwithliberalpolicyproposals.Withthisaimin
d
mind,heappointedacommissionchairedbytheformerheadof
theBankofJapan,MaekawaHaruo.Nakasonehaddeliberately
staﬀed the group with reformist, market-oriented economists
andintellectuals,knowingtheywouldproposeareformvision
that would please American critics of Japanese trade policy.
athisaudiencewasprimarilyforeignisalsosuggestedbyhis
decision to request that the commission complete its reports
justintimetodeliverthemduring“Ron-Yasu”summitmeetings.
ereportswereindeedamarkeddeparturefromearlier
economic policy reports. Calling for “policies based upon
market mechanisms,” the Maekawa Commission urged the
government to promote deregulation based on the idea that
thereshouldbe“freedominprinciple,restrictionsonlyasexceptions.”Ratherthanrelyingonincreasedexportstopropelthe
economyforward,iturged,thegovernmentshould“strivefor
economic growth based on domestic demand” in areas like
housingandsocialinfrastructure.Suchchangeswerenecessary,
itargued,notbecauseAmericansdemandedthem,butbecause
“thetimehascomeforJapantomakeahistoricaltransformation
in its traditional policies on economic management. … ere
canbenofurtherdevelopmentforJapanwithoutthistransformation”(MaekawaCommission98,–0).
Atthetime,theMaekawareportswerewidelydismissedas
“windowdressing,”bothinsideJapanandintheUnitedStates.
eprivateadvisoryorganhadnolegalstandingobligingthe
governmenttofollowitsrecommendations,soitsprettywords
about how Japan would beneﬁt from market-oriented reform
wereseenaslittlemorethananattempttodistractAmerican
criticssotheywouldnotnoticehowslowlyJapanwasactually
changing.Overtime,however,thereportsdidhaveanimpact.
Japanese reformers involved in their preparation referred to
them to back up their arguments, and US oﬃcials brought
themupduringsubsequentbilateraltalks,especiallyduringthe
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Structural Impediments Initiative between 989 and 99
(Armacost996;Schoppa99).
Although the Maekawa Commission and the stubborn
recessionoftheearly990shadmadeliberalideasabouttrade
andcompetitionmorelegitimatewithinJapanbythetimethe
Clinton administration took oﬃce in 99, the Japanese elite
couldnotyetbecalledconverts.Facedwithpost-bubbleproblemsintheﬁnancialsystem,thecabinetledbyMiyazawaKiichi
hadproppedupthestockmarketandbankingsysteminstead
ofallowingmarketforcestoacceleratethestructuraladjustment
of the economy, and once again the Japanese were relying on
growingtradesurplusestoplugthedemandgap.Whenittook
oﬃcetheClintonteamthussteppedupthepressure,vowingto
forceJapantoacceptvoluntaryimportexpansion(vie)targets
astheprimarymeansofopeningthenation’smarkets.
Unwillingtoacceptvies,Japaneseeconomicoﬃcialsonce
againplannedtouseAmericanliberaleconomicideastodeﬂect
bilateralpressure.WhentheClintonteampressedMiyazawato
accepttargetsduringhisspring99visittoWashington,the
prime minister and oﬃcials traveling with him spoke from a
well-coordinatedscript.vieswouldrequiretheJapanesegovernmenttoincrease itsinterventioninthenation’seconomyata
timewhenitwastryingtomovetoamorefreemarketapproach,
theysaid.Japanwasﬁnallytryingtoliveuptotheliberalideals
Americahadbeensellingforsolong.Itwasnowonthesideof
“free trade,” whereas the Americans were pushing “managed
trade.”eJapanesecontinuedthislineofrhetoricthroughthe
conclusionoftheautodisputeinthesummerof99,togood
eﬀect(Lincoln999).eyultimatelywontheEuropeansand
otherthirdpartiesovertotheirsideastheyisolatedtheClinton
teaminternationally,astrategythathelpedJapanfendoﬀvie
demands.
Although this Japanese attempt to hide behind the “free
trade”bannerwasagainmostlyapublicrelationsexercise,the
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rhetoric had consequences. Having claimed that the Japanese
governmentwasmovingawayfrommarketintervention,JapaneseoﬃcialsinvolvedintheframeworktalkswiththeClinton
administration risked being ridiculed unless they could show
thatthegovernmentwasindeedliberalizingtheeconomy.Partly
tofendoﬀaccusationsofthiskind,theprimeministerwhohad
replacedMiyazawaafterelectionsinJuly99,HosokawaMorihiro, quickly charged another blue ribbon commission with
mappingoutareformplan.Heinstructedittoreportbackby
Decembersothathewouldhavesomethinginhandbeforehe
hadtotraveltotheUnitedStates.Hosokawamodeledthenew
commission on the earlier Maekawa Commission, inviting
Hiraiwa Gaishi, head of Keidanren, to head the panel and
bringingonboardreformisteconomistssuchasNakataniIwao.
eHiraiwaCommissionreportagainfeaturedliberalideas
about how Japan needed deregulation, market-opening, and
competitiontopropelitsrecoveryfromthepost-bubblerecession(NakataniandOhta994).istime,however,thecommission took more care to assure that the momentum that had
builtupduringitshighproﬁledeliberationswouldnotbelost
assoonasitsmeetingsended.Iturgedthecreationofaderegulationpromotionheadquarters,thegovernment’scommitment
toaﬁve-yearderegulationactionprogram,andthepublication
of annual deregulation white papers—recommendations that
werealladoptedbytheHosokawacabinetintheearlymonths
of994(Carlile998).Byinstitutionalizingitsideasinthisway,
it thus helped guarantee that the public would be seeing a
steadystreamofpro-marketadvisorycouncilreportsfromthe
governmentoverthesucceedingyears.
CriticsofJapaneseeconomicpolicyhavebelittledtheinitial
deregulationplansofthemid-990saslittlemorethanrepackaged,bureaucraticinitiatives(CarlileandTilton998).Anarrow
focus on the immediate results misses, however, the longerterm consequences of Japan’s decision to trumpet liberal
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rhetoricandideasinreportssuchasthese.Withinmonthsof
the Hiraiwa Commission’s adjournment, one of its leading
members, Nakatani, was loudly bemoaning the failure of the
commissiontoliveuptoitsrhetoric(NakataniandOhta998).
Afewyearslater,TakenakaHeizō,anotherreformisteconomist
who played a leading role on the Economic Strategy Council
under Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, similarly lambasted the
governmentforfailingtomatchitsrhetoricwithdeeds.ese
advocatesofmarket-orientedreformdidnotjustwritebooks,
theyappearedoverandoveragainontelevision,gainingawide
audiencefortheirviewsandvirtualcelebritystatus—especially
asJapanrelapsedintorecessionafter99andagainafter000.
Ineachcase,theyhadalargeraudiencethantheywouldhave
becausetheyappearedas“I-told-you-so”prophets,arguingthat
theeconomy’sdiﬃcultiesgrewoutofthenation’sfailuretofully
enacttheirpro-marketpolicypackages.
Bytheendofthedecade,liberalideasweretheneworthodoxyinJapan.Policywasnotyetalignedwiththeseideas,but
everywhere one looked one saw government reports, bestsellingbooks,andtelevisioncommentatorscriticizingregulations and trade protection for stiﬂing economic growth and
touting rule-based market competition as the tonic for what
ailed the nation. Not just Nakatani and Takenaka, but other
reform economists and intellectuals, such as Sakaiya Taichi
(999), Katō Kan (99), and Noguchi Yukio (99), all wrote
hot-sellingbooksfeaturedincascadingdisplaysinTokyo’sbookstorewindows.
Meanwhile the government continued to churn out economicpolicyreports,bythistimeindependentoftheUS-Japan
negotiating calendar, urging Japan to embrace competition,
individualism, and risk-taking. Particularly notable was the
languagechosenbytwoadvisorycouncilsorganizedbyPrime
MinisterObuchiKeizōaftertheeconomyhitanewlowamid
fearsofaﬁnancialcrisisinthesummerof998.Neitherofthese
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reportswasmotivatedbyadesiretogivetheAmericanssome
prettyprosetodistractthemfrombilateraltradedemands.As
the panels deliberated in 998 and 999, US-Japan economic
relations were as relaxed as they had been in many years.
Obuchiconvenedthepanelssimplytoprovidethegovernment
with blue prints for the future that would guide Japan’s own
eﬀortstorestoretheeconomytohealthasitenteredthenew
century.
e ﬁrst panel, organized immediately after Obuchi took
oﬃce,washeadedbybusinessmanHiguchiHirotarō.Itwasthe
EconomicStrategyCouncil,chargedwiththeurgentandimmediate task of recommending how Japan could right-end an
economythatwasonthebrinkofaﬁnancialcrisisandsuﬀering
from deﬂationary tendencies. e panel’s recommendations
again emphasized competition. It blamed Japan’s economic
problemsontheprevalenceof“moralhazard”situations“where
consequencesdonotchangeregardlessofwhetherpeopletry
to do their best.” It called for reforms that would introduce a
“competitivesocietywithsoundnessandcreativity”inplaceof
theold“convoysystem”(EconomicStrategyCouncil999,9).
Alsointerestingwasthereportissuedbyafollow-uppanel,
thePrimeMinister’sCommissiononJapan’sGoalsinthest
Century (000), that was tasked by Obuchi with the job of
ﬂeshingoutalongertermvision.Inasectiontitled“Realizing
Japan’sPotential,”thecommissionwrote:
eotheressentialchangeistoredeﬁneandrebuildthe
relationshipbetweenprivateandpublicspaceincivilsociety.
is means ﬁrst and foremost promoting individuality and
individualinitiatives:unleashingsturdyindividualswhoare
free,self-reliant,andresponsible….esetoughyetﬂexible
individualswillparticipateinandexpandpublicforumson
their own initiative, creating a dynamic public space. e
public space thus cultivated will provide individuals with
morediversechoicesandopportunities.iswillleadtothe
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emergenceofindividualsandasocietythattakerisksmore
boldly,addresspioneeringchallenges,andaremorecreative
andimaginative.
(p.)

Elsewhere,thereportspeaksabouttheneedforJapantoreplace
agovernancesystemwhereexaltedoﬃcialslookdownoncitizens with a new contractual relationship where “the people”
delegateauthoritytotheirgovernment(pp.6–).IftheMaekawa
andHiraiwareportssometimesreadliketheworkofastudent
tryingtousewordsandphrasesthatwouldpleasetheteacher,
thesemorerecentdocuments,preparedmostlyforconsumption
bytheJapanesepublic,suggestedthatJapaneseeliteshadinternalizedliberalideals.

Defensive Multilateralism
Beforeturningtotheconsequencesofthisideationalshift,we
need to consider another channel through which American
aggressivebilateraltradepressureledJapaneseeconomicelites
toimbibeliberaleconomicideas.Bythemid-990s,Japanwas
amongthemostenthusiasticcheerleadersofthewto (Pekkanen00aand00b;seealsoDavisandShirato00).During
theirtensestandoﬀwiththeUnitedStatesovertheautodispute,
Japanesenegotiatorspresentedthemselvesasthedefendersof
themultilateraltradeorderagainstAmericanaggressiveunilateralism. When the United States attempted to pressure Japan
intonegotiatingbilaterallytoresolvetheirsubsequentdispute
over photographic ﬁlm, Japan again insisted that all such
disputes needed to be referred to the wto. More recently,
Japan stepped forward during the lead-up to the new Doha
Roundasaleadingadvocateofwto reformsdesignedtoend
abusesofanti-dumpingremedies.
Japan’s embrace of multilateralism in the 990s certainly
contrastedwithitsslowcompliancewithgatt andoecd rules
inthe960sand90sandsuggestedthatthenation“hadseen
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thelight”andchangeditsviewsonitsown.Infact,theconversionhadbeenverymuchassistedbytheUnitedStates,which,
throughinsistentbilateraldemands,droveJapantoseekrefuge
inmultilateralism.Japanesegovernmentoﬃcialsarequitefrank
toadmitthattheyturnedtothegatt andwto inself-defense.1
Inthelate980s,afterCongressaddeda“Super0”provision
targeting Japan under US trade law, Japanese oﬃcials began
considering how best to counter the intolerable trend toward
escalatingdemands.Ataboutthesametime,gatt signatories
were considering ways to improve the organization’s dispute
settlementmechanism.Japaneseoﬃcialsquicklyrealizedthat
proposedreforms,whichafteradoptioneliminatedtheability
of losing parties to veto dispute panel rulings and reduced
opportunities for delay, provided another means for them to
deﬂect bilateral demands. Because the United States too was
backing the reforms, they could insist that American oﬃcials
liveuptotheircommitmentbyreferringallsubsequentdisputes
to this body. ey could also counter any American threat to
imposesanctionsunilaterallywithathreattochallengesucha
movebeforeawto panel(Schoppa999).
Japaneseoﬃcialsalsoworkedtochannelbilateraldisputes
involvingcompetitionpolicyandregulatoryharmonizationinto
theoecd,anothervenuefordiscussingissuesinamultilateral
setting. Competition policy was not something the wto had
traditionallyhandled.FacedwithAmericandemandsthatthereforetheseissuesneededtobehandledbilaterally,Ministryof
InternationalTradeandIndustry(miti)oﬃcialsproposedthe
oecd as an alternative forum for dealing with these issues.
miti oﬃcialsalsosoughttoimprovetheirabilitytoresistbilateralpressuretoharmonizeregulationsonAmerican standards
byturningtotheoecd asaforuminwhichtheJapanesecould
pointtoanumberofcompetingregulatorystandardscloserto
thoseemployedinJapan.
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oughmotivatedprimarilybydefensiveconcerns,Japan’s
embraceofmultilateralismagainhadconsequences.Oneofthe
most interesting consequences was the eﬀect of this strategy
shiftonJapaneseoﬃcialssenttostaﬀtheseinternationalorganizations and negotiate under their jurisdiction. Whereas the
mostpromisingyoungoﬃcialsintheMinistryofForeignAﬀairs
(mofa) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(meti) had, in the past, been routed through key positions
dealing with the bilateral relations since the late 980s, these
ministrieshavepromotedtothemostseniorpositionsoﬃcials
with extensive experience in multilateral economic organizations. Oﬃcials admit that this personnel shift reﬂected their
consciousdecisiontoputmoreemphasisonmultilateralismin
ordertocounterAmericantradepressure.2
Likethedecisiontoincorporateliberalrhetoricintogovernment reports, this strategy had ideational consequences. It is
well known that international organizations like the InternationalMonetaryFund(imf),wto,andoecd shareanorganizational culture that emphasizes neoclassical economics.
ough John Williamson (990) was referring mostly to the
Washington-based international organizations (the imf and
World Bank) when he coined the term “Washington Consensus,”thephrasecapturesjustaswelltheeconomicideology
oftheoecd (basedinParis)andwto (Geneva).Eachofthese
institutionsemployslargenumberofeconomists,mostofthem
trained in the United States even if they are not American
themselves.epoliciestheyrecommendincludeprivatization
of state-owned enterprises, deregulation, and labor market
reforms.Bysendingfast-trackyoungoﬃcialstoserveinthese
institutionsforperiodsoftwoormoreyears,thegovernment
assumed the risk that they might absorb some of these ideas
thatweresocontradictorytothepre-990conventionalwisdom
inTokyo.
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Someofthemclearlydid.OneexampleisKawamotoAkira,
ayoungmeti oﬃcialwhowassentin99toserveonthestaﬀ
oftheoecd inParis.Inthatcapacity,oneofhisdutieswasto
assist in the preparation of the OECD Review of Regulatory
Reform in Japan,publishedin999.Overanextendedperiod,
he was required to respond to criticism of Japanese policy
basedlargelyonneoclassicalideasaboutthebeneﬁtsofcompetition.AlthoughhisjobwastomakesureJapandidnotcome
oﬀlookingtoobadinthereport,hehadtophrasehisdefenses
intermsthatappealedtothepermanentoecd staﬀ.edaily
experience, he reports, convinced him that Japan needed farreachingreform.3 WhileinParis,hewroteamass-marketbook
titledRegulatory Reform: Competition and Cooperation (998),
emphasizingJapan’sneedtoharnesscompetitivemarketforces
inordertodealwithitseconomicproblems.Afterhereturned
from Paris, he was tasked ﬁrst with helping to draft the
ministry’sWhitePaper,sketchingoutitsoverallpolicyvision.
In00,hewasgivenajobwherehehadanopportunitytoput
hisideasintopractice.AsheadoftheElectricityMarketDivision,hehelpeddraftnewregulationsfortheelectricitysector
thathaveintroduced(alimiteddegreeof )marketcompetition
intoasectorthathadpreviouslybeendominatedcompletelyby
regionalmonopolies(Schoppa006).
Such experiences, shared by many other young economic
oﬃcials, have helped further consolidate the ideational shift
towardtheacceptanceofneoclassicalviewsoneconomiccauses
and eﬀects within the Japanese government. My experience
talking with economic bureaucrats over the past ten years
suggeststhatmostoftheunder-4generation,aswellasmany
of those above this level, now accept the view that market
competition,facilitatedbyampleinternationaltradeandinvestment, is required to make mature economies such as Japan’s
more productive and wealthy. Older and retired bureaucrats
suchasSakakibara(999)maystilltouttheadvantagesofJapan’s
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state-ledapproach,buthisviewsarenowintheminorityamong
government oﬃcials—not just in meti and mofa but also in
mof.

e Consequences of Ideational Change
Changes in economic ideas, of course, do not in themselves
constitutechangesinpolicy.oughJapanesebureaucratsand
otherelitesnowaccepttheideathatcoddlingincumbentﬁrms
through regulation and trade protection imposes costs on
society, they are frequently unable to move reforms based on
theseideasthroughthepolicyprocessinthefaceofinertiabuilt
upovermanyyearsofrunningtheeconomybasedontheJapanesemodel.Indeed,actualchangeineconomicpolicyhappens
slowly,withthegovernmenthesitanttounleashmarketforces
that might lead to cascading bankruptcies and rising unemploymentandpromisetohurtmostthoseconstituenciestied
mostcloselytotherulingLiberalDemocraticParty(ldp).
Nevertheless,theshiftinideasIhavedescribedhasalready
hadtwoconsequencesthathavestartedtomoveactualpolicy
outcomesinaliberaldirectionandmakecontinuedmovement
in this direction likely in the future. First, liberal economic
reformshavereachedthetopofthepolicyagenda.Scholarsof
publicpolicyhavelongemphasizedhowpolicychangedepends
criticallyonwhichalternativesareonthetable(Kingdon984).
e predominance of liberal economic ideas in Japan today
guarantees that whenever there is enough energy to generate
policychange,reformsalmostalwaysinvolvefurtherrelaxation
ofregulationsandopeningofmarkets.Second,liberalideasare
beinginstitutionalizedthroughchangesindomesticandinternationallawinwaysthatpromisetoshapepolicyforyearsto
come.
Bothofthesecausalmechanismsthroughwhichideasshape
policy can be seen at work in the example of Prime Minister
HashimotoRyutaro’sBigBangreforms.Announcedinthefall
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of996,thisinitiativewasdesignedtomakeJapaneseﬁnancial
markets“free,fair,andglobal.”Interestingly,neitherHashimoto
northechiefarchitectwithintheMinistryofFinance,Sakakibara,wasregardedasaliberal.Yet,facedwiththeneedtodo
something aboutthehollowingoutofJapaneseﬁnancialmarkets,
theyturnedtothesetofproposalsthathappenedtobeonthe
agenda—all of which involved introducing more competitive
marketforcesintoﬁnancialmarkets.Justadecadeearlier,when
themof hadbeenpressuredtoliberalizeﬁnancialmarkets,it
had done so in ways that actually increased oﬃcials’ discretionarypowerbycreating“morerules”(Vogel996).istime,
with the dominant ideology having shifted to a point where
mosteconomicelitessawaneedforJapantoconstrain bureaucraticdiscretionandrelyonmarketforces,thepolicypackage
Hashimotoannouncedtookagenuinelyliberalform.
oughphasedinmoreslowlythantheBritishBigBangof
the atcher years, with the ﬁnal measures not implemented
until00,thepackageliveduptothispromise.Firmspreviously
operating in segmented markets for various banking services
(city, trust, and long-term credit), various types of insurance
(casualty,life,andthirdsector),andsecuritiesarenowfreeto
competeacrossalloftheseboundaries.Previouslystrictlyregulatedfeesfortheseserviceswereliberalizedsothatﬁrmscan
competebasedonprice.Allforeignexchangerestrictionswere
eliminated, allowing capital to ﬂow across borders with no
restrictions. e government guarantee that had previously
promised no bank would be allowed to fail was removed
(Laurence00).esereformshavealreadyhadamajorimpact
on this area of business, with foreign ﬁrms playing a much
largerroleinawiderrangeofﬁnancialservicesandJapanese
ﬁrms having to worry much more than in the past about the
possibilityofbankruptcyiftheyfailtocompete.
eBigBangalsoillustrateshowideas,onceinstitutionalized,canhavebroadandlong-lastingeﬀects.Oncedismantled,
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the government cannot easily recreate the convoy. Once the
reformsbegantobeimplementedinthelate990s,thegovernmentwasnolongerabletokeeptheweakestﬁrmsinbanking,
securities,andinsuranceaﬂoat.Andonceﬁrmsintheﬁnancial
sectorsawthattheirsurvivalwasatrisk,theystoppedsupportingtheweakest,mostover-leveragedﬁrmsinretail,construction,andmanufacturing.atbothﬁnancialandnonﬁnancial
ﬁrmsnowfacethepossibilityofbankruptcymeanstheycannot
aﬀordtooverlookopportunitiestobuygoodforeignproducts
atacheaperpriceorenterintopartnershipswithcompetitive
foreignﬁrms.isshiftinincentivesaﬀectingtheprocurement
andbusinessstrategiesofJapaneseﬁrmshasalreadyplayeda
major role in opening up what were once closed markets in
Japan.
eroleofideascouldalsobeseenatworkinthetermof
KoizumiJun’ichiroasprimeminister.Facedwithstubborndebt
anddeﬂationproblems,Koizumiembracedareformistvision
thatwasevenmorecloselyattunedtothenewliberalorthodoxy
than Hashimoto’s Big Bang. He could have emphasized increasedspendingonunemploymentinsuranceandothermeasuresofthistype,designedtoreassurevotersnervousaboutthe
economy’s continued poor performance, but instead he, too,
focusedonasetofreformsthatwerelargelybasedonliberal
economic principles. His slogan, “structural reform without
sanctuaries,”toldvotershewantedtohelpacceleratethepace
at which the economy adjusted to market forces. ough it
promisedpainintheshortterm,theideawaspopularenough
tohelphimwinapprovalratingsthattopped80percentearlyin
his term and were high enough even in 00 to allow him to
challengeopponentsofliberalreformsinsidetheldp.
e speciﬁc reforms he stressed, too, were liberal ideas,
includingafreezeongovernmentdebtissuanceandtheprivatization of public corporations—including Japan Highway, the
Japan Housing Finance Agency, and the mail, banking, and
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insuranceservicesprovidedbythepostalservice.Koizumihad
a decidedly mixed record in his eﬀorts to push forward this
liberalreformagenda(Schoppa006).HisattempttorestructureJapanHighwayinawaythatwouldconstrainitsabilityto
ﬁnance extensive new road construction failed. On the other
hand,theJapanHousingFinanceAgencywasrestructuredina
waythattookitcompletelyoutofthebusinessofprovidingnew
housingloans.Itnowoperatesprimarilythroughitsroleinthe
secondary markets, like Fannie Mae. Koizumi’s most famous
achievement—the privatization of Japan Post, secured by
expellingrebelldp Dietmembersfromthepartyandcallingan
earlyelectionin00—isnotasclearavictoryforliberalreform
as was advertised at the time. To secure the passage of this
legislation,Koizumiwasforcedtoacceptanumberofcompromises that have limited the entry of new competitors in mail
servicesandhavedraggedouttheprocessofprivatizingpostal
ﬁnancial services to such a degree that it remains unclear
whethertherestructuredJapanPostwillbeginrechannelingits
massive ﬁnancial assets away from the traditionally favored,
government-aﬃliatedclients(Maclachlan,006).Mypointhere
isnotthatliberaleconomicideashavetriumphedoverallopposition, but that they set the agenda in such a way that policy
change since 000 has moved mostly in a liberal direction
wheneverpoliticalenergyhascreatedanopening.
e ﬁnal set of economic policies that can be linked to
Japan’semergingeconomicliberalismarethosethatdealdirectly
withtrade:theproposalsforJapantoparticipateinanexpanding
arrayofbilateral,andnowregion-wide,freetradeareas(Manger
00;Pekkanen00;andNobleinthisvolume).BilateralFree
TradeAgreements(fta)havenowbeencompletedwithSingapore, Mexico, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and additional
bilateral deals are in the works. And these bilateral deals are
now being supplemented by regional deals, starting with a
recently-signedfta linkingJapanandAssociationofSoutheast
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Asian Nations (asean), that may lead eventually to wider
regional agreements including China, Korea, India, Australia,
NewZealand,andmaybeeventheUnitedStates.4 eseagreements are clearly driven in part by forces outside Japan, and
cannotbeattributedsolelytoashiftinideasamongJapanese
elites.Japan’sinterestinftasbeganwhenothernations(Mexico
andSingapore)cametometi withproposals,anditswillingness
toconsideronewithasean asawholehadmuchtodowith
thatorganization’searlierdecisiontosignonewithChina.But
the rapid pace with which they have accumulated is also a
reﬂectionofmeti’sview,heavilyinﬂuencedbyliberaleconomic
ideas,thatJapancannotaﬀordtobeleftbehindastheUnited
StatesandEuropegainadvantagesbywideninganddeepening
their own regional free trade networks (Krauss 000). meti
oﬃcialsseethesefreetradeareasnotonlyasopportunitiesto
expandexportmarketsforJapanesegoodsandassisttransnationalJapaneseﬁrmswithoperationsspreadacrosstheregion
butalsoasopportunitiestobringimportcompetitiontobear
on ineﬃcient Japanese industries in ways that force them to
becomemorecompetitive.Freetradeisnowseenwithinmeti
asavitalpartofitseﬀorttoacceleratestructuraladjustmentof
theeconomy.
Of course, Japan’s regional trade policy continues to be
constrained by politicians and ministries that do not share
meti’senthusiasmforstructuraladjustment.Singaporebecame
Japan’sﬁrstfta partnerinlargepartbecauseitdoesnothave
anagriculturalsectorthatthreatenstochallengeJapan’sineﬃcientproducers.Whilethepoweroffarmers’materialinterests
trumpsJapan’semergingeconomicliberalisminmanycases(as
ithasintheUnitedStatesandEurope),thisshouldnotdistract
us from the fact that outside of agriculture these agreements
promisetomarkedlyincreasetradevolumes,investmentﬂows,
andinternationalcompetition—exactlywhatliberaleconomic
doctrineprescribes.
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Conclusion
ischapterhasarguedthatJapan’sshifttowardamoreproactiveforeigneconomicpolicyisaproductofacomplexlearning
process that has convinced Japanese economic elites that the
nation’seconomicinterestsnowlieindismantlingconvoycapitalismandintroducingmarketforces.Ratherthanwaitingfor
pressurefromtheUnitedStatestoforceittoadoptthesepolicies,theseideasaregeneratinghome-growninitiativeslikethe
Big Bang, structural reform without sanctuaries, and regional
freetradeagreementsthatareopeningJapanuptoforeignand
domesticcompetitionfor its own sake.Whereasrecentinitiatives
have been “home-grown,” however, the process of ideational
changethathashelpedproducethemwasinparttheproduct
ofJapan’searlierinteractionswiththeUnitedStates.Itseﬀorts
to deﬂect gaiatsu by setting up liberal advisory councils and
usingliberalrhetoricendeduplegitimizingtheseviews,especiallyafterJapan’seconomyentereditsdecade-longslump.At
the same time, when it sought to channel negotiations into
multilateralinstitutions,itendedupexposingthenewgenerationoffast-trackedeconomicoﬃcialstotheliberalideasthat
dominatetheseinstitutions.WecannotmakesenseofJapan’s
shifttowardaproactiveforeigneconomicpolicywithoutappreciatingtherolegaiatsu playedinspeedinganddirectingJapan’s
learningprocess.
islastclaimisperhapsthemostlikelytobechallenged
byskepticalreaders.Isn’titpossiblethattheshiftinideasIhave
described here is best explained by the economic diﬃculties
thatconfrontedJapanduringthe990s?Americantradepressure and related interactions among American and Japanese
economic elites were not necessary to bring about the shift
becauseitwasboundtohappeninviewoftheeconomicdiﬃculties Japan was confronting. Readers who are themselves
believersinorthodoxneoclassicaleconomicideasarelikelyto
concludethatitwasonly“natural”thatJapaneseelitesturned
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tomarketcompetitionasthealternativetotheJapanesemodel
whenthatsystemwassoobviouslyfailing.
Iagreethatthenation’seconomicdiﬃculties,likeAmerican
diﬃcultiesduringtheGreatDepression,wereamajorcauseof
theideationalshift.ToassumethatthereforeJapanwasdestined
tolearnthattheAmericanmodelwassuperior,however,isto
ignoretheinherentdiﬃcultiesnationsfacewhenanoldorthodoxyisoverthrown.Rejectionoftheoldapproachdoesnotlead
automaticallytotheacceptanceofanewonebecausethereare
usuallyseveralcontendingapproaches.eextensiveattention
paidtotheUnitedStatesbecauseitwasJapan’sprimaryinterlocutorintradeandeconomicdiplomacy,andthewayinwhich
thisledtheJapanesegovernmenttoparrotliberalideas,played
acriticalroleinmakingAmerican-styleliberalcapitalismthe
“focalpoint”asJapaneseelitessearchedforalternativestothe
ﬂounderingJapanesemodel.
Wecannotrerunthe990swithoutAmericaninﬂuenceto
seeifJapanwouldhavesettledsoquicklyonliberalismasthe
alternative to the Japanese model, purely due to its economic
diﬃculties.ebestwecandoistoconsideracounterfactual.
What if Japan’s primary interlocutor during these years had
beenEurope?eproblemsJapanhasfacedinthe990shave
notbeenmerelythoseofeﬃciencybutalsoofeconomicinsecurityandassociatedtendencyofconsumerstoholdbackon
consumption.IfJapanhadbeenheavilyengagedineconomic
negotiations with Europe during these years, isn’t it possible
that the European welfare state might have emerged as the
orthodoxanswertoJapan’seconomicworries?
Of course this is not how history unfolded. Instead, the
loudestgaiatsu camefromtheUnitedStates,andJapantailored
its response to the American audience. e government peppereditspublicationswithnodstotheeconomiceﬃciencyof
markets;economicnegotiatorssoughttocountertheAmericans
by portraying themselves as champions of free trade; and the
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nationsentitsbrightestyoungoﬃcialstoparticipateinmultilateral economic institutions. It should not surprise us that
these strategic reactions to American pressure led Japan to
honeinonAmerican-stylecapitalismastheprimaryalternative
totheJapanesemodel.

Notes
 Interviewswithtworetired,seniorMinistryofEconomy,Trade,and
Industry(meti)oﬃcials,996and998.
 Interviewwithmiti andMinistryofForeignAﬀairs(mofa)oﬃcials,
996and998.
 InterviewwithKawamotoAkira,999.
4 Burton00.
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6
Bank of Japan Independence at Ten Years:
Searching for Mechanisms of Change
Jennifer Holt Dwyer

is chapter examines the consequencesofthenewBankofJapan(boj)Lawof997toexplorethe
mechanisms through which individual institutional reforms
suchasthismightleadtomeaningfulchangeinJapan’spolitical
economy over time. Although Japan adopted a plethora of
reformsinthe99s,thisstudyfocusesonthecaseofcentral
bankreform.ecaseconfrontstheadditionalpuzzleofhow
theboj hasmanagedtomaintainitsnewlylegislatedindependenceeventhoughithascomeunderunprecedentedcriticism
during this time. e Bank has not achieved the monetary
policyorpoliticalstabilityoutcomesthatdominanttheoretical
argumentsaboutcentralbankindependencepredict.atthe
Bank of Japan was under ﬁre for not producing the expected
macroeconomicstabilitydoesnotprovethattheboj wasdoing
anythingwrong.Monetarypolicyindeﬂationarytimesisnearly
impossible.isstudyproposesthatcentralbankindependence
inJapanhasbeensupportedbycontinuingdomesticpolitical
uncertainty,aswellassomeofthelongertermconsequencesof
thelegalreform.eseincludechangesinrelevantactors’institutional interests, new distributions of political and informational advantages, and the persistence of central bank
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independence as the internationally recognized marker of
qualitycentralbanking.
is investigation concerns path dependency. But, rather
than looking at how the past constrains what came next, this
studyisdesignedtoidentifysomeofthewayspresentinstitutionalrelationshipsarelikelytoimpactJapan’spoliticaleconomy
goingforward.Itismotivated,inpart,bytheongoingdebate
overwhethergoverninginstitutions,deeplyembeddedinsocial
andpoliticalnetworks,changesigniﬁcantlythroughinstitutional
reform,orwhetherthisembeddednessandtheassociatedinstitutionalinterdependenceeﬀectivelypreventinstitutionalchange
muchbeyondareproductionoftheexistingsocio-politicalrelationships.Intheextreme,thisresearchquestionswhetherthe
well-known political economy characteristics we all dutifully
learnedasdeﬁningwhatisuniqueaboutJapan,willevergive
way to something we would recognize as fundamentally different. If this more radical redirection of a national political
economy is possible, then it behooves us to search for the
mechanisms through which this transformation takes place.
Althoughonlyonecase,thisstudyofcentralbankreformillustrates how even a single reform can lead to change in the
broader political economy over time as actors’ interests, as
deﬁnedbytheirorganizationaﬃliations,changeandinformation ﬂows adjust to new institutional patterns, both of which
contribute to new politics. In this way our understanding of
how the policy of central bank reform may have transformed
politicsovertimeshouldshedlightontheextenttowhichthe
99s decade of reform may eventually lead to what we all
recognizeasquitediﬀerentpoliticaleconomy.
e study begins with a very brief review of how the boj
reform emerged as an electoral strategy in the midst of the
politicallyturbulent99s.Itthendiscussestheextenttowhich
thereformdidnotleadtotheoutcomesmostpredictedbythe
centralbankindependenceliterature,namelypricestabilityand
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a depoliticization of monetary policy. What has happened is
thatmonetarypolicyhasfailedtostemdeﬂation,andtheboj
hasbeensubjecttoanalmostunbrokenfloodofcriticismand
secondguessingatboththedomesticandinternationallevels.
After briefly identifying some of the domestic and internationaldevelopmentsthatundoubtedlyaddedtothedifficulties
forthenewlyindependentboj,thechapterexploressomeof
the circumstances that have supported the continuation of
boj independence over this period despite the above mentioned difficulties. Taken together, these sections emphasize
that, even though most lawmakers who supported the new
lawmaynothaveintendedtosignificantlyalterthedistribution
ofeconomicpolicymakingpowerinJapan,thenewboj law,in
combination with other reforms adopted at the same time,
may have a more lasting impact than many expected. The
finalsectiondiscussespredictionsforthenear-termfutureof
theboj independence.

e New Bank of Japan Law:
e Unexpected Child of Domestic Political Uncertainty
eburstingoftheassetbubbleeconomyinJapanin99left
in its wake disruptions in both the economic and political
arenas.1 In99,fortheﬁrsttimein8years,therulingLiberal
Democratic Party (ldp) lost its longstanding position as the
ruling party in Japan’s Diet. Although the ldp’s absence from
government was short lived, and they came back to power
withinayearaspartofacoalitiongovernment,by996,when
most of the debates about reforming the central bank took
place,Japanwasbeinggovernedbyitsﬁfthprimeministerin
three years. Further complicating the calculations of Japan’s
political party strategists was the government’s adoption of
electoralreformsin994.Inshort,domesticpoliticaluncertainty
wasgreaterthanithadbeenatanytimeinthepostwarperiod,
asevidencedbythealmostconstantformationandreformation
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ofpoliticalpartiesandcoalitiongovernmentsduringthisthree
yearperiod.2
ese developments encouraged politicians from many
partiestosearchforsomethingtoturntheelectoraltideintheir
favor. In particular, the ldp was desperate to do well in the
upcoming996lower-houseelectionsandbeyond,havinglost
fourseatsandwatchedanewpartywin8inthe995upperhouseelection.GivenJapan’seconomicdeclinesince99,the
risingawarenessofthenonperformingloanproblemandJusen
crisesfrom995,andtheexposureofnumerousadministrative
scandals,theldp leadershipwaslookingforsomewaytodeﬂect
theelectorate’sangerandprovetheywereas“reformist”asthe
explicitly reform-oriented newer parties. For their part, the
otherparties,aswellasthegeneralpopulation,placedmostof
the blame for Japan’s plight on what was viewed as the ldp’s
poor oversight of excessively powerful Ministry of Finance
(mof) bureaucrats. It was under these circumstances that
granting the Bank of Japan greater independence became an
attractiveelectoraltacticforboththeldp andtheopposition.
e new boj law was formally adopted in 997 and took
eﬀectin998.emostimportantaspectsofthenewlawwere
thatitgrantedindependenceandimposedtransparencyrequirements.Althoughcentralbankindependenceisgenerallyunderstoodtomeanindependencefromthegovernmentasawhole,
inthemidstoftheunprecedentedwaveofcriticismofbureaucratsduringthisperiod,mostoftheoﬃcialdeliberationsand
newspaper reports emphasized freeing the boj from institutionaldependenciesthatenabledthemof toinﬂuencemonetary
policy.Generalizing,non-ldp politiciansleaderssupportedthis
reformbecausetheyvieweditasaﬁrststepindiminishingthe
ldp’s inﬂuence through its close ties to the mof. e ldp
leaderssupporteditbecauseitoﬀeredawaytoshiftblamefor
Japan’spooreconomicperformancetothemof,placatethose
demandingfargreatermof reform,andcountercriticismthat
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theldp wasnotadequatelyreformisttoaddressJapan’slitany
ofproblems.
Asemphasizedabove,centralbankreformwasputonthe
agenda in Japan primarily because of the domestic political
circumstancesdescribedabove;neithermultilateralagreements
nor gaiatusu played any role. Nevertheless, the process was
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by international ﬁnancial market and
ideationaltrends.First,bythemid-99s,Japanwaslosingits
competitiveness as an international ﬁnancial center, and this
development concerned those who were considering central
bankreform.Speciﬁcally,foreignﬁnancialﬁrmsthathadrushed
into Japan in the 98s to take advantage of abundant capital
andskyrocketingstockandrealestatemarketsbeganrelocating
businesses to other parts of Asia. Although foreign ﬁrms did
not represent a large share of the domestic market, they did
bring asset and liability management skills, secondary debt
market experience from the US savings and loan meltdown,
and other types of ﬁnancial expertise that Japanese ﬁnancial
ﬁrms and ﬁnancial market regulators increasingly sought as
Japan’sﬁnancialsectorproblemsincreased.Ontheotherhand,
and somewhat ironically, the percentage of Japanese shares
owned by foreigners rose to a new peak in 996, and these
foreignshareholderswereamongthemostactivetraders.Asa
result, the potential impact of foreign participation in Japan’s
ﬁnancial markets, or lack thereof, was greater than a simple
measure of foreigner-owned market share would suggest. At
theinternationallevel,thedecliningcompetitivenessofJapan
asaﬁnancialcenterwasevidentwhenJapaneseﬁnancialinstitutionsandsomeﬁrmsweredowngradedbycredit-ratingagencies, and Japanese banks were charged a signiﬁcant “Japan
premium”toborrowinoverseasmarkets.Astheyearspassed,
Japaneseﬁrmsthathadoncedominatedtheinternationalleague
tables began dropping down the lists. Taken together, these
developmentscreatedgreaterawarenessinJapanofthepotential
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costsofanincreasinglynegativeassessmentofJapan’sﬁnancial
marketsandinstitutionsbyinternationalﬁnancialmarketactors.
issentimentwascapturedmostclearlyinthealmostmantralikerepetitionoftheargumentthatJapanneededreformsthat
would prevent “transaction ﬂight” and “the hollowing out” of
Japan’sﬁnancialsystembyappealingtointernationallymobile
ﬁnancialmarketactors.
A second way that the international environment shaped
centralbankreforminJapanwasbypresentingaclearinternationallyembracedstandardofwhataqualitycentralbankshould
look like. In the 99s, the virtual consensus, embraced most
ardently by ﬁnancial market participants and the media, was
that a central bank should be legally independent.3 Although
theemergenceofindependenceastheinternationalmarkerfor
quality central banking did not cause central bank reform in
Japan,oncepoliticianshaddecidedtopursuereform,alldebates
were circumscribed by the anticipated market incentives and
credibility-enhancing beneﬁts of adopting an internationally
acceptedstandard.Japan’slawmakers,whoweretryingtorestore
the government’s reputation for good economic governance
andre-establishJapan’spositionasaninternationallyattractive
ﬁnancialmarket,readilyrecognizedthattheiroptionsregarding
thecontentofthenewlawwereconstrained.Attheveryleast,
the existence of a clear international norm forced those who
were opposed to central bank reform to ﬁght an intellectual
battle that extended far beyond a narrow discussion of the
appropriatenessofthesequalitiesforJapan’scentralbank.
Eﬀorts to approximate international best practices and
increase the attractiveness of Japan’s ﬁnancial markets were
central to the boj reform process.4 Oﬃcial and scholarly
accountsofdeliberationssuggestthesame.5 eCentralBank
Study Group (cbsg) Secretariat outlined the groups’ fundamentalthinkingas“inthisageofadvancingglobalizationand
marketization nothing is more important than for the central
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bank to earn the conﬁdence of the global market, … and this
requiressecuringmonetarypolicyindependence.”6 Notsurprisingly, the boj’s statement on the cbsg report concludes that
the new law must be consistent with the concepts and ideas
foundinrecentcentralbankreformsinothermajordeveloped
countries, and that these standards should be aggressively
pursued to gain greater public and market credibility.7 In the
end,Japan’slawmakersagreed.
An examination of the impact of international ﬁnancial
marketsandideationaltrendsonthenewlawhighlightsthree
interestinganomalies.First,onecanseethedisjuncturebetween
political rhetoric and policy choice. boj reform arose out of
politicians’eﬀortstogainelectoraladvantagebyatleastrhetorically reasserting their control over economic policymaking
anddoingsospeciﬁcallybyreducingtheinﬂuenceofthemof
bureaucrats through boj reform. Yet, much to the chagrin of
somepoliticiansafterthefact,theydidnotpasslegislationto
makethecentralbankdirectlyresponsivetotheDiet.Instead,
they granted the bank legal independence, which eﬀectively
reducedtheirinﬂuenceovermonetarypolicyaswell.Second,
this adoption of an international standard is noteworthy because, in the 98s, many if not all ﬁnancial market reforms
quiteclearlydeviatedfrominternationaltrendsinfavorofpoliciesthatcloselyreﬂectedJapan’suniqueregulatorystyle.8 ird,
andﬁnally,thisoutcomeremindsusnottounderestimatethe
extent to which capital mobility and international ﬁnancial
marketintegrationchangethecalculationofthecostsandbeneﬁtsassociatedwithseeminglydomesticpolicyoptions.Inthis
case,thedecisiontohighlightindependenceandtransparency
intheboj lawdemonstratesthatinternationalmarket-players’
perceptionsandideationaltrendscaninﬂuencepolicyoptions
within even large, advanced, industrial economies, including
one with a history of implementing reform in a distinctly
“Japaneseway.”
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Did Bank of Japan Independence Fulﬁll Expectations?
Onewaytoassesstheconsequencesofcentralbankreformis
toaskwhetherthenewboj lawfulﬁlledtheexpectationsembeddedinthecentralbankindependenceliterature.ereare
two particularly prominent arguments, one that emphasizes
anticipatedeconomicbeneﬁts,theother,politicalones.During
thepasttenyears,however,centralbankindependenceseems
tohavefailedtoproduceeitheroneinJapan.Ithas,however,
enabledpoliticianstodeﬂectblameontotheboj andserves,at
least superﬁcially, as evidence of Japan’s gradual adoption of
internationalﬁnancialmarketstandards.
eﬁrstargumentbuildsfromthewellrecognizedcorrelationbetweenhighcentralbankindependenceandlowinﬂation
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) countries. It proposes that central bank independence enables a government to credibly commit not to
stimulategrowthintheshorttermthroughsurprisemonetary
shocks,whichcancausehigherinﬂationinthelongerterm.9 In
short, central bank independence is considered desirable
because it creates low and stable inﬂation rates, and these
provide the best foundation on which to promote sustained
growth.Sincelowinﬂationbeneﬁtsgrowth,andgrowthbeneﬁts
governments, governments are increasingly choosing central
bank independence. In this literature, before the 99s Japan
was considered a statistical outlier, because Japan had one of
theworld’slowestratesofinﬂationandhealthygrowth,despite
havingoneofthemost“dependent”centralbanksaccordingto
variouscomparisons.10
Given this broad expectation of the economic beneﬁts of
centralbankindependence,oneseeminglystraightforwardway
to assess the boj’s performance since 998 is to ask whether
monetary policy has successfully reduced inﬂation, stabilized
prices,andpromotedgrowth.Unfortunately,theanswerisno,
noandno.Strictlyspeaking,wecannotassesstheboj’smanage-
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mentofinﬂationperseunderthenewlawbecauseJapanhas
found itself caught in the most prolonged bout of deﬂation
sincetheShowaDepression.11 Duringvirtuallyallofpostreform
period,pricestabilityhasbeenﬂeetingatbest,andgrowthhas
beenbelowpotential.egrossdomesticproduct(gdp)deﬂator
hasbeennegativealmostwithoutinterruptionsince995,before
the new boj law took eﬀect, and continues through today.12
issituationhasleftJapanwithashrinkingeconomy,increased
the real debt burden in many cases, and strained the macroeconomy.13 Giventheuniquenessofdeﬂationinthepost-wwii
period,however,therewas,foralongtime,virtuallynoscholarship or experience for the boj to draw on in its eﬀorts and
thusnoexpectationsregardingcentralbankindependenceand
deﬂationspeciﬁcally.14
Speaking less literally, however, whether one judges independence as having resulted in a “better” monetary policy
dependslargelyonone’sviewonwhatacentralbankshoulddo
tohaltdeﬂation.Ifoneacceptstheargumentthatthecentral
bank’szerointerestratepolicy,andlateritsquantitativeeasing
andgovernmentbondpurchases,areallabankcando,because
more easing would be akin to pushing on a string, then he
mightconcludethatindependencepreventedthosewhowanted
moreexpansionarymonetarypolicyfromcreatingfalseexpectations.15 If,ontheotherhand,oneacceptstheargumentmade
byquitealargenumberofnon-boj economiststhatinﬂation
targeting,purchasesofalternativeassets,orothernon-conventionalmeansoffurthereasingareabsolutelynecessarytoend
deﬂation, then the boj’s independence, expressed through its
opposition to these policies, certainly seems to have made
thingsworse.16
Althoughthedebatesoverwhattheboj didthatwasright
or wrong are extensive and beyond what I can address here,
suﬃce it to say, the boj came under unprecedented criticism
throughoutthisentiretenyearperiod.Fromtheverybeginning
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in 998, critics claimed that then-Governor Hayami Masaru
wasnotdoingallthatwasnecessarytoﬁghtdeﬂation.Inparticular,hewascriticizedfortalkingdowntheeﬀectivenessofthe
zerointerestratepolicyandsuggestinghemightenditnotlong
after it was implemented. He was criticized for ending zero
interestratepolicyinAugustandoverrulingthegovernment’smotionforapostponementtodoso,andforanoverall
unwillingnesstotryunconventionalmeanstoenddeﬂation.In
particular,criticswerefrustratedbywhatsomeinterpretedas
the boj’s inﬂexibility for the wrong reasons. Some saw this
unwillingnesstocompromiseasaneﬀorttoestablishcredibility
earlybyquashinganydoubtsthatthenewboj wouldbehaveas
independentlyasthelawallowed,orasawaytoputpressureon
thegovernmenttomoreaggressivelypursuestructuralreform.17
Although I do not presume here to oﬀer a deﬁnitive answer,
takingtheabundanceofcriticismintoaccount,onewouldbe
hardpressedtoconcludethatindependenceservedJapanparticularlywellunderthesecircumstances.
Itissomewhatironicthatboj independenceseemsnotto
haveimprovedeconomicoutcomesunderdeﬂationaryconditions, because it is doubtful that independence would have
signiﬁcantly improved monetary policy under normal conditionseither.isisinpartbecause,asexplainedabove,theboj
hadsuccessfullymanagedinﬂationformanyyearsasadependent bank, a record e Economist described as “second to
none.”18 Moreover, the evidence concerning political business
cyclesstronglysuggeststhatthecyclesthatassociateelections
witheconomicexpansioninJapanoccurrednotbecausepoliticians stimulated monetary policy prior to elections, which
wouldjustifyindependence,butratherbecausepoliticianswere
opportunisticandcalledelectionswhentheeconomywasdoing
well.19 Finally, further support for this general claim comes
fromstudiesshowingthatcentralbankindependencehaslittle
impactontheinﬂationratesinmostoftheindustrializedcoun-
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triesbecausetheytendtohaverelativelyopentraderelations,
largeﬁnancialsectors,andrelativelycomplacentlaborunions.20
In short, the broad political economy context in Japan was
alreadysupportingalowinﬂationpolicy,socentralbankreform
wasnotnecessaryforlowinﬂationandgrowth.
If central bank independence did not produce clear economicbeneﬁts,diditatleastproducetheanticipatedpolitical
ones?Oneprominentargumentproposesthatasliberalization
makes monetary policy more diﬃcult, governments increase
centralbankindependenceasameanstoreduceintrapartyor
intracoalitionconﬂictovermonetarypolicyandavoidpunishmentfromvetoplayerswhoarehurt.eargumentclaimsthat
theeliminationofmonetaryconﬂictsshouldenablepartiesand
coalitionstostaytogetherandinpowerlonger.21 Centralbank
independenceshoulddepoliticizemonetarypolicybecausethe
goalsarespeciﬁedinlawandimportantdecisionsaboutimplementationareremovedfromthehandsofpoliticians(orbureaucrats) and handed over to, in Japan’s case, the boj’s newly
empoweredPolicyBoard.
Unfortunately,again,theboj reformhasnotproducedthe
anticipatedoutcome.Quitethecontrary.Since998therehas
beenamoreintenseandfarmorepublicdebateaboutmonetary
policy than at any other time in the post-wwii period. As
suggestedabove,debatesbyeconomistsoverthebestmonetary
policyinadeﬂationaryenvironmentseeminglyappearinevery
newspaper and on every channel. Moreover, these positions
are mirrored in disagreements among reformist and more
traditionalpoliticiansoverhowmuchtheboj canbeexpected
to do without more structural reform in other parts of the
economy.22
Inpart,thispoliticizationwasencouragedbythelawitself.
To improve transparency, Article 54 of the new law requires
thattheboj governorreporttotheDiettwiceayear.However,
asonecentralbankoﬃcialdescribedit,fortheboj governor,
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thenewlawrequiresjumpingfromthefryingpanrightintothe
ﬁre.23 During his ﬁve years in oﬃce, Governor Hayami was
calledtoappearbeforetheDietorapoliticalcommitteemore
than eighty times a year, for several hours in most instances,
andmorethanonceadayforsomeperiods.Onecloseassociate
lamentedthatpoliticianswererequiringthegovernortospend
somuchofhistimedrivingbackandforthandinmeetingsthat
theywereleavinghimnotimetowork.24
Needless to say, these calls before the Diet were not to
congratulatethegovernorforajobwelldone.Rather,politicians
havebeenextremelyvocalandpublicintheircriticismofthe
boj’sresponsetoanumberofissues,butperhapsmostnotably,
itslongresistancetoinﬂationtargetingorpursuinganalternative more expansionary policy to ﬁght deﬂation. Some politicians have become so frustrated with the newly independent
boj thattheyhaveproposedamendingthenewBankofJapan
Law to require more accommodation of government plans in
general, or to include an inﬂation-targeting requirement in
particular.25 Not surprisingly, when Prime Minister Koizumi
Jun’ichiro was considering whom to choose as governor to
replaceHayamiinMarch,politiciansinthiscampwanted
himtoconsideronlycandidateswhowouldcommittoadopta
more expansionary policy. Because Governor Fukui’s 5-year
termexpiredinMarchof8,theJapanesepressisabuzzwith
reports that politicians are considering demanding inﬂationtargeting credentials or some similar commitment from the
nextboj Governor.
ecriticismofboj monetarypolicydoesnotcomeonly
from politicians. Bureaucrats in the mof and the Financial
Services Agency (fsa) have also clearly expressed frustration
withwhattheyconsidertheboj’sunwillingnesstocontribute
moretoimprovingthecurrenteconomicsituation.Inreturn,
theboj haspubliclydisagreedwiththeserepresentativesabout
howbesttostopdeﬂationandhowaggressivelythegovernment
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should be in its eﬀorts to close down failing banks, require
disclosure, and force consolidation of the banking industry.
Moreover,bothformer-GovernorHayamiandGovernorFukui
Toshihiko have had occasion to remind bureaucrats and the
public that no one will be allowed to interfere in monetary
policy discussions. Cross-institution criticism was not absent
inthepast,butboththesheerquantityandharshqualityofthis
mutual ﬁnger pointing increased signiﬁcantly after 998, suggestingthatpriortoindependencesomeofthesedisagreements
would have been handled behind closed doors and managed
largelybythemof.
Finally,thisincreasedpoliticizationisinpartaresultofthe
newly decentralized economic policy-making environment in
Japansince998.Ontheonehand,foroﬃcialsinthemof,the
boj,andthefsa,publiclycriticizingthepoliciesofothersisno
longerasthreateningtoone’scareeraslongasitfurthersthe
interestsofone’sorganization.26Ontheotherhand,andmore
importantly,publicdiscussionanddebateofeconomicpolicies
are now more necessary because there is as yet no eﬀective
directorofnationaleconomicpolicymakingtoreplacethecoordinating function played by the mof during the prereform
period.
eextensivereorganizationofgovernmentministriesand
agenciesinJanuarywasdesignedinparttoputthereins
of economic policymaking clearly in the hands of the prime
minister’s cabinet oﬃce, and speciﬁcally in the hands of the
CabinetOﬃceCouncilonEconomicandFiscalPolicy(cefp)
andtheMinisterofStateforEconomicandFiscalPolicy.27 e
ideabehindthisstructurewasthatcouncilsandministersnot
associated with a particular ministry would be better able to
consider the broad national interest. us far, however, the
eﬀectiveness of this new organization structure is unclear.
TakenakaHeizo,whoheldthepositionoftheMinisterofState
for Economic and Fiscal Policy for most of this period, was
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considered,foratleasttheﬁrstpartofhistenure,nottohave
the political connections necessary to control the economic
agenda.Hewasrepeatedlyforcedtostepbackfromorrevise
his proposals. Although there is not yet enough research to
determinetheeﬀectivenessofcefp,itisonlylogicalthatifthe
cabinetoﬃcedoesnotprovideeﬀectivecoordination,oﬃcials
from various organizations will have more incentive to try to
winsupportfortheirownpreferredoutcomesbytakingtheir
viewspublic.
Insum,centralbankindependencedoesnotseemtohave
reduced overt conﬂict about monetary policy. However, it is
possiblethatthecriticismheapedontheboj issomewhatmore
showthansubstance.atis,oncemonetarypolicywashanded
over to the boj, politicians, bureaucrats, and possibly even
cabinet members concluded that they could enhance their
standingamongrelevantconstituentsiftheycriticizedtheboj.
atiseasiertodoiftheydonothaveauthorityorresponsibility
for achieving those outcomes. In other words, central bank
independence might, ironically, allow greater expression of
interest diversity among party members and across coalitions
becausetheycanaddressparticularisticinterestswithouthaving
toforgeacommonpolicyposition.isincreasedpoliticization
does not make sense according to the two models of central
bankindependencereviewedabove.Itdoesmakesenseifthe
motivationforthenewboj lawwerenotrootedinapreference
among politicians for central bank independence per se, but
ratherinadesiretoredirectpublicangerandsurviveelections
byoﬀeringavoter-targetedexpressionoftheir“commitment”
to tackle Japan’s tough problems, if only the (unreasonable)
independentboj wouldletthem.
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Why Has the Road Been So Rocky
for the Independent Bank of Japan?
Whenrecognizingthecriticismoftheboj,onemustalsokeep
in mind the nearly unbelievable challenges the newly independentboj hasfaced.esechallengesaresummarizedbelow
asthoserelatedtoinstitutionalreorganizationandthoserelated
to economic interdependence. During this ten year period,
Japan has been buﬀeted by a large number of political and
economicdiﬃculties.Andvirtuallyeveryoneofthemhasmade
lifediﬃcultfortheboj aswell.
First, the new boj law was one reform in a huge wave of
reformsandreorganizations.Withinafewyearsoneitherside
oftheboj law,thegovernmentimplementedelectoralreform,
ﬁnancialsystemreform,civilservicereform,andadministrative
reform. Most relevant for this study, the institutional actors
charged with economic policymaking changed signiﬁcantly.
Where there was formerly only the mof in consultation with
thelong-dominantldp,nowthereareanindependentboj and
independentfsa,averydiﬀerentmof,afracturedldp,anda
moreexecutive-likeCabinetOﬃcewithacefp.Anotherway
tolookatthissituationistorealizethatJapanadoptedsomany
ofthesereformsbecause,atapproximatelythissametime,each
leg of Japan’s so-called ruling triumvirate of big business, the
bureaucracy,andtheldp hadbroken.ebusinesssectorwas
tornbetweenthosewhowerestillinternationallycompetitive
andzombieborrowersunabletopaytheirdebts.emonetary
functionsofthemof hadbeengiventotheboj anditssupervisoryfunctionstothefsa.eldp hadlostcontroloftheDiet
fortheﬁrsttimeindecadesandwasstrugglingtolearncoalition
politics.Withsuchathroughshake-upoftheexistinginstitutional order, it is not surprising that monetary policy did not
alwaysdevelopsmoothly.
Second,theeconomyinJapanandbeyondhasexperienced
tremendous turmoil. In addition to the stock market decline
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andnonperformingloans,Japanexperienceditsﬁrstbankfailures in years, the government ran up gargantuan debts, and
EastAsiaexperiencedacurrencycrisisthatreverberatedaround
theworld.eﬁnancialsystemwasinshambles,sothatmonetarypolicyoﬃcials,alsochargedwithﬁnancialsystemstability,
hadtoremembertheimplicationsofpolicyforbankingsector
viability.Growthwasnotleadingtolargerpaychecks,socitizens
werenothappy.Now,whentheboj ismakingsuggestionsto
increaserates,higheroilpricesandtheUSsub-primemortgage
crisisareaddingfurthercomplicationstoestimationsofwhatit
willtaketogettheJapaneseeconomybackonitsfeetandona
low-inﬂation growth trajectory. In short, we should show a
little mercy for the bank. Its ﬁrst ten years have been by any
measureextremelychallenging.

Should We Expect Bank Independence to Last?
Despitetenyearsofextremelydiﬃcultpoliticalandeconomic
circumstancesandtheongoingcriticismofitspolicies,Iexpect
theboj tomaintainitslegalindependenceandfurtherdevelop
as a central economic policymaking actor over time. ree
variables lead me to this conclusion: the codiﬁcation of independence in law; the impact of new institutional forms on
actors’ interests and power resources; and the persistence of
central bank independence as a marker of good economic
governance.
First,legalcodiﬁcationmatters.Inthenewlaw,thegovernmenthasstatedinwritingitsgoalsandpolicymakingexpectationsandhasformallyhandedoverdiscretiontothebank.is
aloneaddssomerobustnesstoboj independence.Havingmade
thepublicargumentthatrevisionofthelawwasnecessaryand
justiﬁed, unmaking the law or otherwise reducing legal independencewouldrequireanawkwardpublicretractionofthese
same claims. Equally important, by deﬁning the bank’s legal
responsibilitiesandobligationsinwriting,thenewlawfacilitates
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morepreciseexpectationsbyallpartiesaboutfuturepolicyand
policymakingbehavior.28 Moreover,thetransparencyprovisions
inthelawenablethebanktojustifyitselfonaregularbasisand
tomakecleartothepublicifsomeoneisencroachingontheir
jurisdiction. When others have criticized the boj’s monetary
policy, the bank has not been shy about reiterating the clear
stipulationofitslegalindependenceovermonetarypolicydecisions.Insum,thelawshouldstrengthenthedurabilityofcentral
bankindependencethroughitsprovisionoflegitimacy,itscoordinationofexpectations,anditsspeciﬁcationofthestandards
againstwhichdeviationsfromthelawcouldbereadilyrecognized. As Carey notes, “e act of writing down rules can
contributetotheirbindingforce.”29
In addition, revoking independence would require lawmakers to agree on monetary policy thereafter, which would
notbeeasyunderthepoliticalandeconomiccircumstancesin
which Japan ﬁnds itself in today. With Japan’s currently split
Dietunabletoagreeonmuchofanything,theprospectsfora
revision of the boj law seem slim indeed. As the conﬂict
management literature outlined above suggests, when policy
preferencesaresodiversethatcreatinganindependentcentral
bankmakeselectoralsense,thenitisexpectedthatunmaking
thatnegotiatedagreementandﬁndingareplacementwouldbe
at least equally diﬃcult, although certainly not impossible.
Centralbankindependencewillbestrengthenedtotheextent
thatvetoplayersinJapanmakeitmorediﬃculttochangethe
lawthantochangethepolicy.30 Inthissense,thepersistenceof
alternative views among lawmakers is ironically a good thing
forcentralbankindependenceatthemoment.
Second,institutionalaﬃliationsinformtheunderlyinginterests and power resources of economic policymaking actors,
andinstitutionalreformsareexpectedtochangesomeofthese.31
Over time these new institutional interests and resources
become the exogenous constraints on future policy options.
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Accordingly,thenewboj lawanditsalteredlinkstothebroader
political economy can be expected to impact the preferences
andpoliticalresourcesnotonlyofboj oﬃcials,butalsopoliticians, cefp members, and fsa and mof oﬃcials. It is quite
plausiblethatthoseinleadershippositionsoutsidetheboj will
ﬁndthattheirpersonalandprofessionalinterestsarebestserved
bynotbeingresponsibleformonetarypolicy.us,forexample,
although the mof consistently resisted granting boj greater
independenceduringearliereﬀortsaswellasduring996and
997,itispossiblethatoncepersonnelrotationshaverelocated
thosewholostpowerandprestigebecauseofthenewboj law,
themof leadershipwillﬁndthatitsnewinstitutionalformhas
redeﬁned its ﬁeld of vision, its mission, and its preferences
concerningmonetarypolicymaking.
Speciﬁcally,mof oﬃcialsmayrecognizethathavinghanded
overresponsibilityformonetarypolicy,theyarenowfreefrom
mostoftherelatedcriticismandpoliticalpressureandableto
embrace ﬁscal policy as their primary reason for being. is
outcomewouldupholdexistingresearchthatshowsthatmof
oﬃcials are particularly concerned with maintaining at least
procedural autonomy, even at the expense of substantive
issues,32 andthatincreasedpoliticizationcausesoﬃcials“toshy
awayfromimpossibletasksandtoformalizeitsresponsibilities
for the tasks that remain.”33 Similarly, as Berhnard’s conﬂict
avoidanceargumentmentionedabovesuggests,boj independenceenablespoliticianstolargelyavoiddirectresponsibilityfor
the increasingly diﬃcult task of setting monetary policy not
only in an internationally integrated, but also a deeply deﬂationaryeconomicenvironment.Inshort,itismorelikelythat
oncemof,fsa,andotheroﬃcialsandpoliticiansbecomeaccustomedtothebeneﬁtsofamorenarrowlydeﬁnedsetofresponsibilitiesandthefreedomtogainpoliticalpointsforcriticizing
a monetary policy, they will become more avid supporters of
centralbankindependence.
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AsRikerhaspointedout,however,outcomesdependnot
onlyonpreferencesbutalsoonpower.34 Withtherevisionof
theboj law,therobustnessofthecentralbank’sindependence
was supported further by an increase in power resources
provided by this new institutional form. Just as institutions
shapemeaning,identities,andideas,theyalsoshapethedistributions of relative power that will inﬂuence outcomes in the
future.35 e boj is expected to gain some relative political
advantagesthroughthereform,becausethenewlawprovides
themeanstodevelopasigniﬁcantinformationadvantageover
the mof and others. boj oﬃcials no longer need to share as
muchinformationwiththemof,andtheirexcessiveresponse
to the transparency requirement enables them to use their
publications and public statements to directly explain their
policiesandconvinceothersoftheirviews.36
eboj’spoliticalskillsandrelativepoliticalresourcesare
likelytoimproveovertimeaswell.Oneoftheﬁrstthingsthe
boj did when it anticipated independence was to establish a
Dietliaisonsectionchargedwithattendingtopoliticians’questions.evastmajorityofpoliticianshavefarlessexpertisein
ﬁnance than do boj oﬃcials. us, during many sessions in
which boj oﬃcials were asked to explain how the ﬁnancial
systemworks,theseliaisonteamswereabletoexplaintheboj’s
thinking behind policy decisions.37 us, despite some politicians’ obvious disagreements with boj policy, over time this
day-to-day interaction has increased the boj’s access to and
relationships with politicians from all parties. is is quite a
radicaltransformationfromthepre-centralbankindependence
periodwhentheboj’spoliticalresourceswereminimal.Finally,
drawing from prospect theory and the idea of hysteresis,
althoughboj oﬃcialshadbeenreluctanttopursueindependence too aggressively for fear of damaging their careers and
relationshipswiththemof iftheyfailed,itisnotunreasonable
topredictthatnowthattheboj hastastedindependence,they
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willbemuchmoreaggressiveintryingtopreservetheirindependence than they were in trying to obtain it.38 Conversely,
oncemof oﬃcialsbecomeaccustomedtolifewithoutresponsibilityformonetarypolicy,theywillbelessmotivatedtoregain
it. Taken together, the impact of a new institutional form is
expected—overtime—tochangethepreferencesandtherelative
power resources available to the relevant actors in ways that
willperpetuatecentralbankindependence.39
ird,centralbankindependenceinJapanwillbesupported
in the international context. is includes a near-universal
ideationalconsensusconcerningthedesirabilityofcentralbank
independence and the very diﬀerent but equally powerful
economicincentivesexpressedbythepreferenceofinternational
ﬁnancialmarketparticipantstodobusinessincountrieswith
independentcentralbanks.40 GiventhedegreeofJapan’sintegration into the international political economy, this political
andeconomiccontextmustalsobetakenintoconsiderationin
theevaluationofthelikelihoodofcontinuedindependencein
thefuture.InthecaseoftheBankofJapan,Iwouldarguethat
the supports provided by this international context are not
trivial.
Takingtheideationalvariableﬁrst,consensualknowledge
notonlyinformspolicymakers,butalsoprovideslegitimacyfor
certain outcomes.41 is is in part because, like institutions,
dominantideascanconstrainone’svisionaboutequallygood
orbetteralternatives.IntheJapanesecase,itiscertainlytrue
thatforyearsmanyJapaneseinandoutofgovernmentseemed
willing, if not eager, to resist neoliberal ideology and liberal
ﬁnancialmarkettrendssoavidlysupportedbytheUnitedStates
and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, having codiﬁed its
commitmenttocentralbankindependence,itwouldbemore
diﬃcultforJapan’sgovernmenttoblatantlyrejectwhatitidentiﬁedasthemanyreasonstoadoptthisinternationalstandard.
Before the reform, foreign governments and market actors
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generallyinterpretedJapan’spoliticaleconomyasslowlyleaving
behind “traditional” ways and anticipating some movement
towards, though not convergence with, an international standard.Initsdiscussionsabouttheneedtochangetheboj law,
theJapanesegovernmentrepeatedlynotedthatthisconsensus
existedandtheimportanceofbringingJapan’scentralbanklaw
intolinewithit.us,shortofaradicalchangeinscholarship
aboutthedesirabilityofcentralbankindependence,42 theinternational ideational consensus on the purported beneﬁts of
centralbankindependenceshouldaddintellectualbackingand
international legitimacy to other domestic supports for continued independence of the bank. Even if the scholarship
changed, the codiﬁcation and altered interests and political
resourcesdescribedwouldmakeasuddenshiftawayfromlegal
centralbankindependenceunlikely.
Anadditionalotherinternationalvariablethatisexpected
to help perpetuate central bank independence in Japan is the
international ﬁnancial market’s preference for countries with
independentcentralbanks.emostcommonexplanationfor
thispreferenceisthat,fordebtorcountriesinparticular,central
bankindependenceisimportantasasignalthatthegovernment
willnotallowinﬂationtothreatengrowthordiminishthevalue
ofthegovernmentassetsheldbyinvestors.43 Inthisregard,the
Japanesecasemightseemunrelated,giventhatJapanisstilla
largecreditornationwithasurplusofdomesticsavings.Nevertheless,overthepastdecade,theJapanesegovernmenthasrun
deﬁcits,creatingadebt-to-gdp ratioofgreaterthan5%.Given
thedowngradingofJapanesedebtbytheleadingcredit-rating
agencies in 998, it is not unreasonable to assume that as
outstanding debt increases, so does the mof’s concern with
how to keep interest rates low and manage repayment in the
future.Certainlyby,whentheratingofJapan’sgovernment
debt was downgraded below the ratings for Greece and Botswana,theJapanesegovernmentwasacutelyawareofhowthe
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internationalﬁnancialmarkets’perceptionofJapan’seconomy
couldimpactitsbottomline.Inshort,althoughthemof does
notlikesomeoftheboj’spolicies,itmustconsidertheinternational ﬁnancial market repercussions if mof-boj debates
becometoovociferous.Similarly,blatantdisagreementsbetween
thetwodonotencourageconﬁdenceinthevalueoftheyen.
egovernment’sconcernwithitsgrowingdebtisnotthe
onlyreasonitwillaccommodateinternationalﬁnancialmarket
preferences for an independent central bank. As mentioned
above,itwasunquestionablymoreimportantforJapantocreate
aninternationallyattractiveﬁnancialmarketinthelate99s
andbeyondthanithadbeenatanytimebefore.Before98,
Japaneseﬁnancialinstitutionsandﬁnancialmarketregulators
werequitehappytohaveverylimitedparticipationbyforeign
ﬁnancial institutions and foreign investors. In the 98s, the
Japanese government oﬀered only token reforms to placate
foreign demands for more. During the 99s, however, the
attractivenessofJapan’sﬁnancialmarketsdeclinedprecipitously,
andmanyforeignﬁrmsdelistedfromtheTokyoStockExchange
(tse)orotherwisepulledoutofJapan’sﬁnancialmarkets.e
government’sconcernwiththe“hollowing”ofJapan’sﬁnancial
markets was discussed above as a factor in the government’s
decision to grant greater central bank independence. Since
998, however, the situation has not improved signiﬁcantly.
Rather, the government is ever aware of the roles played by
foreignﬁrms,investors,andﬁnancialmarketexpertswhobring
toJapangreaterexperienceinriskmanagement,corporatedebt
workouts,thesecuritizationoflow-performingloans,andthe
venturecapitalﬁnancingthatsomewouldsayJapan’sﬁnancial
systemsorelyneeds.44 ForthesereasonsIexpectthegovernment
todemonstrate,howevergrudgingly,thatithasandwillcontinue
toabidebycentralbankindependenceasareadilyrecognizable
symbolofitscommitmenttobettermanagementoftheJapanese
economy.
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Finally,itisunlikelythatthegovernmentwillrevisetheboj
law. It is clear, however, that maintaining the law does not
necessarilyrequireupholdingallaspectsofthelawinpractice.
Bell and Maxﬁeld oﬀer ample case-study evidence that legal
centralbankindependencedoesnotensuredefactoindependence.45 Rather,Iexpectthattheboj’smonetarypolicydiscretion
willbecontestedfortheforeseeablefuture.Speciﬁcally,Iexpect
twoemergentpatternstopersist.First,theDietwillcontinueto
pressure the boj to accommodate its generally more liberal
preferencesthroughgreaterinterventionintheselectionofthe
governorandvicegovernor.Atpresent,thisismanifestinthe
opposition approval of certain former bureaucrats by some
politicians or their insistence that the next appointments be
givenonlytothosewhoexpressaﬁrmcommitmenttoinﬂation
targeting. Just as Roe v. Wade has become a litmus test for
SupremeCourtJusticesintheUnitedStates,inﬂationtargeting
islikelytobecomethelitmustestinJapanforsometime.isis
especiallylikelybecause“inﬂationtargeting”seemstobeclose
totheconsensuspolicyprescriptionforﬁghtingdeﬂation.
Iexpecttoseepoliticianscontinuetocriticizetheboj asa
means to garner electoral support in this era of heightened
politicaluncertainty.Atthemoment,theDietissplit,withthe
ldp controllingthelowerhouseandtheDemocraticPartyof
Japan (dsp) controlling the upper house. Because they have
beendeadlockedonavarietyofissuesandthepoliticalmaneuveringisintense,theboj oﬀerspoliticiansinalmosteveryparty
aneasyscapegoatforconstituents’complaintsabouttheinadequate economic recovery. It seems likely that the boj will
providethistargetforaslongastheJapaneseeconomydrags
along.

Conclusion
enewboj lawcameaboutprimarilybecauseoftheperceptionbydiﬀerentpartypoliticiansinthegoverningcoalitionthat
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theywouldnotwintheupcomingelectionunlesstheydemonstrated through action their commitment to reform Japan’s
troubled domestic ﬁnancial and administrative institutions.
Increasing central bank independence enabled politicians to
look reformist, deﬂect blame at home, and restore credibility
overseas.egovernmentbuiltthenewlawaroundtheprinciples of independence and transparency because it wanted to
communicate to domestic constituents and the international
economiccommunitythatitwas“cleaningupitsact.”eboj
reformshowedthatthegovernmentembracedlegitimateand
internationally compatible steps towards more eﬀective economicmanagementthatithopedwouldincreasetheinternationalcompetitivenessofJapan’sﬁnancialmarketsanddomestic
economy.
Despiteaﬁrstdecadeofpoormonetarypolicyperformance
andunendingcriticismfrommanyquarters,thepersistenceof
centralbankindependencemightbeexplainedbysmalltransformations in actors’ interests that arise through institutional
changethatiscoupledwiththecontinuinginternationalacceptance of central bank independence as a marker for quality
central banking. is argument that the independence of the
boj mayprovemorerobustthancurrentcircumstancessuggest
assumes,however,thattheeconomydoesnotturnsigniﬁcantly
worse.eneartermmaywelloﬀerthegreatestchallenge,and
itisnotcertainwhethertheboj willbeabletomaintainboth
legalandpracticalindependence,giventheveryunusualmonetary,ﬁnancial,andpoliticaluncertaintyJapancurrentlyfaces.
One must remember that securing political support is
necessaryforevenlegallyindependentcentralbanks,andmuch
will depend on the next governor. Unfortunately, during the
centralbank’sﬁrstﬁveyearsofindependence,GovernorHayami’sseeminglystubborndemeanorfueledcriticismofthebank,
and seemed to alienate the banks’ supporters and ultimately
underminedthebank’scredibility.atbeingsaid,thecircum-
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stancesunderwhichhewasexpectedtolaunchthisneworganization were simply brutal. Scandals and the ﬁnancial crises
escalatedjustashetookoﬃce,andpoliticiansandbureaucrats
engaged in unusually public and heated public debates. On
March,,Mr.HayamiwasreplacedbyGovernorFukui
who, despite his reputation as a Hayami conservative, was
initiallywelcomedaspoliticallymoresophisticatedandopenminded about alternative strategies. As Governor Fukui approachestheendofhisﬁve-yeartenure(March8),however,
thathoneymoonglowhasfadedandtheboj isstillcriticized
fornotcommunicatingclearly.46 Asaresult,althoughpressures
arebuildingtoﬁndtherightnewgovernor,thepoliticalenvironmentisnotpromising.47 enextgovernor’stermmaywell
determine whether the boj can successfully transition into a
central bank that works in the political world but does not
becomeaproductofit.

Notes
 issectiondrawsfromDwyer4a.
 Curtis999oﬀersadetaileddiscussionofpoliticsinthisperiod.
 e impact of international ideational trends on ﬁnancial market
reformsisdiscussedingreaterdetailinDwyer4b.Onthedevelopment of independence and transparency as international central
bankingstandardsseeMarcussen,especiallypage,Maxﬁeld
997, and Forder, 998. In addition to ignoring the transparency
aspectofthestandard,thisdiscussionadmittedlyleavesasidedebates
aboutthewisdomofthisconsensusanddistinctionsbetweenlegal
andpracticalindependence.
4 Personalinterviewsand4.
5 In addition to the Central Bank Study Group proceedings, see
Nakakita(999:5–56),BankofJapan(996),Cargilletal.(:94–
96),theminutesoftheBankofJapanLawSubcommitteemeetings,
January , 997, and January 4, 997, Diet deliberations 4th
Session,LowerHouseFinanceCommitteeMay7,997,andMay9,
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997,the6thLowerHouseGeneralMeetingMay,996,andthe
9thLowerHouseGeneralMeetingDecember,996.
6 cbsg ProceedingsOctober996.
7 BankofJapan996.
8 Vogel996.
9 SeeRogoﬀ985,BarroandGordon98,andWoolley984.
 For discussion of what constitutes central bank independence, see,
for example, Berger, de Haan, and Eijﬃner , Woolley 984, or
Lohman997.Cargill,Hutchinson,andIto(:85)compareassessmentsofboj independence.
 Kojima.
 ebriefreprieveinfy 997wasduetotheconsumptiontaxincrease.
Cabinet Oﬃce /5/7 (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/qe7/
rdef-q7.csv).
 ItoandMishkin4:5.
4 InCargillandParkerarguedthatexcessiveattentiontocentral
bankindependencemightexacerbatethethreatofdeﬂation.
5 E.g.,Okina999,OkinaandShiratsuka4.
6 ItoandMishkin4outlinemanyofthesecriticisms.
7 Ito and Mishkin 4, oﬀer a review of this critical literature. See
alsoCargill,Hutchinson,andItoandPosen:5.
8 “A Yen for Independence,” e Economist. November 6, 996,
4(799):77–8.
9 Inoguchi979,citedinCargill,Hutchinson,andIto997,chapter7.
 Franzese999:666.
 Bernhard998;BernhardandLeblang;Hallerberg.
 Shiozaki,.
 Interviews4.
4 Interviews4.ecurrentGovernorFukuiToshihikonegotiated
ascheduleclosertothatoftheChairmanoftheUSFederalReserve.
5 “ldp wantstosettargetforinﬂation,”e Japan Times. November,
.eboj opposesinﬂationtargetingandviewsitasanillegal
constraintonitsindependence.
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6 isisarelativestatement,recognizingthatcomparedtoUSorUK
debates,disagreementsinJapanstilltendtobecouchedinrelatively
mildterms.Alsothisismoretrueformof andboj oﬃcials,whowill
most likely stay with their organizations throughout their career,
thanforfsa oﬃcialswho,dependingontheirrank,mightreturnto
themof laterintheircareersorhavetheirretirementpostsdeterminedthroughthemof.
7 Mulgan,,Chapter.eCouncilisinchargeoftheformulation
of economic and ﬁscal policies and is modeledaftertheUSWhite
House Council of Economic Advisors. e Council is chaired by
Prime Minister and has up to eleven members, including related
ministers,theGovernoroftheBankofJapan,andmembersfromthe
academicandprivatesector.
8 Carey,77.
9 Carey,757.
 LohmanncitedinKeeferandStasavage;75.
 North98,HallandTaylor996.
 Rosenbluth99,McKean99,Vogel996.
 McKean99:.
4 Riker98.
5 Knight99,HallandTaylor996.
6 Unfortunately, their economic information is not always accurate.
“Inside View: Experts Question boj’s Ability to Assess Economy.
Nikkei Financial Daily.September4,7.
7 Interviews,4.
8 Hardin98:8–8.
9 Toclarify,Iamnotarguingthatthisinstitutionalformisnecessarily
self-reinforcinginthenaturalinstitutionsenseasdescribedinKnight
99.
4 isbroadacceptanceoftheassociationofcentralbankindependence
with quality economic governance does not mean that this idea is
necessarilycorrect.atissueisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.
4 Marcussen998.
4 Someofwhichisemerging.
4 Maxﬁeld994.
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44 I do not mean to exaggerate the welcome oﬀered to foreign ﬁrms;
there are still many Japanese, both in and out of government, who
prefer to keep Japanese business among the Japanese. Widespread
criticism of foreign ﬁrms looking for “ﬁre sales” of Japanese ﬁrms
providesevidenceofthis,aswellasanalmostmirrorimagetoAmericancomplaintsaboutJapanesebuyingUSpropertiesinthe98s.
45 Bell;Maxﬁeld994and997.
46 “boj Politicians must improve lines of communication.” Nikkei
Weekly.February,7.
47 is upcoming selection process will be particularly diﬃcult and
importantbecausethegovernorandthetwovicegovernors’terms
expire at the same time, and the split Diet has already failed to
approveseveralotherattemptedappointments.
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7
Japan’s Shifting Role in
International Organizations
Phillip Y. Lipscy

SincetheMeijiRestoration,adesirefor
internationalstatusandrecognitionhascriticallyshapedJapaneseforeignpolicy.AfterdefeatinWorldWarii delegitimized
colonialism and militarism as means to this end, Japanese
foreignpolicyhasfocusedonpeacefulmeansofattaininginternationalpreeminence.eseinclude,e.g.pursuitofeconomic
growthundertheYoshidaDoctrine,provisionofoﬃcialdevelopmentassistancetodevelopingcountries,anddissemination
ofJapanesetraditionsandsocialnormsthroughculturaldiplomacy.Japanhasalsobecomeakeycontributortomajorinternational organizations such as the United Nations (UN),
InternationalMonetaryFund(imf),andWorldTradeOrganization(wto).However,althoughJapaneseﬁnancialcontributions to international organizations have grown signiﬁcantly,
formalrecognitionofJapan’sinternationalstatureinsuchorganizations has not necessarily followed. Emblematic is Japan’s
inabilitytoobtainapermanentseatontheUNSecurityCouncil,
butJapanalsolagsbehindinotherkeymeasures,suchasthe
numberofemployeesandhigh-rankingoﬃcialsinmajorinternationalorganizations.
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Inthischapter,IwillanalyzeJapan’srelationshipwithinternational organizations in the broader international relations
context. As scholars of organizations have noted, institutions
frequently exhibit path dependence—a tendency for initial
conditionstopersistdespitechangesinunderlyingfactors.AsI
will demonstrate in section two, path dependence has been
pervasive in international organizations. Despite considerable
shifts in geopolitical and economic realities since the end of
WorldWarii,internationalorganizationshavelaggedbehind
inimportantrespects.Nonetheless,institutionalchange(orthe
lackthereof )hasnotbeenuniformacrossinstitutionalsettings.
AsIwillargueinsectionthree,Japan’sabilitytosecureagreater
roleininternationalorganizationshasbeenmediatedbyformal
institutionalrulesandthestrengthofJapan’sbargainingposition
vis-à-visothermemberstates.Inthefourthsection,Iwillfocus
speciﬁcallyonJapan’srelativebargainingpowerintheBretton
WoodsInstitutions—theimf andWorldBank—andarguethat
the availability of credible outside options has contributed to
greaterrelativesuccessintheWorldBank.eﬁnalsectionwill
presentabriefconclusion.

Rigidity of International Organizations
Scholarsofinstitutionshavelongrecognizedthetendencyfor
institutionsto“lockin”initialconditions,evenafterconsiderable
shiftsinunderlyingrealities(Arthur989;David99;Goldstone
998;Pierson2000).istendencyhasalsobeenobservedin
institutionalizationattheinterstatelevel,particularlyinterms
of extending the stabilizing eﬀects of hegemony beyond the
apexofhegemonicpower(Krasner976;Keohane98;Ikenberry200).Suchinstitutionalrigiditycanbehelpfulformaintaining continuity and stability in the international system.
However,itcanalsoproduceglaringdiscrepanciesbetweena
state’sperceptionofitsplaceintheinternationalorderandits
abilitytoobtainpreferredoutcomesininstitutionalsettings.
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BeingonthelosingsideofWorldWarii,Japanwasabsent
fromthenegotiatingtableintheinitialbargainingovermuchof
thepostwarinstitutionalarchitecture.Ineﬀect,asalate-mover,
Japanhasbeen“lockedout”ofsomepositionsofinﬂuencein
major international organizations. For example, the imf and
the World Bank oﬃcially came into being at a conference of
twenty-ninealliednationsatBrettonWoods,NewHampshire
in 9. Despite the large number of nations present at the
inception, the core details of the Bretton Woods institutions
werehammeredoutthroughaseriesofcompromisesbetween
rivalplansdevelopedbyHarryDexterWhiteoftheUSTreasury
on one hand and Lord Keynes of Great Britain on the other.1
ebirthandtheinitialmandateoftheinstitutionswereessentiallytheresultofabargainingnegotiationbetweentheﬁnancial
authoritiesoftheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.Asaconsequencesinceinception,thetopleadershippositionsoftheimf
and World Bank have gone by convention respectively to a
European and a US national. is has made it diﬃcult for a
Japanesenationaltobeplacedatthehelmofeitherinstitution.2
evotingsharesoftheimf havealsoexhibitedatendency
tooverrepresentinceptionmembersandunderrepresentpostinceptionmembers(Rapkinetal.997).Figure7.separatesGroup
ofSeven(G7)statesintoAlliedandAxispowers,accordingto
their aﬃliation during World War ii and plots shares of imf
votingpowerasaproportionofsharesofworldgrossdomestic
product—the most straightforward measure of a country’s
weight in the global economy. By this measure, the wartime
Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Japan) have lagged behind their
actualplaceintheworldeconomydespitethepassingofhalfa
centuryanddramaticshiftsineconomicrealities.Incontrast,
the former Allied powers (Canada, France, United Kingdom,
UnitedStates)remainoverrepresented.3
Similarly, employment at international organizations has
tendedtofavornationalsfromthevictoriouspowersofWorld
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Figure 7.1 G7: Ratio of International Monetary Fund voting shares
to shares of world gross domestic product
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Note: Allies include Canada, France, United Kingdom, and United States. Axis includes Germany, Italy, and Japan. GDP is nominal. Data from International Monetary
Fund and Rapkin et al. (1997).

Warii attheexpenseofdefeatedpowers.Figure7.2plotsthe
number of “leading people” in international organizations by
country of nationality as compiled in 200 by the Union of
InternationalAssociations.Asthegraphindicates,employment
ofnationalsfromGermany,ItalyandJapanlagsbehindother
keystatesincludingsubstantiallysmallerstatessuchasBelgium.
Figure 7. plots the same information by educational backgroundoftheemployee.Employeeseducatedinallofthecity
ofTokyoareonlyafractionofthoseeducatedinsingleacademic
institutions,suchasHarvardorYale.
is discrepancy likely has multiple causes—for example,
due to limited labor market mobility, Japanese nationals have
traditionally faced greater obstacles and risk in pursuing fulltimeemploymentatinternationalorganizations.However,there
areseveralinstitutionalfactorsthattendtomakeemployment
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Figure 7.2 Number of “leading people” in international organizations
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Figure 7.3 Educational background of “leading people”
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static.Mostnotably,thedistributionofinstitutionalheadquarters tilts towards countries, such as France and the United
States,thatplayedimportantrolesininstitutionbuildinginthe
postwarperiod.epresenceofinstitutionalheadquarterscan
facilitatetheemploymentofhost-countrynationalsforavariety
of reasons. Among them: () reducing hardship for nationals
whocancontinuetoresideintheirhomecountry;(2)greater
visibility and opportunities to establish contacts with current
employees;()self-reinforcingnetworkeﬀects,e.g.,duetothe
tendencyforcurrentemployeestoprefernewhireswithsimilar
training or skills. In addition, the location of an institutional
headquarterscanalsoaﬀecttheideologicalleaningsofaninternationalorganizationanditsconsequentpolicyoutput.Notably,
theorthodoxyoftheUSTreasuryandBrettonWoodsinstitutions in the 990s espousing sound macro and liberal market
policies as a prerequisite to economic growth acquired the
location-speciﬁcappellation—”eWashingtonConsensus.”
Another major international organ that has come under
heavycriticismforinsuﬃcientlyreﬂectinginternationalrealities
istheUNSecurityCouncil.eﬁvepermanentmembersofthe
SecurityCouncil—China,France,Russia,theUnitedKingdom,
andtheUnitedStates—haveremainedstaticsincetheinception
oftheSecurityCouncildespitefairlydramaticshiftsinunderlyinggeopoliticalconditions.Whileitisdiﬃculttoconstructa
single measure that accounts for the geopolitical weight of a
stateintheinternationalsystem,thecaseforincludingJapanis
strong.Accordingtoonewidelycitedmeasure,theComposite
IndexofNationalCapabilitycollectedbytheCorrelatesofWar
project,JapanhasoutrankedFranceandtheUnitedKingdom
sinceroughlythe970sandhasbeenonaparwithRussiasince
thecollapseoftheSovietUnion.4 Asimilarargument,basedon
materialcapabilities,couldbemadeforincludingGermanyand
India.Nonetheless,reformingtheSecurityCouncilhasproved
diﬃcultdespiterepeatedattempts.
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Japanhasbeenparticularlyaﬀectedbyrigidityininternational organizations since the end of World War ii. rough
rapidpostwarreconstructionandeconomicgrowth,Japanrose
throughtheranksofworldpowersduringthelate20th century,
emergingasthenumbertwoeconomyandnumberoneprovider
ofoﬃcialdevelopmentassistancebythelate980s.However,
this meteoric rise did not immediately translate into greater
status and recognition in major international organizations.
AlthoughGermanyandItalyhavesharedasimilarpredicament,
their representation in the European Union provides some
advantages that Japan has lacked—e.g., by virtue of being a
European,aGermannational,HorstKöhler,wasselectedasthe
managingdirectoroftheimf from2000to200.
islackofprogresshasnotbeenduetoalackofinitiative
orleadershiponthepartofJapanesepolicymakers.Inseveral
majorinternationalorganizationsestablishedafterthereemergence of Japan as an important international player, Japanese
policymakershaveplayedanactiverolethatiscommensurate
withthecountry’sgeopoliticalandeconomicinﬂuence.Inthe
WorldTradeOrganization(wto),Japanhasoccupiedanimportant agenda-setting position as part of the “G” along with
Canada,theEuropeanUnion,andtheUnitedStates.Japanwas
alsoafoundingmemberandhasbeenanactiveparticipantin
theG7/G8.Perhapsmostsigniﬁcant,Japanhasplayedamajor
leadershiproleintheAsianDevelopmentBank(adb)sinceits
inception.
Japan has also made signiﬁcant progress within organizationstowhichithasbeenalatecomer.Althoughstillunderrepresented,JapanesenationalshavegainedgroundinmajorUN
organs,forexamplemorethandoublingtheirnumbersinthe
InternationalLaborOrganization(ilo),UnitedNationsDevelopment Program (undp), United Nations Children’s Fund
(unicef),andWorldFoodProgram(wfp)from99to2007.
Japanese nationals have also occupied important leadership
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rolesininternationalorganizationsasepitomizedbytheformer
UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,OgataSadako.
Japanese voting shares in the imf and World Bank have also
graduallymovedtowardsabetterreﬂectionofJapan’sweightin
theworldeconomy.

Variations in Japan’s Position in International Organizations
Although Japan has demonstrated important leadership and
secured some notable gains in international organizations,
progresshasnotbeenuniformacrossinstitutionalsettings.In
thissection,IwillarguethatthedegreeofJapanesesuccesshas
been aﬀected by three key factors: the initiative of Japanese
policymakersinpressingforgreaterrecognition;institutional
rules; and Japan’s bargaining leverage. e third point will be
furtherelaboratedinthefourthsection.
GreaterrecognitionforJapaneseinterestsininternational
organizationshasrarelybeenautomatic.Inmostcases,redistributing key measures, such as voting shares or employment
arrangements, is a zero sum game. If the presidency of an
organization is given to one nation, another nation will be
prevented from occupying the same position. Increasing the
votingpowerofonenationwillinevitablydecreasethevoting
powerofanother.InanorgansuchastheUNSecurityCouncil,
it is possible to add new permanent members without eliminating existing members. However, even in such an additive
case,theinclusionofnewmemberswillhaveadilutiveeﬀect
on the voting power of existing members, particularly if the
newmembersaregivenaveto.Hence,favorablechangesinthe
statusquoofinternationalorganizationshavegenerallymaterialized through the diplomatic initiatives of Japanese policy
makers.However,ascanbeseeninJapan’srepeatedeﬀortsto
secureapermanentSecurityCouncilseat,thisishardlyasuﬃcientcondition.
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esuccessofJapaneseeﬀortshasalsobeenmediatedby
institutional rules. UN Security Council reform presents a
particularchallenge.econditionsrequiredforUNSecurity
CouncilreformaredescribedinArticle08oftheUNCharter:
AmendmentstothepresentChartershallcomeintoforce
forallMembersoftheUnitedNationswhentheyhavebeen
adoptedbyavoteoftwothirdsofthemembersoftheGeneral
Assembly and ratiﬁed in accordance with their respective
constitutionalprocessesbytwothirdsoftheMembersofthe
UnitedNations,includingallthepermanentmembersofthe
SecurityCouncil.

isArticleeﬀectivelysetstwopreconditionsforinstitutional
reform:two-thirdsmajoritysupportwithintheGeneralAssembly(ga),andunanimoussupportamongthePvetoholders—
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.Practicallyspeaking,thissetsahighbarforUNSecurity
Councilreform.Anyreformeﬀortmustbepalatablenotonlyto
stateswithdivergentinterests,suchastheUnitedStates,China,
and Russia, but also a supermajority of developing countries
withintheGeneralAssembly.
Comparatively speaking, the institutional rules governing
votingsharesintheimf andWorldBankaremoreconduciveto
reform.Votingsharesaresubjecttoperiodicreview,obviating
theneedfortime-consuminglobbyingtogetinstitutionalreform
on the agenda. Reform requires a supermajority vote, but
becausevotesareroughlyallocatedbyeconomicweight,developed countries carry a disproportionate share of votes, and
only the United States has veto power. In addition, because
votingpowerisweighted,thereisgreaterroomforcompromise
andlessscopeforbargainingfailureduetoissueindivisibility.5
WhereasJapanhasmadegradualgainsinimf andWorldBank
voting shares since the 980s, progress on the UN Security
Councilhasprovendiﬃcult.
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Finally, Japan’s bargaining leverage has not been uniform
acrossinstitutionalsettings.Fromamaterialstandpoint,Japan’s
economic heft is not matched by a commensurate military
capability. Although Japan has made profuse ﬁnancial contributionstointernationalorganizations,ithasbeencriticizedon
occasionforbeingunwillingtoputitspersonnelinharm’sway,
a limitation dictated by the Japanese constitution. However,
bargaining leverage does not arise from material capabilities
alone.Inthefollowingsection,IwillcontrastJapan’seﬀortsin
theimf andWorldBankandarguethatthecomparativeattractivenessofoutsideoptionsindevelopmentlendinghasresulted
inmorefavorablebargainingoutcomesforJapan.

Japan in the Bretton Woods Institutions
e imf and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development(ibrd)oftheWorldBank6 havevirtuallyidentical
de jure rulesforthedistributionofvotingpower.Votingpower
is largely determined according to the share of subscriptions
heldbyeachmemberstate.7 Inturn,subscriptionsharesareto
broadly reﬂect a country’s standing in the world economy,
measuredthroughsuchindicatorsasgdp,trade,reserves,and
thevariabilityofcurrentreceipts.Inbothinstitutions,redistributionscanoccuraspartofageneralincreaseincapitalization
oronanadhocbasisforindividualcountries.Bothinstitutions
requireasupermajoritytoapproveanychangeinsubscription
shares.8 However,thede facto processforredistributingshares
involves a highly politicized bargaining process.9 Although
speciﬁcformulasareusedasguidelinesforcalculatingsubscriptionshares,theformulasthemselveshavebeenthesubjectof
muchwrangling.“Itwassaidthatthereareonehundredtwenty
waysbywhichtocalculateacountry’squota”(Ogata989,2).
Oﬃcially,subscriptionsharesintheibrd aretobederivativeof
andparalleltothoseintheimf.However,signiﬁcantdiscrepancies have developed over time due to divergent interstate
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bargainingoutcomes.iscaseisthereforeusefulforisolating
theeﬀectofexternalbargainingpoweroninstitutionalrigidity.
AsIhavearguedelsewhere(Lipscy2008),themainpolicy
areaoftheWorldBank—developmentlending—hasgenerally
produced greater institutional competition compared to the
policy area of the imf—balance of payments lending. Among
other reasons, balance of payments lending is more likely to
require broad coverage of international economic conditions
and necessitate the imposition of conditionality, making it
advantageoustodelegateresponsibilitytoauniversalisticinstitutionsuchastheimf.Consequently,intheﬁeldofdevelopment
lending,myriadregionaldevelopmentagenciesperformfunctionssimilartotheWorldBank,10 andahostofcreditorstates
providebilateraldevelopmentassistancethroughdomesticaid
agencies. In contrast, balance of payments lending has been
generally dominated by the imf, with occasional assistance
fromotherinternationalﬁnancialinstitutions(ifis)andcreditor
states.
Hence, a member state that is dissatisﬁed with the status
quo in the World Bank will generally ﬁnd attractive outside
optionsthroughwhichdevelopmentlendingcanbefunneled.
Similaroutsideoptionsforanimf memberarecomparatively
limited—forexample,wereJapantoattemptabailoutofKorea,
itwouldfacetheunattractiveprospectofhavingtolendunconditionally or impose politically explosive conditions on the
Koreangovernmentandprivateinstitutions.erefore,dissatisﬁedstatesintheWorldBankaremorelikelytobeabletoexert
bargainingleveragethroughthecrediblethreatofexit—e.g.,by
withholdingfundsorchannelingresourcesintoalternativeinstitutions(Muthoo999;Voeten200;Gehlbach200).Giventhis
relativebargainingadvantage,Japanandotherdissatisﬁedstates
arepredictedtoachievegreatersuccessinobtainingpreferred
redistributiveoutcomesintheWorldBankovertheimf.
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Japan’s push for greater status in the Bretton Woods
institutions
Intheearly980s,Japanesepolicymakersinitiatedacampaign
for greater representation and voice in the Bretton Woods
institutions. Japanese representatives made it clear that they
felttheexistingdistributionofsharesfailedtoreﬂecttheunderlyingeconomicreality.11 Inparticular,Japanpushedforunambiguous number two status in terms of voting shares in each
institution,withanunoﬃcialtargetsetatapproximately8%of
shares.12 Simultaneously,Japanpushedforgreaterrepresentationofitsnationalsasemployeesandgreaterideologicalrecognition for the merits of the “Asian Development Model.”

Figure 7.4 Relative shares: Japan vs. USA
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Japanese oﬃcials pursued an unusually aggressive bargain
strategy,threateningtowithholdﬁnancialcontributionstothe
institutionsifitsobjectiveswerenotmet.13 Inthissection,Iwill
argue that, consistent with my theoretical predictions, Japan
hasgenerallyachievedgreatersuccessintheWorldBankthan
intheimf intermsofformalrepresentationaswellasinﬂuence
overoutcomes.
Japan’s subscription shares
Figure7.showstheratioofJapan’ssharesofworldgdp and
subscriptionsvis-à-vistheUnitedStates.14 Afteritinitiatedits
campaignforgreaterrepresentation,Japan’sshareintheWorld
Bankincreasedconsiderablyfromalevelcomparabletoitsimf
share.Bythelate980s,Japan’ssubscriptionsharesintheBank
hadmovedtothe7%–0%range,andJapaneseoﬃcialsconsidered their primary objective accomplished.15 In comparison,
imf quotashareshaveconsistentlylaggedbehind.Japan’sattainmentofunambiguousnumbertwostatusineachinstitutionis
indicatedbythetwocirclesinﬁgure7..isgoalwasattained
in 98 for the ibrd but not until 998 for the imf, a lag of
thirteenyears.16
Qualitative evidence
Qualitative evidence reinforces the observed trend in voting
shares.Speciﬁcally,Japanhassuccessfullyexertedadegreeof
ideological inﬂuence within the World Bank, particularly in
referencetothemeritsofthe“AsianDevelopmentModel”with
theAsianDevelopmentBank(adb).Japaneseauthoritieshave
alsopursueddevelopmentapproachestailoredtoAsianneeds
intheadb andthroughbilateralaid,acredibleoutsideoption
vis-à-vis the World Bank. is cannot be said of the imf, as
became painfully apparent during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis
withrespecttotheAsianMonetaryFund(amf).Japaneseinﬂuenceoverimf conditionalitieswasseverelylimited.Proposals
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for an amf did not come to fruition, and bilateral lending by
Japaneseauthoritiesprovidedverylimitedcompetitionagainst
theimf.
Intheearly990s,JapanpressuredtheWorldBanktomove
awayfromitstraditionalneoclassicalapproachthatemphasized
economicliberalizationand“shocktherapy”forthenewpostSovietrepublics.Aformalstatementofthiscriticismcamein
99 with the issuance of “Overseas Economic Cooperation
FundOccasionalPaperNo.,”whichemphasizedgovernmentoriented growth measures and sharply criticized the World
Bankorthodoxy.Aroundthistime,Japanwasstillridinghighin
thebubbleeconomyandrevisionistaccountstoutingthemerits
oftheJapaneseorAsianmodelproliferated.Japan’scriticismof
theWorldBankfollowedtheselines.Japanalsohadtheability
to promote its developmental philosophy through its own
foreignaidchannelsaswellastheadb,givingfurtherreason
for the World Bank to take Japan’s perspective seriously. e
signiﬁcanceoftheoecf paperisdemonstratedbythefactthat
itpromptedaresponse,albeitanegativeone,fromthen-World
Bankchiefeconomist,LawrenceSummers.WorldBankpresident Lewis Preston is said to have remarked, “If there is a
systemouttherethatisabettermousetrapthantheonewe’ve
got,weoughttouseit”(Awanohara99,7).
Japan took the further step of funding the famous “East
AsianMiracle”study,whichexaminedtherapidgrowthofAsian
economiesandconcededthatgovernment-ledgrowthcanresult
inrapid,egalitariangrowthundersomeconditions.Although
themiraclereportprovidedmanycaveats,includingtheprobableinapplicabilityoftheAsianmodeltocountrieslackingan
eﬃcientbureaucracy,Japandemonstratedconsiderableinitiative
and leadership by proposing and getting the World Bank to
carrythroughwiththestudy(Awanohara99,66–77).
Partlyasafunctionofthisinstitutionalhistory,theWorld
Bankwaslessenthusiasticabouttheimf’sprescriptionsduring
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theAsianﬁnancialcrisis,whichemphasizedorthodoxmeasures
such as market liberalization and structural reform. Until the
verge of the crisis, World Bank economists gave Asian economiessuchasIndonesiaacleanbillofhealthinwhatwascalled
a“haloeﬀect,”basedontheimpressivetrackrecordofeconomic
growth (Blustein 200, 92–96). World Bankers and adb staﬀ
werealsoseverelycriticaloftheimf duringthecrisisforsharing
minimalinformationanddictatingpoliciesdespiteaskingthe
developmentorganizationstocontributevastsumstotherescue
packages. en-World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz
was particularly vocal in his criticism of the imf’s policy
prescriptions.17
Japan’sideologicalimprintwasmuchmorelimitedwithin
theimf.isremainedthecasemorethanhalfadecadeafter
thecommissionofthe“EastAsianMiracle”report.roughout
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, Japan adopted a stance that treated
thecrisisasoneofshort-termcapitalmovementsratherthan
structuralproblemsrequiringmajorreform,particularlyinthe
directionofmarketliberalization.However,imf conditionality
repeatedly emphasized orthodox policies contrary to Japan’s
position.en-viceministerforinternationalaﬀairsSakakibara
Eisukerecountsthenegotiationswiththeimf inOctober997
overIndonesiaasfollows:
At the time, the main issue at stake was whether to
construct a “large package” dictating large-scale reform of
theIndonesianeconomyandexceedingthe$7.2billionai
package,ora“smallpackage”focusingonstabilizationofthe
exchangerate.…ItistruethatSuharto’sregimewascorrupt,
andwealsobelievedthattheNationalCarProjectshouldbe
eliminated—however, we were opposed to the imf sticking
itsnoseintothesesortsofpoliticalorstructuralproblems.

Sakakibara goes on to describe how he and his deputy,
Watanabe Tatsuro, engaged in a two hour-long “very heated
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argument(dai-gekiron)”withtheimf missionchiefonOctober
6 threatening that “if you ignore the opinion of the Japanese
governmenttothisextent,wewillhavetoconsiderouroptions
….”18 However, despite this overt intervention by the highestlevelinternationalﬁnancialauthoritiesinJapan,imf policydid
notbudge.
e Asian Development Bank and the Asian Monetary Fund
eAsianDevelopmentBank(adb)andtheAsianMonetary
Fund(amf)aretworegionalorganizationsproposedbyJapan
inthepolicyareaoftheWorldBankandimf.Anexamination
ofthefateofthesetwoinstitutionsprovidesadditionalsupport
for the perspective that they operate in policy areas with
diﬀerentdegreesoffeasibleoutsideoptions.
e adb was established in 966. Yasumoto (98) notes
that“Japan[hasadopted]anunusuallyactive,initiative-taking
stance…[playing]aleadingandcriticalroleintheestablishment
andsubsequentadministrationoftheAsianDevelopmentBank”
(p.).NotonlyisJapanthelargestshareholderandcontributor
totheBank,butitalsoprovides%ofthestaﬀandhasheldthe
presidency since the Bank’s inception. Woo Cumings (99)
also points to direct Japanese leadership at the policy level,
noting that “in recent years Japanese nationals have headed
strategicplanningaswellasprogramunits”(p.2).ismay
seemamootpointgiventhattheadb isaregionalinstitution
andJapanisthelargesteconomyinAsia.However,themembership of the adb includes the United States as well as ﬁfteen
European countries representing the core leadership of the
BrettonWoodsinstitutions.Japan’swillingnesstocommittoan
active leadership role in the adb is indicative of how Japan
mightactinotherinternationalorganizationsifnototherwise
constrained.
Japan maintains considerable inﬂuence over adb policy,
and as a consequence, development projects tend to adhere
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morecloselytoJapaneseeconomicviewscomparedtothoseof
theWest.“eadb’sAsiandirectors[likeJapan]tendtotakea
realisticviewbornoutofthedevelopmentexperienceintheir
respective countries” (Woo-Cumings 99, 2). is has
producedconﬂictswithadb creditorsespousingmoreorthodox
perspectives,mostnotablytheUnitedStates.eadb provides
amultilateralchannelthroughwhichJapancanprovidedevelopmentassistanceaccordingtoaphilosophyclosertoitsown
comparedtothatoftheWorldBank.
Unlike the adb, the Asian Monetary Fund was proposed
duringtheheightoftheAsianﬁnancialcrisisbutnevercame
into existence. According to Sakakibara (2000, 80–82), the
JapaneseMinistryofFinancebeganseriousworkontheamf
proposal following the imf-sponsored ai support meeting
held in Tokyo on August , 997. He asserts that an “Asian
sense of solidarity” pervaded this meeting and became a key
factor in his decision to promote the amf plan. e ai
bailout package exposed imf underfunding and served as a
model for the amf by demonstrating that pooling abundant
Asian reserves could be an eﬀective strategy in dealing with
ﬁnancialcrises.eamf wouldalsoobviatetediousandtimeconsuming consensus building in the future by automating
commitments.
eUSTreasuryactedimmediatelyafterobtaininginformationontheamf andactivelyopposedit.AccordingtoSakakibara, then-Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called
himdirectlyathisresidenceatmidnightandangrilybegan,“I
thoughtyouweremyfriend”(2000,8).Duringaheatedtwohour conversation, Summers allegedly criticized the plan for
excludingtheUnitedStatesandallowingforactionautonomous
of the imf. e United States saw the enforcement of imf
conditionality as crucial to resolving the Asian crisis, and
perceivedtheamf asencouragingneedlessmoralhazardand
duplicationofimf functions.
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e amf presented a conundrum for Japanese oﬃcials.
Japanese actions during the Asian crisis, including the amf,
reﬂectedfrustrationwithitsinabilitytoobtaindesiredoutcomes
with the imf. As part of the new Miyazawa initiative, Japan
tooktheunusualstepofprovidingasmallamountofbilateral
balance of payments lending to Malaysia, a country that had
rejectedimf orthodoxyandimposedcapitalcontrols.Afterthe
crisis,JapanalsoinitiatedtheChiang-Maiinitiative(cmi),which
would provide limited amounts of bailout lending to Asian
economiesincrisis.However,Japanesepolicyhas,byandlarge,
soughttotieamf andcmi ﬁnancingtoimf lendingratherthan
createanalternativesourceofconditionality.iswasoneof
the factors that ultimately undermined the amf. If the amf
were to be merely a supplemental ﬁnancing mechanism with
noindependencevis-à-vistheimf,aregionalinstitutionwould
be unnecessary, and supplementing the resources of the imf
woulddo.
Nonetheless, the amf proposal produced a rare moment
whenaregionalalternativetotheimf appearedcredible.is
emergenceofapotentialoutsideoptionbroughtaboutadjustment on the side of the imf. Sakakibara (2000, 86) suggests
thattheUnitedStatesenticedAsiannationsawayfromtheamf
using promises of increased imf quotas. ese quota adjustmentsoccurredin998tothebeneﬁtofAsiannations,including
Japan,whichﬁnallysecuredanindependentnumbertwopositionabovethatofGermany.Inaddition,Japanbeneﬁtedfrom
theopeningoftheimf regionaloﬃceforAsiaandthePaciﬁcin
Tokyo, which, one observer notes, “is quickly developing into
the locus of regional imf activities such as economic surveillance”(Rowley997).
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Alternative explanations
Beforeconcludingthissection,Iwilladdressseveralalternative
explanations. Although each contains some element of truth,
noneofthesealternativesprovidesafullaccountoftheevidence.
First, a neorealist scholar of international relations might
argue that Japan’s comparative success in the World Bank
reﬂectsunderlyingpowerasymmetriesintherespectiveinstitutionalareas.Putanotherway,Japan’sinﬂuenceininternational
institutions may simply reﬂect discrepancies between Japan’s
economic power in the area of development and balance of
paymentslending.IntermsofOverseasDevelopmentAdministration(oda),Japanwasthenumberonedonorformuchof
the990s,dramaticallyincreasingitsaidatatimewhenother
developed nations were beset by aid fatigue. Comparatively
speaking,Japan’spositionininternationalﬁnancehasweakened
aftertheburstingofthebubble,leavingtheUnitedStatesina
positionofhegemony(Simmons200).Althoughthereisprobablysometruthtothisexplanation,itfailstoaccountforseveral
elements of the empirical evidence. For one, if institutions
merelyreﬂectunderlyingeconomicstrength,Japanshouldhave
been much more inﬂuential in the World Bank during the
990s,anditsvotingshareshouldhaveexceededorcomecloser
to that of the United States. In addition, the timing of events
would also appear to be inconsistent with a realist account.
Japan’sﬁnancialstrengthpeakedintheearly990sanddeclined
rapidly thereafter, while levels of foreign aid remained strong
untilveryrecently.However,Japan’svotingstrengthintheimf
rose gradually from .8% in 980 to .6% in 990 to 6.% in
998. Voting shares in the World Bank rose more quickly,
although Japan did not become the number one donor until
992.
Second, one might argue that Japan’s inﬂuence in each of
theBrettonWoodsinstitutionsisafunctionofeﬀort.Perhaps
Japan has tried more tenaciously to secure inﬂuence in the
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WorldBankthanintheimf.Again,thereissometruthtothis
hypothesis. Japan’s eﬀorts to secure greater representation in
the World Bank appear to have come slightly earlier in the
980scomparedtosimilareﬀortsvis-à-vistheimf (Rapkinet
al.997).elag,however,isnotgreaterthanafewyearsand
hardlyexplainsdiscrepanciesthatsubsequentlycontinuedfor
morethantwodecades.ReﬂectingtheimportanceJapanplaced
onrepresentationintheimf,then-primeministerHashimoto
Ryutaroissuedastatementin989thatJapanwouldﬁnditdiﬃculttoﬁnancetheinstitutionunlessgiven“theproperranking
toreﬂectoureconomicpower.”19 Despitethisexplicitthreatto
reallocate resources, Japanese representation in the imf
continued to lag behind that in the World Bank. In addition,
eﬀortprovidesverylittleleverageoverthedistinctfatesofthe
adb and the amf, which were both promoted vigorously by
Japaneseﬁnancialoﬃcials.Finally,explanationsbasedoneﬀort
suﬀerfromanendogeneityproblem—ifJapaneseoﬃcialsrealize
that securing preferred outcomes in the imf are prohibitively
diﬃcult, their eﬀorts will naturally be redirected towards the
WorldBank.
ird, a critic might argue that the observed phenomena
areduetohistoricalaccidentsorpurelyincidentalfactors.Asin
any case study, nonsystemic factors undoubtedly had a large
impactonthepolicyoutcomesanalyzed—e.g.,thepersonalities
andstylesofSummersandSakakibarasurelymadeadiﬀerence
inhowtheAsianCrisiswashandled.However,amoresystematic analysis of cross-national voting shares yields similar
results—sharesintheWorldBankhaveexhibitedgreaterﬂexibility over time than shares in the imf for all member states
(Lipscy 2008). It should also be noted that the salience of
outside options in bargaining has been established in a wide
rangeoftheoreticalandempiricalapplications(Muthoo999;
Voeten200;IversenandRosenbluth2006;Johns2007).
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Conclusion
Japanhasincreasinglybecomeamajorplayerintheinternational
organizational architecture, although signiﬁcant challenges
remain. In relative terms, Japan’s economic and geopolitical
weight is likely to have peaked in the early 990s. As such,
Japan’srepresentationinﬁnancialinstitutionsisnolongerlikely
topresentaglaringdiscrepancywitheconomicreality.However,
Japan’sinabilitytosecureapermanentseatontheUNSecurity
Councilwilllikelyremainproblematicintothefuture.Whereas
institutionalrigidityisagreatobstacleforrisingpowers,itisa
boonfordecliningpowers.MuchastheUnitedStatesdidafter
WorldWarii,Japanwillhavemuchtogainfromfurtherinstitutionalizingitsinﬂuenceandleadershipwhileitstillremains
inapositionofpreeminence.
Japan’sexperienceinfacinginstitutionalrigiditiesalsoholds
important lessons for how existing organizations can accommodatenewrisingpowerssuchasChinaandIndia.Itislikely
thatAsiawillbecomeanincreasinglycriticalcenterofeconomic
andgeopoliticalactivityinthecomingdecades.Powertransitions can be notoriously destabilizing for the international
system, often producing geopolitical tensions (Organski 98;
Kennedy987)oreconomicturbulence(Kindleberger986).If
majorinternationalorganizationsallowforsmoothpowertransitions, such destabilization may be mitigated. On the other
hand, if such institutions are overly resistant to change, the
internationalorganizationalarchitecturemayprovetobebrittle.

Notes
 Cohen977,p.90
2 For example, Japan nominated but ultimately withdrew Sakakibara
Eisuke for the managing directorship of the imf in 2000. Finance
MinisterMiyazawaKiichinotedthat:“enominationofDr.SakakibarareﬂectedJapan’spositionthattheimf,asatrulyglobalﬁnancial
institution, should determine its Managing Director based on a
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c andidate’sabilitytoleadthisinstitutionintherightdirectionand
not based on his/her country of origin.” (imf External Relations
Department,“Mr.Yoshimura’sStatementoneWithdrawalofthe
Nomination of Dr. Sakakibara For Managing Director of the imf,”
March,2000).
 isis,inpart,becausetheimf quotaformulasincorporatemeasures
besidesgdp,includingshareofworldtradeandreserves.However,
thequotaformulasthemselveshavehistoricallybeensubjecttonegotiationamongmajorquotaholders,andactualquotasharesdonot
necessarilyreﬂectoutcomesofthequotaformulas.Foranexcellent
discussion,seeBoughton200.
 Singer,etal.972(v..02).
 SeeFearon998.
6 Iwilluseibrd andWorldBankinterchangeablyinthesubsequent
text.
7 ereisalsoaverysmallﬁxedcomponentdistributedequallytoall
membersof20votingsharestoeachmember.
8 eexactthresholdhasbeenadjustedovertimetomaintaintheveto
of the United States as its voting share declined. Currently, it is at
8%.
9 Amongothers,seeHorseﬁeld969;GarritsendeVries98,–;
Rapkinetal.997;Boughton200,89–7.
0 Amongothers,onemaypointtotheAsianDevelopmentBank,InterAmericanDevelopmentBank,CentralAmericanBankforRegional
Integration,AfricanDevelopmentBank,IslamicDevelopmentBank,
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Council of
EuropeDevelopmentBank,CaribbeanDevelopmentBank.
 “Because of the insuﬃcient adjustment of quota shares during the
previous General Reviews of Quotas, the present quota does not
necessarilyreﬂectchangesoftheeconomicrealitiesofmembercountries.Appropriateadjustmentsofquotasharesshouldbeanintegral
partofthecomingEightReviewofQuotas.”StatementbyMayekawa
Haruo (Alternative Governor of the Fund and the Bank of Japan),
Summary Proceedings of the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings,98,
p. 9. “I would like to emphasize that an extensive adjustment of
quota shares among member countries would be an indispensable
preconditioninimplementingtheeightquotaincrease,inorderthat
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membercountriesshallcooperatewiththeFundinaccordancewith
their relative economic positions in the world economy and thus
allowtheFundtofunctionsmoothly.”StatementbyWatanabeMichio
(GovernoroftheFundandtheBankofJapan),Summary Proceedings
of the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings,982,p.9.
2 Rapkinetal.997,78.
 Ibid.77–78.
 Usingthisratiocontrolsforchangesindistributionsharescausedby
theentryofnewmemberstates.Rawvotingsharesbehavesimilarly.
Nominal gdp is used rather than purchasing power parity (ppp)
becausethisistheinputusedbytheimf initsquotaformulas.
 By989and990,policystatementsfromJapaneseoﬃcialsreﬂected
dissatisfactionwithJapan’spositionintheimf butnotintheWorld
Bank.SeestatementsbyRyutaroHashimoto,Summary Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting of the IMF and World Bank,989and990.
6 InterviewswithcurrentJapaneseMinistryofFinanceoﬃcialsindicate
thatJapannowconsidersitsrepresentationinbothinstitutions(asof
200)tobeadequate.
7 See,forexample,JosephStiglitz,“eInsider—WhatIlearnedatthe
worldeconomiccrisis.”e New Republic,2000.
8 Sakakibara,2000(mytranslation).
9 Hobart Rowen, “Japanese Intensify Push for Higher imf Ranking,”
Washington Post,26September989.
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PART iv
Japan’s Strategic Response
to Regional and Global
Challenges

8
Sino-Japanese Energy Relations:
Prospects for Deepening Strategic Competition
Kent E. Calder

Together,JapanandChinaaretheeconomic,andpotentiallythepolitical,giantsofAsia,lockedina
complexpolitical-economicscorpion’sdance.eyaccountfor
approximatelytwo-thirdsoftheeconomicproductoftheregion
andmorethanhalfofitsmilitaryspending.Sino-Japanesetrade
is among the most vigorous and dynamic on earth and has
morethandoubledoverthepastﬁveyears.
Despite their deep and growing economic ties, however,
China and Japan have an increasingly wary geopolitical relationshipthatisdangerous,globallyimportant,andremarkably
misunderstood.roughouthistory,hierarchyhashelpedstructurethebilateralrelationsofthesegiants:onewasalwaysclearly
moreprosperousorpowerfulthantheother.Inclassicaldaysit
wasChina;foroveracenturyfollowingtheMeijirestoration,
Japanwasgenerallypreeminent.
Onlyinthepasthalfdecadehastheunprecedentedprospect
of simultaneous Chinese and Japanese power and aﬄuence
beguntomaterialize.Aless-developedChinahasbeengrowing
e author expresses special appreciation to Yukie Yoshikawa for her
research assistance and comments on this paper.



KentE.Calder

rapidly,whileamoreaﬄuentandmatureJapanhasremained
relatively stagnant, with a population that in 005 began an
unprecedentedpeacetimedecline.eclassicalconditionsfor
achronicsecuritydilemmaandbalanceofpowerstrugglebetweenmatureandrisingpowers,whichsomelikentotheAngloGermanrivalryontheeveofWorldWarI,havecomesteadily
intoview.1
GeopoliticaltensionsbetweenChinaandJapanhavemany
dimensions.e“shadowsofreuniﬁcation”intheTaiwanStraits
and the prospect of impending geopolitical change on the
Koreanpeninsulaaretwooftheclearest.2 erapidprogressof
ChinesemissiletechnologyandJapan’scountervailingcommitmenttomissiledefensecooperationwiththeUnitedStatesare
anotherexpressionoftensionsbetweenChinaandJapan.
Inaworldoftighteningmarketsforoilandgas,however,
animated by China’s explosive economic growth, the energy
dimensionofSino-Japaneserivalryappearsincreasinglysalient.
Yettheprospectsforenergycooperationarealsorising.Energy
ties are an especially interesting aspect of the Sino-Japanese
relationshipbecausetheyareapowerful“double-edgedsword,”
with the potential to sharply leverage either cooperation or
conﬂictbetweenthesetwogiants.

Contrasting Resource Endowments
Japan is singularly deﬁcient in energy resources, with only 59
millionbarrelsofprovenoilreserves—aboutaten-dayssupply
at current rates of consumption.3 Apart from some small oil
depositsinNiigataPrefectureontheJapanSeacoastandsome
low-qualitycoalinHokkaido,Japanisalmostsingularlybereft
ofhydrocarbons.Indeed,ithasbeenalarge-scaleimporterof
oilsincethelatenineteenthcentury,andconstraintsonitsoil
importswereamajorcasusbelliinDecember94.4 Currently
a full 99 percent of its entire oil and gas supply must be
imported.
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China, in contrast, is signiﬁcantly better endowed with
domestic energy resources, including coal reserves that rival
thoseoftheUnitedStatesasthelargestonearthandsigniﬁcant
oil reserves as well. Indeed, China remains the world’s sixth
largestoilproducer,5 continuingtodrawheavilyonlargenortheastern ﬁelds, such as Daqing, that are only slowly moving
towarddepletion.Anditistheworld’slargestcoalproduceras
well as its largest consumer of coal. Yet environmental and
infrastructuralproblems,compoundedbyaChinesereluctance
to oﬀer foreign investors the incentives necessary to access
state-of-the-art drilling technology, prevent China from realizingitsfulldomesticenergyproductionpotential.
e major Chinese domestic reserves, of oil in particular,
arelocatedinthenorthandthewest,asindicatedinFigure8..
Meanwhile,energydemandissurginginthesouthandtheeast,
wherethebulkofChina’snewlyaﬄuentmiddleclassisconcentrated.erailwaysandpipelinesneededtotransportoil,coal,
andnaturalgasfromonepartofthecountrytoanotherremain
under-developed,andinawoefulstateofdisrepair.Oﬀshoreoil
ﬁeldsintheEastandSouthChinaSeascouldprovideapartial
escape from these painful energy dilemmas, but they often
presentproblemsoftheirownintheformofterritorialdisputes
withChina’sneighbors.
China’s coal reserves, as indicated above, are even more
massive than its substantial oil deposits, and the country
depends on coal for seventy percent of total primary energy
consumption.6 Yet, as in the case of oil, transportation also
stands as a signiﬁcant barrier to full exploitation of those
deposits.Long-distancetransportation,ofcourse,isespecially
cumbersome,sincecoalissobulky.elargestcoalﬁeldsarein
thenortheast—particularlyinShandongandShansi—whereas
themostrapidlyexpandingenergydemandisseveralhundred
milestothesouth,alongthesoutheasterncoast.
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Diﬀering Energy Security Imperatives
Flowingfromtheirdiﬀeringresourceendowmentsandpositions
in the global political economy, China and Japan have contrastingconceptionsofenergysecurity.edetailshavevaried
somewhat across their respective modern histories and producedbroadcontrastsinincentivestructures.esecontrasting
imperatives animate the shifting patterns of cooperation and
conﬂict that have emerged over the past two generations of
interactionbetweenthesetwogreatpowersofAsia.

Figure 8.1 China’s complex energy geography

Source: US Department of Energy Oﬃce of Fossil Energy.
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JapanhasbyfarthelargesteconomyinAsia,withagdp of
wellover$4trillion.Reﬂectingitshugeeconomyanditsradical
lack of domestic energy reserves, Japan also has by far the
largestoilimportsintheregion,atover4millionbarrelsper
day, as well as liquiﬁed natural gas (lng) imports that reach
roughlyhalfoftheentireworld’stotal.eseimportsofbothoil
and gas ﬂow heavily from the Middle East, where Japan gets
nearly90percentofitsoilandapproximatelyone-thirdofits
gas. e bulk of energy imports ﬂow through either Japanese
trading companies or multinational energy ﬁrms, since the
private-sectorJapaneseenergyproducersarenotwelldeveloped.
Although its economy is massive, Japan is not growing
rapidly,andhasnotbeendoingsoformorethanﬁfteenyears.
Inenergy,comparedtoChina,itisthe“pioneer,”ratherthanthe
“pursuer,”havingestablisheditspresenceinpreviousyearsand
feelingonlyalimitedneedtoexpand.7 Japan’senergyinterests
areconservativeandentrenched,especiallyinthePersianGulf.
Geopolitically, those interests are safeguarded by the United
States, Japan’s principal global ally, making Japan relatively
comfortablewithdependenceonextendedsealanesfromthe
GulftoYokohamathataredominatedbytheUSNavy.
China’senergysecurityimperativesaredecisivelydiﬀerent
fromJapan’s.Mostfundamentally,Chinahasmuchmorerapidly
expandingenergyneeds,ﬂowingfromitsrelativelysmall,but
explosively growing economy. China’s oil consumption, for
example, rose .9 percent in 005, compared to only a .4
percentincreaseinJapan.8
Inabsoluteterms,China’senergydemandremainssurprisingly small, relative to its huge population, due to low percapitaenergyconsumption.In005,Chinaconsumedlessthan
sevenmillionbarrelsofoilperday,littlemorethanonethird
the total of the United States, although slightly more than
Japan’s5.millionbarrelsperday.9 Yetthisaggregatedemand
seems fated to grow massively in the future, as Chinese per
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capitaenergyconsumptionisstillonlyone-ﬁfthofUSandonetenthofJapaneselevels.us,amajorenergysecurityimperative for China is necessarily to think about new sources of
energy—bothgeographicalandfunctional—tofeedaneconomic
machinethatisfatedtobemuchlargerinadecadeortwothan
itistoday.
AlthoughChina(prc)facesamuchstrongersupply-expansion imperative thandoesJapan,itdoesnotconfrontsuchan
extremescarcityofdomesticenergyresources.Asnotedearlier,
Chinahasrelativelysubstantialdomesticenergyreserves,particularlyofcoal.Intheshort-term,China’senergysecurityproblem
hasamuchlargerinfrastructural componentthandoesJapan’s.
China badly needs railways, ports, and pipelines to transport
energy.Japanalreadyhasthem.
ethirdmajordiﬀerencebetweenJapanandChina’senergy
incentive structure is geopolitical. Japan is a close ally of the
UnitedStates,withitscommandinginﬂuenceintheglobalsea
lanes, whereas China remains on delicate terms with Washington.Consequently,Chinatendstoseeitsenergysecurityas
enhanced by overland pipelines that avoid the sea lanes that
Americadominates.Beijingespeciallyfavorsoverlandpipelines
fromadjourningnations,suchasRussiaandKazakhstan,ina
waythatislandJapandoesnot.

A History of Energy Cooperation
Ironically, in view of recent geopolitical rivalries, yet understandably, considering national resource endowments, Japan
and China have a long history of energy cooperation. China
beganexportingoiltoJapanin974,halfadecadebeforethe
economic acceleration impelled by the Four Modernizations.
isSino-Japaneseenergysupplyententecontinuedforthirty
years. Reﬂecting their close geopolitical alignment from the
early 970s until Tiananmen, China and Japan were energy
partnersfornearlytwodecades.
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eSovietUnion,tobesure,competedstronglywithChina
for the Japanese oil and gas market. In 97, for example, the
SovietUnionproposedthatJapanprovidecreditsofupto$
billionfortheconstructionofapipelinefromtheTyumenoil
ﬁeldinwesternSiberiatothePaciﬁcportofNakhodkaandthat
the USSR supply Japan with an estimated annual ﬂow of 40
milliontonsofcrudeoil.eRussiansalsoproposedasecond
trans-Siberianrailwaytotransportthecrudeoilovermuchof
thedistancethatwouldhavebeencoveredbythepipeline.
China,nevertheless,providedmorerealisticenergysupply
prospectstoJapan.Oilwasdiscoveredinthe970sintheBohai
GulfandYellowSeaareas,only400milesfromJapanbytanker.
e Tyumen ﬁelds, by contrast, were ,00 miles from Japan
and required complex combined rail and tanker transport.
ReﬂectingtheseSino-Japanesegeographicalcomplementarities,
under the 978 long-term trade agreement, China agreed to
supplyJapanwithagoalof7milliontonsofoiltheﬁrstyearand
then47milliontonsinﬁveyears.Japanimportednotonlyoil
fromChina,butalsocoal.10
WhenMoscowreduceditspromisedlevelofoilfromthe
Tyumenﬁelds,Beijingnotonlycounteredwithahigheroﬀer,
butwasalsoabletodosowithoutaskingforlarge-scalecredits
fromJapan.Aslateas990,Chinawasexporting$billionofoil
annuallytoJapan—representingoverhalfofChina’sworldwide
oilexports,and7.percentofJapan’stotaloilimports.11 is
traditionoforganizingenergytradethroughcooperativelongtermtradeagreementsstartedin978.eseagreementshave
been repeatedly extended every ﬁve years, with the latest
version,signedinDecember005,extendedto00.12
ChineseoilexportstoJapanfollowingtheoilshocksofthe
970swereattractivetobothnations.ForJapan,theyallowed
diversiﬁcationawayfromtheWesternmajors,whichcontrolled
around5percentofJapaneseoilimportsduringthisperiod.
Imports from China also provided Japan with a way to oﬀset

8KentE.Calder

the strategic vulnerabilities of large-scale dependence on the
MiddleEast,whilegainingincreasedleverageinbargainingfor
lower prices with the producer countries and oil majors. For
inﬂuentialJapanesemanufacturers,suchasNipponSteel,energy
importsfromChinaalsoprovidedameansofincreasingJapanese manufactured exports, by linking Chinese oil exports to
China’s steel, industrial plant, and machinery imports from
Japan.13
ForChina,oilexportstoJapanprovidedforeignexchange
andalsoaccesstoJapanesetechnology.Between97and974,
justasoilexportstoJapanwereabouttobegin,Japanconcluded
agreementsforthesaleofseventeenindustrialplantstoChina,
with a value of $470 million, including fertilizer and petrochemicalfactories.eseoilsuppliesgraduallyexpandedinto
gasexportsaswell.Indeed,aconsortiumofJapanesecompanies,
ledbyBridgestone,negotiatedwithChinafortheconstruction
ofaliquifactionplantnearagasﬁeldintheTakangareacapable
of producing 00,000 tons of liqueﬁed natural gas (lng) per
yearforexportbacktoJapan.
Amid this symbiotic energy interdependence, both China
andJapande-emphasizedtheircomplexandconﬂictingterritorialclaimsagainsteachother.China,foritspart,strovetolure
JapanawayfromtheUSSRthroughitsenergyexports,leaving
disputesovertheEastChinaSeaandtheDiaoyu/Senkakuissues
totheside.Japan,ontheotherhand,refrainedfromexploring
resources in the East China Sea, both because it expected to
continueoilﬂowsfromChinaandalsobecauseitsowncompanieshadbeenfrustratedintheirsearchforoﬀshoreoil.

China’s Expanding Economy
Changes the Geopolitical Landscape
is felicitous energy symbiosis between Japan and China
continued into the 990s. As noted above, in 990 Japan still
importedover$billionannuallyinoilfromChina.isChinese
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oil was attractive to Japan not so much for its quality—Saudi
lightwasmoreattractiveforgasoline,aviationfuel,andmany
other sophisticated applications—but because of the trade
expansion opportunities that it created for Japanese trading
companies.OilgeneratedhardcurrenciesforChineseproducers
andindirectlyfortheChinesegovernment,whichcouldinturn
beexchangedforthetechnology,plants,andmachineryneeded
topropelChina’sindustrialdevelopment.14
Ultimatelyitwastheexplosive,sustainedeconomicgrowth
triggered by the Four Modernizations, generating enormous
andrapidlygrowingnewenergydemand,thatcriticallydeepenedenergyrivalriesbetweenJapanandChina.Despitesubstantialdomesticreserves,geographicalimbalances,coupledwith
related infrastructural weaknesses, prevented local Chinese
producersfromsupplyingtheircountry’sowninternaldemand.
GivenChina’smassivedomesticcoalreserves,thenewrivalries
acrosstheEastChinaSeanotsurprisinglycenteredonoiland
gas.
In99,China’slong-standingglobaloiltradesurplusturned
to deﬁcit. at imbalance steadily deepened over the ensuing
decade,asnotedinFigure8..Bytheendof005,Chinawas
importinganet.8millionbarrels/day,orroughlytwo-thirds
ofJapan’smassivetotal.15
Between 000 and 005, rising Chinese oil demand accounted for slightly more than one-third of global demand
increases.16 Fueledbyrisingautomobileownershipandsurging
petrochemical production, China’s oil consumption passed
Japan’sin00and,by005,wasnearlysevenmillionbarrels
perday,comparedto5.4millionbbl/dayforJapan.Virtuallyall
oftheincrementaldemandwassuppliedfromimports,dueto
thedomesticsupplyconstraintsdiscussedabove.
AsshowninFigure8.,theprospectsarestrongforsubstantialfutureincreasesinChineseoildemand,fueledbyindustrial
and consumer demand, as well as lingering ineﬃciencies and
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Figure 8.2 China’s net oil imports
Unit: barrels per day
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Source: China’s Statistical Yearbook (until 2003) and BP Statistical Review of World
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price misalignments. Gasoline in China, for example, retailed
for$.80agalloninmid-005andremainssubstantiallybelow
world prices.17 Reﬁners, for their part, continually complain
about price controls that inhibit needed investment. Chinese
currentlyconsumeapproximatelytwobarrelsofoilperperson
per year, compared to 8 barrels in the United States, and
China’susagewillinevitablyrise.

e Deepening Reality of Sea Lane Dependence
JapanhasbeendependentonenergysealanesfromSoutheast
AsiaandtheMiddleEastthroughoutitsmodernhistory.China,
asitsoilandgasimportssteadilyrise,isfollowingasimilar,if
less pronounced course. In 00, China imported nearly 70
million tons of crude oil, yet only 7 percent of this total—
mainlyfromRussiaandKazakhstan—arrivedbyrail.erest—
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Figure 8.3 Strong prospects for rising Chinese oil demand
Unit: million barrels per day
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afull9percent,orclosetotwomillionbarrelsaday—cameby
sea.
EnergysealanedependencestirslittleanxietyinJapanand
is an increasingly important economic rationale for its close
politicalalliancewiththeUnitedStates.18 YetsealanedependenceisinherentlydisquietingformanyinChina,ashasbeen
noted,duetoChina’sstrategicvulnerabilityatsea.Apartfrom
moreobviouspolitical-militaryconsiderations,Chinahasother
uniquevulnerabilitiesﬂowingfromitsrisingsealanedependence that are of national concern. Only 0 percent of its
importedoilcomesinChinesetankers,with90percentbeing
shipped to China by foreign ﬂeets. And between 80 and 85
percent of China’s oil imports come through the Straits of
Malacca,only.5mileswideatitsnarrowestpoint.Handling
millionbarrelsofoiland40billioncubicmetersofnaturalgas
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daily,theStraitsareanaturaltargetforterroristsandaninterdictionpointintheeventofprospectiveconﬂictwithforeign
partners.
e historical record suggests that China fears energy
dependenceonthebroaderworld,andthatithassomereason
todoso.Sovietadvisorsinthe950splayedamajorroleinthe
Chinese oil industry, and their departure following the SinoSoviet split of 90 precipitated severe energy shortages in
China.ItalsoleftChinadependentontheSovietUnion,anew
adversary,formorethanhalfofitsreﬁnedoilproductconsumption.Chinahasalsobeensoberedbythepost-Sovietuseofboth
oil and natural gas as a geopolitical lever in Russia’s dealings
withneighbors,suchastheUkraine,Moldova,andevenBelarus,
overthepastdecade.
Chinese analysts appear to see the United States as a
prospectivethreattoChina’senergysecurity,althoughBeijing’s
rapidlyescalatingenergyneedsmayalsohavereinforcedChina’s
short-term inclination to avoid confrontation with Washington.19 ere is no nation powerful enough to balance the
United States, and the American Navy dominates the 7,000milesealanesfromShanghaitotheStraitsofHormuzthrough
whichhalfofChina’soilsuppliesmustpass.Economicsanctions
havebecomeanimportanttoolofAmericanpolicyinthepostcoldwarworld.IntheviewofsomeChineseobservers,China’s
vulnerabilitytoUSeconomicpressureandrelativelackofallies
could restrict its options on such strategically and politically
importantissuesasTaiwan.Ataminimum,astheyseeit,the
United States appears disinclined to address issues of SinoAmerican energy interdependence in a positive spirit, as evidenced by the rejection of China National Oil Corporation’s
bidforUnocalinthesummerof005.
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Reducing Energy Vulnerability:
Sino-Japanese Approaches in Comparative Perspective
Conceptually speaking, Japan and China should have at least
ﬁvestrategicoptionsforreducingvulnerabilitytoprospective
internationalpressureintheenergyarea:()increasingenergy
eﬃciency;()functionaldiversiﬁcationawayfromoil,infavor
of nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and natural gas, the
supplyofwhichisgenerallylesssusceptibletosealaneinterdiction; () geographical diversiﬁcation of energy supplies; (4)
reducing reliance on international majors, while conversely
increasingtheshareofenergyimportsﬂowingthroughdomesticallyownedorcontrolledintermediaries;and(5)developing
themilitarycapabilitytoindependentlyprotectdomesticenergy
supplies.
Amongtheforegoingpossiblealternatives,thetwocountries
have adopted a markedly diﬀerent mix of approaches to the
problem of assuring energy security. is important reality
concentrates the arena of prospective bilateral confrontation
overenergyintoasmallnumberofcriticalareas,suchasoﬀshore oil development in East Asian waters and competition
over pipelines and third-country concessions. e divergence
in Japanese and Chinese approaches, however, also builds
complementaritiesbetweenthemthatcouldwellopenavenues
forfuturecooperation.
Japanhasgivenstrongprioritytodomesticindustrialtransformationasaprimarymeansofcopingwithproblemsofenergy
security.Inthisregard,threepolicyprioritieshavebeenespeciallyimportant:()energyeﬃciency;()developmentofalternativeenergyformsthatenhanceenergyindependence;and()
industrialstructuretransformationtowardknowledge-intensive
sectorsandawayfromenergy-intensiveareas.Together,initiatives in these areas have allowed Japan to remarkably reduce
the energy intensity of its economy since the mid-970s. is
risingeﬃciency,coupledwithmorethanadecadeofeconomic
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stagnation,hassigniﬁcantlymoderatedtheneedthatJapanfelt
so keenly a generation ago to compete aggressively in global
energyandraw-materialsmarkets.20
Intrasectoral improvements in Japanese energy eﬃciency
sincetheoilshocksofthe970shavebeenespeciallyimpressive,
asshowninFigure8.4.Overallindicesofindustrialproduction
(iip)perunitofenergyconsumedinJapanhavedroppednearly
40 percent from levels of the 970s.21 In non-ferrous metal
production, for example, in 004 Japan consumed only 45.8
percent as much energy per unit of production as in 97. In
chemicalsthisratiowas5.;inpaper/pulp5.;insteel7.5;
andincement8..22
Industrial structure transformation—away from energyintensive materials sectors, such as steel and petrochemicals,
and toward areas that consume little energy, such as elec-

Figure 8.4 Japan’s improvement in energy eﬃciency
100
80
60
40
20
0
Steel

Non-Ferrous
Metal

Chemicals

1973

Paper/Pulp

Cement

2004

Note: Calculated with 1973 ﬁgure as 100.
Source: Energy Conservation Center. Handbook of Energy and Economic Statistics
in Japan, 2006 edition, pp. 68–69.

Sino-Japanese Energy Relations75

tronics—has also helped to substantially reduce aggregate
energy demand in Japan. Overall, non-raw material-intensive
industriesinJapanhavegrownnearlytwiceasfastastheirraw
materialintensivecounterpartssincethemid-970s.isdiﬀerentialwasespeciallysharpduringthe975to985decadeand
was strongly encouraged by industrial policy.23 As a consequence,theshareofmaterialsindustriesinJapaneseindustrial
production fell from  to  percent during the period from
975to005,whilethoseoflessenergy-consumingmetalsand
machinerysectorshasgrownfrom0to5percent.24
Japan has also pursued active alternative energy policies
thatincreaseautonomyfromhydrocarbonimports.emost
signiﬁcantamongthesepolicieshasbeensupportfornuclear
power that has few equals anywhere else in the world, apart
fromFrance,Sweden,Russia,andSouthKorea.In97only0.
percent of Japan’s primary energy supply was provided by
nuclear power, but that ratio rose to a high of .7 percent in
998.25 After years of economic uncertainty, political controversy,andderegulationduringandjustaftertheAsianﬁnancial
crisis, the Japanese government has recently begun to reemphasizenuclearpowerandrebuildthepolicyconsensusto
supportit.
econventionalwisdomregardingJapaneseforeigneconomic policy has long emphasized its mercantilist character
and the formidable eﬀectiveness of Japanese state strategy in
dealingwithinternationaleconomicmatters.26 Whatisstriking
intheenergyarea,however,ishowlittle salience statecorporationsorgovernmentpolicycompanieshaveinJapan,andhow
weaklytheyaresupportedbystatepower.Incomparisonwith
China, or even the United States, what has been remarkable,
untilthecomingoftheAbeShinzoadministration,isnotthe
scopeofJapanesegovernmenteﬀortsatenergydiplomacy,but
ratherthelackthereof,andtherelativeineﬀectivenessofsuch
eﬀortsthathavebeenmade.27
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Japanese and Chinese approaches diverge sharply with
respecttothethreeﬁnaloptionsdiscussedaboveforassuring
energy security. With respect to geographical diversiﬁcation,
Japan has heretofore largely accepted the long-term market
logicofrelianceonMiddleEasternoilsupplies.Ithasconsistently relied on a small number of producers in the Persian
Gulf—particularlySaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates,and
Iran—forwellover80percentofitstotalimports.28
China, in sharp contrast to Japan, has made substantial
eﬀorts to diversify away from the Middle East, resulting in a
dependence ratio in 005 on that region of only around 45
percent,orlittlemorethanhalfthatofJapan.AlthoughChina
has, to some degree, exploited geopolitical tensions between
the United States and Iran to encroach on Japan’s traditional
specialrelationshipwiththelattercountry,29 whatisfarmore
strikingisthevigorofitsnewrelationshipswithAfricanenergy
producers with which Japan is virtually uninvolved. China
procured nearly one-third of its oil imports from Africa in
005;30 the continent is only a marginal supplier for Japan.
Indeed,in00and007,AngolacompetedcloselywithSaudi
Arabia as the largest exporter in the world of oil to China.
ChineseoilimportsfromAngolain005,atover7milliontons
annually,werefarmorethantriplewhattheyhadbeenin00.
Reﬂecting its deepening energy interdependence with
Africa,Chinahasgivenasubstantialprioritytothatcontinent
in its diplomacy, which has, in turn, further deepened the
alreadysubstantialenergyinterdependencebetweenthetwo.
Inlate00BeijingsponsoredanAfrica-ChinasummitconferenceinChina,whichforty-eightAfricanheadsofgovernment
attended.31 ChinesePresidentHuJin-Taohasalsogivenconsiderable precedence to African energy producers in his own
personalsummitdiplomacy.HehasbeentoAfricathreetimes
already,makingapointofvisitingsuchnationsasAngolaand
Nigeria,whicharemajoroilexporterstoChina.JapanesePrime
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MinisterKoizumiJun’ichiro,moreconcernedaboutobtaining
AfricansupportforJapan’sbidtobecomeapermanentmember
oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(unsc),visitednomajor
energyproducersatallinhisAfricantravels.
China has also utilized national policy companies much
moreactivelyandeﬀectivelythanhasJapan.ChinaNationalOil
Company,inparticular,hasbecomeextremelyactiveoverseas,
evolvingintoamajormarketplayerinAfricaandKazakhstan,
forexample.ChinaNationalOilCompanyhasreceivedsubstantialgovernmentsupportinthateﬀort.Japaneseenergydevelopmentcompanieshavebeenlessdynamic,althoughdiplomatic
cross-pressures in Iran and elsewhere have at times slowed
theiradvance.AlthoughnominallyaSocialistnation,Chinahas
used market mechanisms, such as initial public oﬀerings that
capitalizeonfavorablelong-termdemandprospectsinitsenergy
future,toleveragethestrengthofpublicpolicycompaniessuch
asChinaNationalOilCompanyininternationalmarkets.

Flashpoints of Sino-Japanese Competition
Although direct Sino-Japanese energy competition over the
pastdecadehasbeensurprisinglysubduedduetoadomestic,
transformation-oriented Japanese energy strategy, there is a
goodchancethatbilateralrivalrywillintensifysubstantiallyin
thefuture.RapidlyrisingChinesehydrocarbondemand,interactingwithbroadergeostrategictensions,couldbeanimportant
catalyst.Anothercouldbeanincreasinglycoherentandinsistent
Japaneseenergydiplomacy,theoutlinesofwhichbecamevisible
andincreasinglyclear-cutundertheAbeadministration.
e most dramatic recent manifestation of Sino-Japanese
energycompetitionhasbeenclosetohomeintheEastChina
Sea.Estimatesvaryregardingactualreserves,butbothoiland
gasdepositsappeartobesubstantial.Chineseestimatesrange
from75trillionto0trillioncubicfeetofgas,whereasJapanese
estimatesofoilsuggest“wellover94.5billionbarrelsofquality
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oil.”32 eattractivenessofthesereservestoChina,inparticular,
is enhanced by their close proximity to areas of rapid energy
demandincreasealongChina’ssoutheasterncoast,asshownin
Figure8.forwhichtherearefewalternativesourcesofsupply.
e East China Sea gas reserves are especially attractive to
China,giventhehigheﬃciencyofgasasaresidentialfueland
itsfavorableenvironmentalcharacteristics.
epoliticaloriginsoftheSino-Japaneseenergyconﬂictin
theEastChinaSeaarerootedinthegeographyanditsrelationship to the recent evolution in international principles for
governingexploitationofsubmarineresources.UndertheUN
InternationalLawoftheSea,theexclusiveeconomiczone(eez)
ofanationis00nauticalmilesfromthatnation’scontinental
shelf. In the East China Sea, however, the widest separation
betweenChinaandJapanisonly0nauticalmiles.Chinaand
Japanhaveadopteddiﬀerentcriteriaforsettingtheirconception
ofeezsinthearea:Japanhasadoptedthemedianlineprinciple,
and China has insisted on conﬁguring its eez based on the
prevailingcontinentalshelfintherelativelyshallowEastChina
Seawaters.33
eﬂashpointforconﬂicthasrecentlybeentheChunxiao/
ShirakabagasﬁeldsthatlieonlyfourkilometersontheChinesesideofthemedianlineandwhereChinabeganseriousexploratoryoperationsinMay004.InMay005,Japan’sMinistryof
Economy,Trade,andIndustry(meti)authorizedJapaneseﬁrms
to explore in contested areas. In September 005, Chinese
warshipsappearedatthenowactiveﬁeldsontheeveofJapan’s
nationalelections.BetweenNovember00andJanuary007
ChinabeganactuallytappingbothoilandgasfromtheseEast
China sea ﬁelds and supplying it to mainland China, despite
Japaneseprotests.
e outcome of this dispute remains uncertain, but prospectsarerisingforacompromiseagreement.Chinaneedsthe
gasaswellasfundingforlarge-scaledevelopment.Japan,under
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PrimeMinisterAbeShinzo,appearedtodesiresomesymbolic
relaxationoftensionswithChina,asevidencedbyAbe’sOctober
00visittoBeijing,evenasJapanpreparestocounterChina
on broader security matters and attain its acquiescence in an
enhancedJapanesemilitaryposture.High-leveldiscussionshave
been informally bringing the two nations closer on this issue
sincethefallof00.
Otherimportantﬂashpointsforconﬂict—prospectivelyless
tractablethantheEastChinaSea—clearlyremain.Amongthe
mostdiﬃcultconcernenergyrelationswithRussia,especially
with respect to pipeline diplomacy. China’s energy imports
fromRussiahavebeenrising;RussiabecameChina’sﬁfthlargest
oil supplier in 004. Yet Japan also has strong aspirations to
access Russian gas reserves—nearly one-third of the world’s
proventotal,andoilaswell.
Between 00 and 005 the two countries fought a bitter
andultimatelyinconclusivebiddingwarforapipelinetoaccess
theAngarskoilﬁeldjustnorthofLakeBaikal.Althoughfavoring
Japan over China in 004, in April 005 Moscow virtually
rejecteda$billionJapaneseoﬀertohelpﬁnancethepipeline34
infavorofalesserChinesebidandbackedawayfromaposition
favoringalimitedterritorialdealwithJapanthatithadmaintained for more than a decade. Ultimately, still wanting to
secureasmanyAsiancustomersaspossible,Russiadecidedto
branchtheprospective4,88-kilometerpipelineatSkovorodino
near the Russian-Chinese border, the midpoint of the entire
route. Doing so would supply 0 million tons of oil a year to
Chinaand0milliontonstobetransferredbyrailtothePaciﬁc
coasttoJapan.Constructionunderthiscompromiseplanstarted
inApril00.35
During 00, Russia forced two major Japanese trading
companies,MitsubishiandMitsui,intoanunfavorablerenegotiationofthestrategicandlong-standingSakhalinii liqueﬁed
naturalgasproject.Russiausednominalenvironmentalconcerns
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asawedge,withChineseenergyconcernsacomplicatingbackgroundfactorforJapan’senergyaspirations.
IranisanotherpotentialﬂashpointinSino-Japaneseenergy
relations.InIran,bothJapanandChinareceivedmajor,separate
oilﬁelddevelopmentconcessionsduringtheperiodfrom00
to005—theJapaneseatAzadeganandtheChineseatYadaravan.36 YettheIranianshavestrongincentives,inthecontextof
thecontinuingnuclearcrisis,toforcetheJapaneseandChinese
to compete with each other. China’s strong geopolitical ties
withIranandJapan’sdiﬃcultyinmatchingthemduetotheUSJapanallianceareaparticularfrustrationforJapaneseaspirations
that could seriously complicate Sino-Japanese and even USJapanrelations.
In the longer run a crucial issue in Sino-Japanese energy
relations must inevitably be the respective roles of the two
AsiangiantsinthePersianGulf.JapancurrentlyisbyasubstantialmarginthelargestcustomerintheworldforPersianGulf
oil,butChina’srapidlyrisingdemandwillalmostcertainlyalter
that situation. How Sino-Japanese rivalries work themselves
outintheGulf,especiallyasChineseenergydemandrisesto
many times its current levels and as the nature of American
involvementintheMiddleEastchangesarequestionsofutmost
importancefortheglobalgeopoliticalfuture.atwasclearly
onthemindofJapanesepolicymakersasPrimeMinisterAbe
ShinzopreparedforamajordiplomatictriptotheMiddleEast
inMay007.attherivalryhasalreadybegunisclearfrom
developments in Iran discussed above and the competition
betweenthetwoduringthe004to007periodtosignfreetradeagreementswiththeGulfCooperationCouncilstatesof
thePersianGulf.37

Cooperative Prospects: Too Little, Too Late?
Lookingtothefuture,thereareclearlydeepeningcompetitive
prospectsloominginSino-Japaneseenergyrelations,especially

Sino-Japanese Energy Relations8

inRussiaandtheMiddleEast.Sino-Japanesecompetitioncould
beexacerbatedbystillundeterminedconﬂictsintheEastChina
Sea, perhaps interacting with territorial issues, or a Taiwan
crisis.Towhatextentcanrevivedcooperativeventures,building
onthesubstantialsuccessesofJapaninthe970sand980sin
energyconservation,nowblazeapathwayofglobalimportance
thatChinacanemulate?
eprospectsforrevivedcooperation—diﬀerentfromthe
970sand980s,butneverthelessconsequential—appearrelatively good, especially if they are encouraged by the United
States.ChinaclearlyneedsJapaneseenergy-conservationtechnology,aswellasaccesstothedisputedEastChinaSeaﬁelds.
Andforitsownbroaderpoliticalanddiplomaticreasons,the
AbegovernmentappearedbentonbuildingbridgesinnonmilitaryﬁeldstoChina.
Besidesenergyconservation,cleanenergytechnologyisa
ﬁeldforprospectivecooperation.Aspreviouslymentioned,70
percent of Chinese primary energy consumption is coal, and
theairpollutionitgeneratesimpactsJapanintheformofacid
rain.isgrimrealityhasdriventhetwocountriestocooperate
since99incleancoaltechnologythroughmeti’sGreenAid
Plan.In00,JapanandChinasetupajointventure,Fushun
Hubo Clean Coal Co., Ltd., to produce clean coal in Fushun
CityinLiaoningprovince.38
ehighprioritythatChinaiscomingtoassigntoenergy
andenvironmentalmatterswhereJapancanmeaningfullycooperate was dramatically expressed in Prime Minister Wen Jia
Bao’s March 007 opening address at the National People’s
CongressinBeijing.39 Wenreaﬃrmedthecentralimportance
ofrapideconomicgrowthasanationalprioritybutalsowarned
thatgrowthcouldbeseriouslyconstrainedbyenergyandenvironmentalproblems.China’scurrentﬁve-yearplancallsfora
0percentreductioninenergyconsumptionperunitofgdp,
butWennotedthatthatgoalhadnotbeenmetintheﬁrstyear
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oftheprogram.Hecalledforredoubledeﬀortsinenergyconservationandthereductionofpollutiondischargelevels.
An additional area for potential enhanced cooperation is
nuclearenergy.In00,Chinaannouncedthatitwouldspeed
uptheconstructionofnuclearpowerplantsfromthecurrent
8,700 megawatts capacity to 40,000 megawatts by 00.40 In
thesameyear,Japanalsoannounceditsplantoraisethenuclear
powerratiooftotalelectricpowerproductionfrom9percent
in004to0–40percentin00.Japanreaﬃrmedtheimportanceofciviliannuclearcooperationasamajorareaforenergy
cooperationwithAsia,includingChina.41
eonlyquestioniswhetherthegeostrategictensionsand
thecycleofgrass-rootsmistrustbetweenthetwoAsiangiants
haveescalatedtosuchapointthatthesortofpragmaticaccommodationsthataresomuchintheglobalinterestwillbepoliticallypossible.eUnitedStates,whilereaﬃrmingitsalliance
withJapanasitsprincipalPaciﬁcally,needstoreaﬃrmthatit
sees the importance of Sino-Japanese, and indeed US-SinoJapanese,energycooperation.42
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Japan’s Business Community
in Sino-Japanese Relations
Gregory W. Noble

Afterseveralyearsofincreasingfrigidity
under Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro, relations between
JapananditsNortheastAsianneighborsseemtohavethawed
somewhat.SoonafterassumingoﬃceinSeptember2006,new
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visited China and then held talks
withChineseandSouthKoreanleaders.China'sambassadorto
Japan, Wang Yi, reported, “e political stalemate has been
broken.”AfteryearsofconﬂictoverKoizumi’svisitstoYasukuni
Shrine, Beijing and Tokyo had “ﬁnally overcome this political
impedimentdamagingbilateralrelations”(Xinhua,December
2, 2006). e Chinese and Korean governments responded
onlyinthelowestkeytoAbe’sproposalstoreviseJapan’spaciﬁst
constitutionandinjectapatriotic,ornationalistic,tenortoits
educationalsystem.Forhispart,PrimeMinisterAbereported
satisfactionthatChinahadfortheﬁrsttime“positivelyevaluated”Japan’s60-yearrecordofpeacefulpostwardevelopment
anditsdeterminationtocontinuepeacefuldevelopment(Budget
Committee,HouseofRepresentatives,October0,2006).Even
Japanese diplomats highly suspicious of Chinese intentions
agreedthatAbe’svisittoChinahadgoneextremelysmoothly,
and emphasized that China’s approbation of postwar Japan
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marked a crucial turning point (author interviews in Beijing,
November 2006). e succession of Fukuda Yasuo as Prime
MinisterinSeptember200furthereasedrelations.
eserecentbreakthroughscomeagainstabroaderbackgroundofdiplomaticandeconomiccooperationinEastAsia.
Japan signed a series of free trade or “economic partnership
agreements”(epa),mostlyinEastAsia.Itactivelyparticipated
intheﬁrstEastAsianSummit,whereKurodaHaruhiko,presidentoftheAsianDevelopmentBank(adb)andformerlyJapan’s
Vice Minister of Finance for International Aﬀairs, called for
deeperandmorerapidregionalintegration(adb pressrelease,
November5,2006).enextmonthKawaiMasahiro,Kuroda’s
deputyandprofessorofeconomicsoftheUniversityofTokyo,
receivedfront-pagecoverageintheNew York Times (December
, 2006) for advocating regional monetary cooperation: “We
believe that some US dollar depreciation would be necessary,
and collective joint appreciation of the East Asian countries
couldbeneeded”tomanagethatdecline(seealsoKawai2005).
Further East Asian summits occurred in the Philippines and
Singapore.epreliminaryagreementreachedattheSix-Party
talks in February 200 held the ﬁrst promise of resolving the
NorthKoreannuclearcrisissincetheBushadministrationtook
oﬃceahalfdozenyearsearlier.
Despite recent cause for cautious optimism, skepticism
about prospects for Sino-Japanese relations and regional cooperation runs deep. e Japanese government constantly
complainsabouttheChinesemilitarybudgetandChinesenaval
activities. Popular opinion in Japan about China has fallen to
all-time lows, while attitudes toward Korea, always volatile,
have grown frostier. East Asian integration has not excited
much popular interest in Japan, but to the extent they know
about it, citizens seem skeptical or hostile. e United States
has continually pushed Japan to step up military cooperation
withtheclearintentofconstraining,ifnotcontaining,China.

Japan’s Business Community in Sino-Japanese Relations 

eacademiccommunityhastakenagenerallyskepticalstance
on prospects for regional integration, arguing that existing
regional institutions and schemes amount to little more than
paperagreementsandtalkingshops.
How should we understand this contrast between deeply
embedded skepticism and recent upturns? No doubt those
upturns stem at least in part from random ﬂuctuation in the
politicalarena.Asrecentlyasthespringof2005,anti-Japanese
demonstrations swept Chinese cities, and renewed conﬂict
could easily break out over recently renewed coverage of the
“rapeofNanking”;“comfortwomen,”thesubjectofaresolution
passed by the American House of Representatives; or any
numberofcontentiouscontemporaryissues,includingmaritime
explorationsarounddisputedterritories,suchasTokdo/TakeshimaortheSenkaku/Diaoyudaoislands.
At the same time, something deeper and longer-term in
orientation is going on. Japan is reacting to changes and
demandsintheregion,mostofthemindirectlyreﬂectingthe
economic and diplomatic rise of China. However, these reactionsdonotstemprimarilyfrompressureorinducementfrom
China itself, which until recently remained ambivalent about
Sino-Japaneserelationsandregionalintegration.einﬂuential
Japanesebusinesscommunityandrelatedpartsofthebureaucracyarelayingthegroundformoreregionalcooperationand
preparingforamoremultilateralfuture.eirstanceisdriven
bytheperceptionthatregionaltradeandinvestmentarehighly
integrated and that pressures to cooperate on ﬁnancial and
monetary aﬀairs will accelerate as the dollar depreciates and
graduallylosesitscentralityinEastAsia.emostimmediate
concernofthebusinesscommunityissigningaseriesofhighqualitybilateraleconomicpartnershipagreements.Butbusiness
leaders also see a need to accommodate long-term moves
toward some kind of East Asian community and a more
multilateralinternationalorder(Noble200).isdevelopment
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isconsistentwiththeargumentofJacobsandPage(2005)that
business elites exert a disproportionate inﬂuence on foreign
policy. It can also be seen as supporting Solingen’s (2005)
contentionthatoutward-orientedcoalitionsaremorelikelyto
supportregionalintegration.

Hostility and Skepticism toward China and Asia
Despite the recent, and possibly temporary, upturn in SinoJapanese relations, the degree of suspicion, hostility and fear
(particularlyontheJapaneseside),cannotbeunderestimated.
FortheJapanesepublic,Chinaconjuresupimagesofauthoritarianism,militaryexpansion,crime,insecurity,environmental
destruction,andclashingcollectivememories.Speciﬁcconﬂicts,
suchastheShenyangConsulateissueof2003(Wan2003)and
theanti-Japaneseriotsof2005(Lam2005)pileontopofrecurring tensions over visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the editing of
historytextbooks,andincursionsbyChinesesubmarinesinto
Chinesewaters.eJapanesepublicisparticularlysensitiveto
anumberofissuesthatreceivelessforeignpresscoveragebut
are favored topics of local media reports, such as economic
competition from inexpensive and sometimes unsafe Chinese
productsandthegrosslyexaggeratedroleofforeignersinJapan’s
energeticallyhypedbutlargelynonexistentcrimewave.1 Public
attitudesreﬂect,inpart,adownwardspiral(atleastuntilvery
recently) of aggressive and even hostile comments by the
governmentsorleadingpoliticiansoftheNortheastAsiancountries.Startinginthemid-0s,JapaneseattitudestowardChina
deteriorated sharply, particularly following the repression of
protestorsnearTiananmenSquareonJune4,andtheantiJapanesedemonstrationsof2005.In200,only34percentof
Japaneserespondentsreportedafeelingof“aﬃnity”(shinkinkan)
towardChina,andonly26percentregardedrelationsbetween
thetwocountriesasgood(Naikakufu200).
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In contrast, Japan has experienced fewer direct conﬂicts
with Southeast Asian countries since the end of the Vietnam
War.AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(asean)countries
havehadlittleoccasiontovoicecriticismsofJapan,andpopular
imagesofSoutheastAsiainJapanhavesteadilyimproved.By
200,5percentofJapaneseadultsreportedthatrelationswith
Southeast Asia were good, and 44 percent claimed to feel a
senseofaﬃnity.
Two points about these opinion polls deserve to be highlighted.First,foreignrelationsgenerallydrivepopularattitudes,
which helps account for the otherwise puzzling volatility in
“aﬃnity.” Second, with regard to most countries and regions,
suchasNorthAmerica,Europe,andSoutheastAsia,thestate
of bilateral relations receives signiﬁcantly higher ratings than
doesaﬃnity;theonlyexceptionsappeartobesmallandfriendly
AustraliaandNewZealand,whichelicitreportsofbothpositive
relations and aﬃnity from about two-thirds of the Japanese
public. In contrast, when it comes to China, aﬃnity clearly
exceedsperceptionsofbilateralrelations,suggestingthatJapanese do, in fact, feel a degree of underlying regional identity
with their Northeast Asian neighbors despite deep political
conﬂicts.
OpinionsurveysspeciﬁcallyaboutJapaneseattitudestoward
theEastAsiancommunityturnouttobesurprisinglydiﬃcult
toﬁnd(forareviewofsurveyresearchintheregion,seeMinato
200).OneonlinepolltakeninJuly2006reportsoverwhelming
opposition, with negative opinions outweighing supportive
views more than two to one.2 e results may just reﬂect the
generallyright-wingslantofon-linepollsandtheblatantbias
ofthewording,but,tosomedegree,theyprobablyalsoreﬂecta
tendencyinJapantoseetheideaofEastAsianregionalcooperationasinevitablydrivenanddominatedbyChina.
Certainly, anti-Chinese sentiment is so pervasive on the
Japaneserightastoconstituteanobsession.Forexample,inthe
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twelveissuesofthewidelycirculatedjournalSeiron thatFujiSankeipublishedin2006,theleadarticle(thearticleprintedon
thespineofthejournal),featuredtheword“China”seventimes,
always pejoratively. e orientation of Hiramatsu Shigeo, a
specialistontheChinesemilitaryfeaturedregularlyinSeiron
andotherconservativejournals,emergesclearlyfromthetitle
of his 2006 book China will Annex Japan (Hiramatsu 2006).
Justincaseanyreadersremainedindoubtastothegravityof
theperceivedthreatfacingJapan,thenextyearhepublisheda
newvolumeentitledChina Plunders Japan (Hiramatsu200).
Asthepublisherexplains,“isbookanalyzesChina’splotnot
justtoplunderJapan’slandandwatersbuttotakeitseconomic
power,itstechnologicalpower,anditsverysoul.”3
Althoughitistemptingtoviewsuchworksastheproduct
ofextremistcrackpots,theirauthorsarenotnecessarilymarginal
ﬁgures,noristheirsocialimpacttrivial.Hiramatsuwasdirector
ofthethirdresearchoﬃceattheNationalInstituteofDefense
Studies and a professor at Tokyo’s Obirin University. Tokyo
UniversityLibraryholds26ofhisworksinitscollections,most
of them published by the respectable mainstream publisher
Keisoushobo. China will Annex Japan racked up strong sales
forahardcoverbookonforeignpolicyanddefense:asofMarch
,200,itranked,6outofthemillionsoftitleslistedonthe
Japanese site of Amazon.com. Nor are Hiramatsu’s hyperbole
andparanoiaunique.eheadoftheLiberalDemocraticParty’s
(ldp’s)PolicyAﬀairsResearchCouncilrecentlytoldreporters
that,
[i]fTaiwangoesfunny,inthenexttwentyyearsorsowemay
become the number 20th-odd province of China. … After
theShanghaiWorld’sFairendsin200,Chinamayraiseits
headinanunpeacefulway.IfTaiwanweretofallcompletely
underitscontrol,itisinevitablethatJapanwouldbenext.
(Mainichi Shimbun, February26,2006)
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Incontrast,conservativeshavepaidrelativelylittleattention
to the concept of East Asian regional cooperation, perhaps
becausetheyrejecttheideaoutofhand.ConservativecommentatorYayamaTarodevotedaSankei Shimbun column(December22,2005)tothesubject,warningreaders:“Don’tbetakenin
byChina’s‘EastAsianCommunity’ploy.”Developmenteconomist Watanabe Toshio sounded a similar warning about the
dangerous,bizarre,fantasyofanEastAsiancommunity(Watanabe 2005:206–), but whereas center-left journals such as
Ronza provided considerable coverage and Sekai published a
special issue (January 2006) on the occasion of the ﬁrst East
Asian summit, the conservative journals largely ignored the
summits.
If the Japanese government has not adopted a stance as
negativeasthatofconservativecommentatorsoreventhemass
public,ithascertainlyexpressedgreatconcernaboutdevelopments in China. e lack of transparency and continuing
double-digitincreasesinChinesemilitaryspending,occurring
atatimeofbudgetaryconstraintinJapan,comeinforspecial
criticismasevidenceofhostileintent,asdoreportedincursions
ofChinesevesselsintoareasclaimedasterritoryorexclusive
economic zones by Japan (Boeicho 2006:4–42, 40). China’s
successfultestofitsabilitytodestroyasatelliteinspaceraised
alarm in both Tokyo and Washington, not least because the
tardyresponsebyChina’sleadershipraiseddoubtsaboutcivilian
controlofthemilitaryinChina.
eseviewsarecertainlyamenabletocontestation.Chinese
militaryincreasescomeafteralongperiodofrestraint,andthe
shareofmilitaryspendingingovernmentoutlayshasremained
ﬂat, just as Japan’s “one-percent of gdp” cap allowed large
increases in military spending during Japan's rapid growth
period.Moreover,China’sincreasedmilitaryinvestmentsalso
reﬂectitsenormoussize,itsmyriadsecurityconcerns,andthe
rapidriseinciviliansalaries.WhereasJapanremainsunderthe
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protectionoftheworld’sdominantmilitarypower,Chinaviews
the United States as a security threat, and its own defense
budget is dwarfed by that of the US. Furthermore, Japan and
especiallytheUnitedStatesalsohavenumerous“extra”allocations for defense that are not always transparent (cf. Kaplan
200).Moreover,Chinesemilitary“incursions”typicallyinvolve
contested territory or economic zones. Although the United
States and Russia have also destroyed satellites and resisted
Chinese calls to demilitarize space, these considerations are
virtually never aired in Japan. Yet as long as China’s military
capacityincreasesrapidly,includesmissilestippedwithnuclear
weapons, and remains under the control of an authoritarian
governmentwithanhistoricalgrudge(justiﬁedornot)against
Japan,concerninJapanisunlikelytoabate.
NoristheUnitedStatesgovernmentinclinedtoallowthose
concerns to fade. In response to pressure and encouragement
fromtheUnitedStates,Japanhasembarkedonaseriesofpolicy
revisionsdesignedtosupportAmericanmilitaryactivitiesand
particularlytohelpcounterChina.JapanunderAbeworkedto
redeﬁnetheConstitutiontojustifycollectivedefense,andeventually to revise the constitution itself. e United States has
explicitlynamedthelastasaprerequisiteforJapantoqualifyfor
apermanentseatontheUNSecurityCouncil(Wu 2006).
Sinceabout2003Japanhasroutinelycloakedreferencesto
regional cooperation with invocations of universal values of
democracy,liberalism,andhumanrights.Japanhasexhibited
littleevidenceofintrospectiononwhatexactlymightconstitute
liberalismorhowtoexportdemocracyandapparentlynotthe
leastattentiontothegovernment’sownpolls,whichshowthat
onlyoneJapaneseinﬁveputspriorityonbasingforeignpolicy
on promotion of democracy and human rights—fewer than
halftherespondentswhofavortraditionalthemesofpromoting
peace,resolvingregionaldisputes,andattendingtoglobalproblemssuchasenvironmentalprotection(Naikakufu200:図 41).
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Japan’srecentselectivefocusondemocracyandhumanrights
represents a break with decades of promoting relations with
SoutheastAsiaandotherregionswherefullydemocratic(much
lessliberal)regimeswere(andstillare)farfromamajority.No
doubtthesentimentsofJapaneseleadersaresincere.Ina2006
meeting between Foreign Minister Aso Taro and Indonesian
VicePresidentMuhammadJusufKalla,forinstance,Asotook
thevirtuallyunprecedentedstepofraisinghumanrightsissues
withamajorregionaltradepartnerandsupplier.Allthesame,
itisclearthat“universalvalues”havecomeintofavorlargelyas
atooltodelegitimizeChinaandjustifyJapan’spositionofleadership in Asia (Green 2006:06–), and that their invocation
remainstentativeandselective(Katsumata2006).
Insum,Japanesepublicopiniondemonstratesconsiderable
skepticism if not hostility toward China. e rising military
capabilitiesofChinaandtheaggressiveresponsesoftheAmerican and Japanese governments have contributed to a rising
cycleofdistrustandfear.DespiterecenteﬀortsbytheJapanese
and Chinese governments to calm the waters, public opinion
remainsatbestguarded.Totheextentthattheyareawareand
have an opinion, Japanese citizens apparently have mixed to
jaundicedviewsofregionalcooperation,whilemostacademics
havebeenskepticalabouttheprospectsforregionalintegration.
China stands up (yet again)
DespitewidespreaduneasinessinJapan,theissueofcooperation
withChinaandAsiarefusestogoaway.Afterarelativelullin
thelate0s,Chineseeconomicgrowthacceleratedagainjust
asChinaenteredtheWorldTradeOrganization(wto)inlate
200. China became by far the largest supplier of imports to
Japan.eweaknessofdomesticdemandaftertheburstingof
thebubbleeconomymadeJapaneseﬁrmsincreasinglydependentonexports.In200,fortheﬁrsttime,Japaneseexportsto
China(includingHongKong)surpassedexportstotheUnited

6 GregoryW.Noble

States. Asked to cite the most important challenge of their
workinChina,Japanesecorporateandgovernmentoﬃcialsin
ChinaimmediatelycitedthefactthatmajorJapanesecompanies
operatinginChinanowreceivemorethanhalfoftheirrevenues
from the domestic market and expect that share to continue
rising steadily (author interviews in Beijing, November 2006
withJapanExternalTradeOrganization[jetro],JapanAutomobile Manufacturers Association [jama]). With continued
growth,revaluationoftheyuan,andapartialshiftfrominvestmenttoconsumption,ChinaisontracktoreplacetheUnited
Statesasasourceofmarginalgrowthinglobalconsumptionby
204(Garner2005).
Asrecentlyas200,Japanesecompaniesearned6percent
oftheirproﬁtsathome,2.4percentintheAmericas,and6.
percent in Asia-Paciﬁc. By 2005 the home market share had
declinedto0.percent,despiteastrongrecoveryincorporate
proﬁts,whereastheAsian-Paciﬁcsharealmostmatchedthatof
theAmericas,0.0percentto0.percent.Despitedissatisfactionwithinadequateprotectionofintellectualrights,concerns
about rising wages and decreasing tax breaks, and tentative
evidence that some ﬁrms are seeking to avoid putting all of
theirbasketsinonemarketbydiversifyingtoVietnam,Japanese
ﬁrms remain overwhelmingly more interested in expanding
theiractivitiesinChinathanelsewhere(jetro 200:6,).
Initially,skepticswonderedwhetherChinacouldwithstand
the shock of entering the wto, and if it would abide by the
unprecedentedly draconian conditions under which it was
admitted (Lardy 2002). Predicting the demise of China or its
economyhasbeenaboomindustryinJapan.Perhapsthemost
tellingisadeﬁanttextbytheextraordinarilyproliﬁcandrabidly
anti-Chinesewriter,KoBunyu(HuangWenxiong),aTaiwanese
residentofJapan.AfterpredictingChina’scollapseinand
renewing his bet in 4, he titled his third version Even So,
China will Collapse (Huang2004).
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ForJapanesebusinessleaders,though,China'sextraordinary
economicperformanceafterenteringthewto anditssuccessfulcombinationofrapidgrowthwithmacroeconomicstability
suggesttwothings.First,despiteallthechallengesfacingChina,
underestimatingtheresilienceoftheChineseeconomyandthe
rule of the Communist Party could be costly. Second, the
Chinese economy has grown so important to Asia and the
worldthatitisnotinJapan’sinterestsforChinatocollapse.For
Japan's neighbors South Korea, a vital if occasionally prickly
ally, and Taiwan, China is the largest export market and the
majortargetfordirectforeigninvestment.
IftheriseofChinahascombinedopportunitywiththreat,
italsocarriesimportantimplicationsforJapan’svitalrelationship with asean. e re-ignition of Chinese growth raised
fears that asean would lose foreign direct investment and
exportmarkets,orattheleastthatthespeedofChineseentry
wouldcreatelosersaswellaswinnersandforcejarringadjustments in neighboring economies in the process (Eichengreen
andTong2006;Ravenhill2006),complicatinglifeforJapanese
investors.Governmentsinasean feeltheneedforeconomic
and political balancing and developmental assistance so that
theycanengageChinawithoutbeingoverwhelmedbyit.us
theywelcomearoleforJapanasabalanceevenastheyreject
eﬀortstocontainChina.

Japanese Domestic Politics and Regional Cooperation
Japanesepoliticalleadershaveconsistentlyendorsedtheprinciple of East Asian community. Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro’s announcement of a “Hashimoto doctrine” during a
triptoasean countriesinadvertentlycontributedtothe
creationofasean+3.Fiveyearslater,ontheoccasionofanother
Southeast Asian visit, Prime Minister Koizumi delivered an
“extraordinarilyimportant”policyspeechinSingapore(Tanaka

 GregoryW.Noble

2005:5). e day after signing with Singapore Japan’s ﬁrst
economicpartnershipagreement(epa),Koizumiproclaimed,
[o]urgoalshouldbethecreationofa“communitythatacts
togetherandadvancestogether.”Andweshouldachievethis
throughexpandingEastAsiacooperationfoundeduponthe
Japan-asean relationship. … e ﬁrst step is to make the
bestuseoftheframeworkofasean+3.4

eldp notonlyacceptedthisvision,butranonit.Item
0 of the party’s electoral manifesto for the 2005 election to
theHouseofRepresentativescommittedthepartyto“exercise
solid leadership in ‘Asian diplomacy’: we will improve and
strengthenrelationswithsuchneighboringcountriesasChina
andSouthKoreaandpromotetheconceptofanAsian‘community.’”5 InakeynoteaddresstoanassociationofAsianpolitical
partiesheldinSeoulin2006,thedirectoroftheldp’sinternationaldivisionreceiveda“magniﬁcent”roundofapplausefor
hisexplicationoftheldp’sapproachtofurtheringthecreation
of an East Asian Community.6 Incoming Prime Minister Abe
advocated active Japanese leadership to promote East Asian
cooperation,whileMinistryofEconomy,Trade,andIndustry
(meti)Vice-MinisterWatanabeHiromichiadvancedtheMinistry’s line that foreign policy toward Asia and other dynamic
regions,alongwithenhancementofproductivityandinnovation,
constituted the three pillars of Japanese economic policy
(statements at House of Councilors Committee on Economy,
Industry,andEmployment,November,2006).
Diﬀerences of emphasis are not hard to ﬁnd, of course.
Kyuma Fumio, head of the Japan Defense Agency, promoted
theideaofincorporatingpoliticaldialogueandpersuasioninto
theEastAsianCommunity(eac)concept(HouseofCouncilors
Committee on Diplomacy and Defense, November 30, 2006).
Incontrast,TakebeTsutomu,ldp CabinetSecretaryattheend
oftheKoizumiadministration,viewedeac largelythroughthe

Japan’s Business Community in Sino-Japanese Relations 

prismofcounteringChina.Heemphasizedtheneedtoinclude
India and Australia to balance China, staunchly defended
Koizumi’svisitstoYasukuni,brushedoﬀKoreanconcernsabout
Japaneseforeignpolicy,andexpressedgreatsatisfactionatthe
enthusiasticattitudetowardJapaninVietnam(pressconference
atldp,August22,2006).
Foreign Minister Aso Taro, also known for his hard-line
stancetowardChina,chosetomakeavirtueofnecessity.While
defending East Asian engagement and socialization against
skeptics,theperennialprimeministerialcandidatearguedfor
mobilizingJapaneseresourcestogarnerrecruitsforauniversal
values campaign along a vast Eurasian “arc of freedom and
prosperity.”HechampionedJapan’sleadershipandexperience
and its ability to serve as a “thought leader” for the region.
Despite his constant talk of universal values, he emphasized
thatJapanwouldnotimposeitsvaluesonothersandwouldnot
always completely agree about values even with the United
States (House of Representatives Foreign Aﬀairs Committee,
December3,2006).
Other parties also have largely supported the concept of
communitybuildinginEastAsia.eldp’scoalitionpartner,
Komeito,traditionallyhashadclosertiestoChina,soemphasizing East Asia comes naturally (House of Representatives
BudgetCommittee,October0,2006).eoppositionDemocraticPartyofJapanhasbeenhighlysupportiveoftheconcept
inprinciple,thoughitinsiststhatagreementswithotherAsian
countries not lead to an inﬂux of foreign workers competing
withitsconstituents(HouseofRepresentativesPlenaryMeeting,
October26,2006).

e Japanese Business Community:
Preferences, Organization, Inﬂuence
Milner () notes that multinational corporations tend to
resistprotectionism,sinceitreducestheirabilitytomaneuver

200 GregoryW.Noble

freelyintheglobalmarketplacetoaccessinexpensiveresources.
FriedenandRogowski(6)addasimplehypothesistopredict
thestanceofpoliticalintereststoeconomicintegration:owners
offactorsofproductionthatareinabundanceathome,suchas
capitalorinnovation-intensiveindustriesinrichcountries,or
unskilledlaborinpoorcountries,arelikelytofavorexpansion
of trade and investment as an opportunity to attain higher
returns,whereasownersofscarcefactors,suchaslow-skilled
labor in wealthy countries, are likely to resist the intensiﬁed
competition (for historical evidence comparing general and
sector-speciﬁcfactorsofproduction,seeHiscox200).us,it
is not surprising that in the United States and the United
Kingdom,largeﬁnancialﬁrmsandoilcompanies,whichhave
globalbusinessoperationsandhavedevelopedastrongcompetitiveedge,havebeenamongthemajorbackersofgloballiberalization.Butglobalizationisnotalwaystheprimaryconcernof
ﬁrmswithcross-borderoperations.Rugman(2005)showsthat
most “multinational” ﬁrms remain overwhelmingly national,
earning the vast majority of their sales and proﬁts from one
country or region, or at most two. is helps explain Chase’s
ﬁnding(2003)thatmultinationalsoftensupportregionaltrade
accordsratherthaninsistingonintegrationonlyattheglobal
level.
How well do these approaches predict the preferences of
JapaneseﬁrmstowardEastAsianintegration?Withafewmodiﬁcations, quite well. As Frieden and Rogowski (6) would
expect, farmers, small businesses, and organized labor, all of
whichrepresentscarcefactorsinJapan,arehighlyskepticalof
measures to open the Japanese market in return for greater
regionalintegration.
UnlikethecaseintheAnglo-Americancountries,however,
theﬁnancialsector,andparticularlythebankingsector,hasnot
beenanactiveproponentofregionalintegration.esolution
tothisapparentpuzzleisstraightforward.Notwithstandingthe
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massivehoardofdomesticsavingsthatappearedinthe0sto
giveJapanesebanksacrushingadvantage,theﬁnancialsector
hasnotdevelopedtheskillsandstructurestocompeteeﬀectively
intherestofAsia,muchlessinadvancedmarkets.Japanhasan
abundanceofcapital,butnotanabundanceofﬁnancialskills.
Aftertheburstingoftheﬁnancialbubble,nonperformingloans
hobbledJapanesebanks,whichsharplycontractedtheirloans
toAsiaduringtheAsianﬁnancialcrisis.erecord-lowinterest
ratesusedtocombattherecessionthenunderminedtheprofitability of Japanese banks. Megamergers designed to sop up
excesscapacityalsodelayedtheintroduction,integration,and
upgradingoftheinformationtechnologynecessarytocompete
with American and British banks. Japanese banks lagged far
behind in securitization and other eﬀorts to move beyond
simpledeposit-and-loanoperations.Onlyafterovercomingthe
nonperformingloansproblemin2003and2004didJapanese
banksrecoverproﬁtabilityandbegintore-engageAsia,though
still not quickly enough to keep pace with the expansion of
Westernbanks.OntheeveoftheAsianﬁnancialcrisis,Japanese
banksaccountedforalmostone-thirdofallcreditextendedto
Asia by banks reporting to the Bank for International Settlements(bis);in2005theJapanesesharebarelytopped0percent
(Takayasu2006:26).
Japanese banks cannot aﬀord to ignore China and Asia
forever,ofcourse.Alreadytherearesomesignsofheightened
engagement.Japanesebanksarerapidlyexpandingtheirsupport
fortheactivitiesofJapaneseinvestorsinChina(authorinterview,
jetro,Beijing,November2006).Inmid-2006,BankofTokyoMitsubishiufj,whichcontrolsmoreassetsthananyotherbank
intheworld,invested0milliondollarstoacquireastakein
BankofChina(pressrelease,June,2006).Attheendofthe
year, it took advantage of the opening of the banking market
speciﬁedunderChina’swto entrytoestablishanewChinese
subsidiary.Atthesametime,SumitomoMitsuiBankexpanded
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its network in China and established a new China division
separate from its Asia division. Its research and consulting
subsidiary, Japan Research Institute, pumps out a stable of
publicationsontheChineseandAsianeconomies.Onbalance,
though,Japan’sbank-dominatedﬁnancialsystemisjustbeginningtoreestablishaseriouspresenceinAsia,andespeciallyin
China, and lags far behind Western ﬁnancial ﬁrms such as
hsbc,BankofAmerica,GoldmanSachs,andCreditSuisse.
Similarly,energyﬁrmsplayonlyamodestroleasadvocates
ofregionalintegration(Tanabe,ed.2004).Gasandelectricity
companies, particularly Tokyo Gas and Tokyo Electric, see
cooperationwithotherregionalcountriesasawaytomaintain
theirbargainingpowerastheworldmarketforliqueﬁednatural
gasexpandsbeyonditsinitialbaseinJapanandAsia.Although
the Northeast Asian countries compete vigorously for gas
supplies, they can sometimes act as allies when it comes to
pipelinesandexpensivefacilities.Japanesegasusers,inparticular,havebeencaughtbetweeninstabilitiesarisingfromenergy
deregulation and cross-entry at home and the need for longterm contracts in the capital-intensive gas business. Japanese
companies also have a huge technological lead in energy eﬃciency and clean plant technology, which they hope to sell to
China and the rest of Asia, although lack of funding and
concerns about intellectual rights protection have largely
impededbigdealssofar.Inaddition,Japanlackstheglobaloil
companiesthataresoimportantinorientingtheUnitedStates
and the United Kingdom to world markets. Much more than
gas, oil is a genuinely international commodity, the biggest
producers of which are in the Middle East and Central Asia,
welltothewestofEastAsia.Government-backedattemptsto
matchtheoilmajorshavebeenorientedtoproductionrather
thandistributionandhavenotprovensuccessful.
Ratherthanbanksandenergyconcerns,themostprominent
Japanese supporters of regional integration are integrated
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trading houses (sogo shosha) and manufacturers. e shosha
havebeenactiveinAsiaforwelloverahundredyears.eyare
particularly active in supplying imports of energy and other
commodities. In less developed countries, such as ailand,
Indonesia,orChina,theyplayanevenmoreimportantrolein
organizing regional trade in components and raw materials.
Wherevermarketsareimperfectandinstitutionssuchasbanks
and capital markets immature—as in most of the developing
world—shosha ﬁndproﬁtableopportunities.
Shosha executives have long served as leaders in major
businessorganizationsandhaveenjoyedintimatecontactswith
government.Shosha haveworkedinaninformalandlow-key
mannerthroughoutSoutheastAsia(Katzenstein2005).Inrelations with China, shosha have taken a somewhat more open
role,activelycombating“Chinathreat”argumentsinJapan,and
urgentlycallingforJapantocatchupinChina:
Japanesecompaniesshouldbemoreconcernedaboutthe
possibilitythatthey[unlikeWesternﬁrms]willbeleftoutside
thegrowingmarketinChinaratherthanahollowing-outof
domesticindustriesduetoincreasedinvestmentinChina.
(JapanForeignTradeCouncil2003:)

emostactivesupportersofcooperationintheEastAsian
region are Japan’s manufacturing ﬁrms, especially automobile
producersandelectronicsﬁrms.esteelindustry,animportant
supplier to both, but especially to automobile producers, is
anotherforceforintegration.Autoandelectronicsassemblers
sell a growing share of their output in Asia, and they have
developed an intricate division of labor in Asia, increasingly
centered on China. Textile ﬁrms also are quite regionalized,
andchemicalsaremovingintoAsiaaswell,butingeneralthose
sectors are much less economically dynamic and are still at
least as concerned with serving and protecting the home
marketasexploitingopportunitiesinAsia.EvenJapan’sfamed
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electronics industry has struggled recently, failing to keep up
withAmericanﬁrmsineitherinnovation(Anchordoguy2005)
ortheﬂexible,eﬃcientuseofAsianproductionnetworks(Ernst
2006).AgoodindicationoftherelativeinterestofJapan’sbusinesscirclesinregionalintegrationcomesfromthemembership
oftheCouncilonEastAsianCommunity,whoseﬁfteencorporatesponsorsincludeTokyoElectricPower,Toyota,twosteelrelatedcompanies,threesogo shosha,severalelectronicsﬁrms,
andacoupleofmiscellaneousﬁnancialinstitutions,including
thepoliticallyactiveOrix,butnobanks.7
By and large, Japanese ﬁrms make their case on regional
integration by way of industry associations and especially the
two main peak associations, Nippon Keidanren and Keizai
Doyukai.AstheprimaryagglomerationofJapan’slargestﬁrms
and major industry associations, Keidanren has long enjoyed
privilegedaccesstoJapan’srulingpartyanditsprimeministers.
Itselaborateorganizationalstructurecoversvirtuallytheentire
Japanese economy and a wide range of policy areas. Keizai
Doyukaiismuchleaner.Itsmembershipofindividualexecutives
ratherthancompaniesandassociationsgivesitgreaterfreedom
tospeakboldlyatthecostofadegreeofrepresentativenessand
accountability.
einﬂuenceofthepeakassociationshasﬂuctuatedover
time.Fromroughly60,Japaneseﬁscal,regulatory,andﬁnancialpolicytiltedawayfrombigbusinesstofavorthesmallbusinessesandindependentprofessionalsthatprovidedtheprimary
backing(alongwithfarmers)oftherulingparty(Calder).
In response to incessant criticisms of incestuous relations
between government and business, in 3 Keidanren relinquished its role of establishing quotas for political campaign
contributionsfromlargeﬁrmsandindustryassociationstothe
ruling party. Combined with political instability and weak
proﬁts,contributionsfromleadingﬁrmssagged.Anumberof
observersdeclaredthattheonceformidableinﬂuenceofKeidan-
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renhaddeclinedastheeconomygrewmorediverseandinternationalized(Mori6;Vogel).
Startingfromthemid-0s,however,Keidanrenbeganan
activeandeﬀectivecounterattackonpolicyissues,and,in2002,
it resumed political contributions. Once dominated by the
heads of domestically-oriented industrial ﬁrms, leadership of
the Keidanren turned to companies from the internationally
tradedgoodssector,thoughserviceﬁrmsremainunderrepresented. Toyoda Shoichiro headed Keidanren from 4 and
,andhissuccessoraschairmanofToyota,OkudaHiroshi,
assumedthetopspotin2002.KeizaiDoyukai,oncethebuttof
puns on its name (“What kind of association?”) also staged a
strongresurgence.etopﬁguresatKeizaiDoyukaiwerenot
only externally oriented but were often trained in the United
Statesorstationedthereforlongperiods;manyofthemhailed
fromthetinyshareofJapanesecompanieswithalargeoreven
majority ownership by foreign shareholders. Not surprisingly,
theystakedoutamoreconsistentlyandaggressivelyneoliberal
linethandidKeidanren(Noble2006).InadditiontoKeidanren’s
notinconsiderablestaﬀofpolicyanalysts,thetwoorganizations
enjoy tight links with a dense network of academics, experts,
andgovernmentoﬃcials,particularlyatmeti andtheMinistry
ofFinance(mof).
WiththereorganizationoftheJapanesegovernment,pioneered by Prime Minister Hashimoto in the late 0s and
implementedfrom200,thepeakassociationsgainedavaluable
newpointofinstitutionalaccess.enewCouncilonEconomic
andFiscalPolicy(cefp)consistsofuptotenmembers,asmany
as half of whom can come from outside of the government.
UnderPrimeMinisterMori,twoeconomistsandtwobusiness
executives assumed the private sector posts, an allocation
unchangedunderPrimeMinistersKoizumi,AbeandFukuda.
eﬁrsttwobusinessexecutivesappointedwereToyota’sOkuda
Hiroshi,andUshioJiro,founderofUshioCorporation,alarge
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producerofhalogenlightsandotherelectricalandopticalproducts,andchairmanofKeizaiDoyukaifrom5to.With
the inauguration of the Abe administration, the two private
sector posts passed on to Niwa Uichiro of the shosha Itochu
andMitaraiFujio,chairofCanonandheadofKeidanren,thus
solidifyingthesensethatoneofthecefp postswouldautomaticallybelongtothepreeminentpeakorganizations.BothMitarai
andNiwahadbeenlong-timeresidentsoftheUnitedStates(23
yearsandyears,respectively),andbothhadearnedreputations
astough,American-stylemanagers.
epowerandprestigeoftheautoandelectronicsindustries are important assets for the peak associations and for
Japanese business, whose reputation took a heavy hit during
theHeiseirecession.ToyotaandCanon,inparticular,appealto
awiderangeofconstituents:highlyproﬁtablegloballeadersin
theirﬁelds,noonecanaccusethemofbeingcronycapitalists
or minions of Japan, Incorporated. At the same time, their
facilityatmanufacturing,highratesofinvestmentinresearch,
development,anddesign,andcommitmenttoemploymentand
corporatealliesinJapanshieldthemfromtheusualcriticisms
leveledagainstneoliberalglobalists.
Someanalystsputmoreemphasisontheroleoflobbying
byspeciﬁcJapaneseﬁrmsandindustriesinpursuingepasand
regional trade arrangements (Manger 2005; Solis 2003; Pekkanen2005).Others,suchasmeti negotiatorSekizawaYoichi
(Sekizawa200)downplaytheroleofindividualﬁrms,instead
highlighting changes in the overall economic environment,
includingthegrowthofunilateralistapproachestotradeinthe
UnitedStatesandgridlockatthewto,andtheeﬀectofthose
changesonthethinkingofJapaneseagencies.Onmanyissues,
however—includingtheimportantroleplayedbyKeidanren,in
which executives from Toyota have played a crucial role in
recentyears—analystslargelyagree.
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e business community’s policy proposals on regional
cooperation
e preferences and priorities of Japan’s corporate circles
regardingregionalintegrationaretransmittedinanimpressive
streamofreportsandpolicyrecommendationsfromKeidanren
andKeizaiDoyukai.8 etwoorganizationsgenerallyadvocate
similarpolicies,althoughtheformer,withitsgreaterresources,
issues more reports, whereas the Keizai Doyukai often stakes
out a somewhat bolder stance on economic reform. eir
approachesarelargelyconsistentwiththepoliciesoftheldp;
indeed, it is not always easy to tell who is inﬂuencing whom.
Not surprisingly, both lobby to liberalize labor markets, lift
protectionforagriculture,cutexpenditures,and,ifadditional
revenuesmustcomefromsomewhere,increasetaxesonconsumption rather than on corporate or personal income. Both
stronglysupporttheUS-Japansecurityalliance,and,inrecent
years,bothhavesupportedconstitutionalrevisionandenhanced
defensecapabilities.However,whereasKeidanrenunderMitarai
seems to have moved to the right, vigorously ratifying Prime
MinisterAbe’scallstoinculcatepatriotismandrevisetheconstitution(Keidanren200a),Doyukaihas,ifanything,pulledback.
Recentreportsemphasizecomprehensivesecurity,humansecurity, and multilateralism. ey refer positively to paciﬁsm,
expressed some doubts about the American invasion of Iraq
evenbeforeitturnedintoanobviousdebacle,andsimplycall
for “consideration” of constitutional revision (Keizai Doyukai
;2004a;2004b;2006a).
WhenitcomestorelationswithChinaandEastAsia,the
stance of the business associations becomes clearer. Keizai
Doyukaiforthrightly,ifdiplomatically,opposedPrimeMinister
Koizumi’stripstoYasukunishrineandrepeatedlyinsistedthat
Japantakeacomprehensiveanddiplomaticapproachnotjust
toYasukunibuttohistoricalconsciousnessandotherregional
issues.ChairmanKitashiroKakutarostronglyendorsedPrime
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Minister Abe’s ambiguous but well-received pledge to Korea
andChinathathewoulddealwiththeYasukuniissue“appropriately” (Keizai Doyukai 2006b; Kitashiro press conference,
October,2006).Keidanrendidnotissueanexplicitstatement
callingonPrimeMinisterKoizuminottovisitYasukuni,but,
accordingtopressreports,in2006ChairmanOkudaengaged
in a round of mini-shuttle diplomacy between Koizumi and
Chinese leaders that may well have contributed to Koizumi’s
lower-keyapproachtohislastvisitasprimeminister(wearinga
business suit, refraining from entering the main hall, and
professing to visit as a “private citizen," Kyodo, October 22,
2006).
In a joint “message” to the Japanese and Chinese governments, Keizai Doyukai (2006b) called for a forward-looking,
“comprehensive strategic partnership” that could “advance
together”onavarietyofissuesinEastAsiaandtheworld.e
emphasisonAsiashowsupinthecommitteeworkthatisatthe
heart of the Doyukai’s activities. In recent years, of the ﬁve
regional subcommittees, the ﬁrst covers Asia and the second
handles China, the only country allocated its own subcommittee. Shosha executives have headed both subcommittees.9
Similarly,Keidanren(2006a)advocatesaforeignpolicythat“on
thefoundationoftheJapan-USAlliance,unfoldsadiplomatic
andcommercialstrategyemphasizingtheAsia-Paciﬁcregion.”
eattitudeofKeidanren,thebusinesscommunity,andthe
Japanese business-academic-diplomatic establishment toward
EastAsianintegrationisbestrevealedbyexaminingthecontent
and evolution of the report of the “Okuda mission” commissioned by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo and delivered to the
asean+3meetinginNovember(「アジア経済再生ミッ
ション」報告書. ),andKeizaiDoyukai’sreportadvocating
active creation of an integrated East Asian region (Keizai
Doyukai 2006c). Okuda led a high-powered group of eight,
including two respected economists, two prominent former
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bureaucrats (Gyoten Toyo of the Ministry of Finance and
OkamotoYukioofForeignAﬀairs),thechairmanofMitsubishi
Bank, and Bank of Japan oﬃcial Fukui Toshihiko, soon to be
namedvicechairofKeizaiDoyukaiandthengovernorofthe
BankofJapan(boj).Duringitsintensiveeleven-dayschedule,
the mission oﬃcially met with nearly 200 people in South
KoreaandSoutheastAsia.
As a response to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, it is hardly
surprising that the Okuda Report recommends measures to
monitor and moderate short-term capital ﬂows and calls for
strengthenedJapaneseaidandassistance.Similarly,theappeal
for increased internationalization of the yen trods familiar
ground, while the push for trade liberalization and free trade
areasandepasisconsistentwithJapan’snewcampaignofbilateral liberalization and the epa negotiations with Mexico and
Singapore.Eventhereferencesto“thedeepeningofeconomic
interdependence” are unremarkable. More surprising is the
prominentappealtothe“commondestinyoftheAsiancountries”andtheemphasisontheimportanceofopeningupnot
justSoutheastAsiaandKorea,butJapanitself,mostnotablyto
long-terminﬂowsof“humantalent”(人材),sothatJapanwould
become“acountryopentothepeopleofAsia.”
In retrospect, though, the most remarkable aspect of the
report is what is missing: any reference to China. After the
accelerationofgrowthandquadruplingoftradethatfollowed
China’saccessiontothewto in200,thatomissionwouldnot
berepeated.By2005,Kohara,stillanoﬃcialattheMinistryof
ForeignAﬀairs(mofa),publishedanelaboratedversionofthe
Okudareport(Kohara2005),tellinglyentitlede East Asian
Community: e Growth of Chinese Power and Japan’s Strategy,
anddrapedwithaneﬀusiveandaﬃrmativeblurbfromKeidanren’s Okuda. Kohara highlights the huge increase in regional
trade integration and the inﬂuence of the North American
FreeTradeAgreement(nafta)andtheEuropeanUnion.He
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ritualisticallyaﬃrmstheimportanceofasean,virtuallyignores
Korea, and devotes most of his attention to a sympathetic
recountingofChina’srecovery(復権)ofitsnaturalplaceasthe
centerofAsia.
Kohara accepts that in the foreseeable future China’s
economicinﬂuencewillmatchtheUnitedStatesglobally,and
thatitwillsoonsurpassthatoftheUnitedStatesinEastAsia,
butrejectsthepossibilitythatChinacouldcreateahegemonic
regionalorder.Whilerepeatedlyreaﬃrmingthecrucialroleof
the US-Japan Alliance, he also periodically chides the United
Statesforitshegemony,unilateralism,andmarketfundamentalism.Heacknowledgestheseveregovernanceproblemsfacing
asean andeventheEU,butherebutstheargumentthatAsia’s
diversity renders regional cooperation impossible. Instead, he
arguesfortheprimacyofpoliticalwillandthepossibilitiesfor
evolutionary expansion of cooperation. And while advocating
functionalist“openregionalism,”includingparticipationbyIndia
andperhapseventheUnitedStates,heacceptsthatasean+3
willbethekeyorganizationalrepresentationofregionalactivity.
Sixmonthslater,shortlyaftertheﬁrstEastAsiansummit,
KeizaiDoyukaipublished“RecommendationsfortheRealization of East Asian Community" (Keizai Doyukai 2006c). e
reportnotesthe“powershift”accompanyingtheriseofChina
andtherapidincreaseinregionalinterdependence,andasserts
thatdiplomacytowardEastAsiamustforma“thirdpillar”in
Japaneseforeignpolicy,aftertheUnitedNationsandtheUSJapanAlliance.ereportcallsforthedevelopmentofan“equal
partnership” with East Asian countries, including a comprehensive eﬀort to reduce problems of contending historical
consciousness.Itemphasizesthatthefailureofasean countries,
and not just China and Korea, to support Japan’s bid for a
permanentseatontheUNSecurityCouncil,evenafterallthe
aidJapanhasgiventhem,indicatesaneedtoaccentuateeﬀorts
tocultivatetrustthroughevolutionarycooperationinavariety

Japan’s Business Community in Sino-Japanese Relations2

offunctionalareas,beginningwitheconomicliberalization.It
alsoavers(twice)thatitwillbeimportanttoreducetheoppositionoftheUnitedStates,whosesecurityblanketremainsessential to East Asian stability, by maintaining and upgrading
Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (apec), and supporting
ﬂexible,functionalparticipationofnonregionalcountries.
eDoyukaireportholdsfasttoasetofbasicphilosophical
precepts (理念), including democracy, market economy, and
basichumanrights,butitacceptsthatforthetimebeingthe
preceptsarevaluesandgoalsratherthanprerequisitesforcooperation.ItnotesthateveninEurope,regionalcooperationhas
takenﬁftyyears,andexpectsthatEastAsiawillhavetodevelop
itsown,uniqueform.us,theimmediatetaskisaccelerated
liberalizationandmovementtowardbilateralandregionalepas,
which will build up trust and patterns of cooperation at the
sametimethattheyhappilyfacilitatetheproductionnetworks
oftheJapanesecorporationsthatbelongtoKeizaiDoyukaiand
Keidanren,allthewhilekeepingthesupport(oratleastavoiding
the opposition) of the United States. At any rate, the report
reasons,therapidlyincreasingsizeandintegrationofEastAsia
dictatethatJapanmusttakeanactivepartincreatinganEast
Asiancommunity,andimprovementofSino-Japaneserelations
isaprerequisitetoattainingthatgoal.
Asian economic integration, in practice, will be catalyzed by
autos and steel
Twointerrelatedthemesstandoutinthesereports:thegrowing
centralityofEastAsia,andtheneedforanaging,slow-growing
Japan to create a more dynamic, ﬂexible, and innovative
economy. e business associations hope that linking Japan
morecloselytoadynamicAsiacanreigniteJapanesegrowth.
ThemostimmediatetechniqueissigningeconomicpartnershipagreementsthatfacilitatethegrowthofJapanesefirms,
particularly in industries such as autos and electronics that
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have developed elaborate production networks in Asia that
wouldgainfromincreasedeconomicopennessandintegration.
epas are not limited to East Asia, of course—Mexico was a
crucial early case—but Asian countries have been the most
numerousandimportantpartnersforJapan,andepasareintimately linked to other regional developments, such as the
asean FreeTradeArea(afta).eautoindustry,inparticular,
iscentraltoJapan’seconomy,anditsleaders,asnotedabove,
have been centrally ensconced in the policy-making process.
EvenafterOkudaHiroshisteppeddownasheadofKeidanren
andasoneoftwoprivatemembersofthecefp,hissuccessorat
Toyota,ChoFujio,servedasavicechairmanofKeidanren.e
share of Japanese automobile production occurring outside
Japanhasbeenincreasingforyearsandisnowoverhalf;among
theoverseasproductionareas,AsiasurpassedNorthAmerica
in2006(JapanAutomobileManufacturersAssociation200:6)
In the 60s and 0s, protectionism in Southeast Asia
forcedJapaneseautoﬁrmstoestablishassemblyoperationsin
eachlocalmarket.Frustratedwiththesmallvolumesandineﬃciency,theJapaneseautomakersconstantlypushedforliberalizationandwereimportantforcesbehindtheasean freetrade
agreement (afta) and various industrial complementarity
schemes.Initialprogresswasslow,buttheAsianﬁnancialcrisis
acceleratedtherateofliberalization,asdidtheriseofChinaas
analternativereceptacleforforeigninvestmentandevenasa
competing site for export of small vehicles. Where Southeast
Asian countries once dragged their feet on afta and carved
outnumerousexceptions,particularlyinautos,afterthecrisis
theybegantoacceptthatlong-termliberalizationwasinevitable
(Legewie2000).
Japan’s epa negotiations pushed the process further. Although details vary from country to country (and as of mid200hadnotentirelybeencompletedinthecasesofIndonesia),
thebasicoutlineissimilar:10 tariﬀsonmostpartsareeliminated
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or reduced immediately, while most others face elimination
within ﬁve to seven years, along with most tariﬀs on steel
imports(covering50percentofJapanesesteelexportstoailand, and 63 percent to Malaysia). Tariﬀs on remaining parts
and assembly are to expire by 205 (in a few cases, assembly
operationsaresubjecttofuturenegotiations).Inotherwords,
in return for maintaining a few more years of protection for
localassemblyoperations,mostofwhichareownedbyJapanese
automakers,theasean countrieshaveagreedtoaradicalliberalizationoftradeinautopartsandcrucialcomponents,suchas
steel.
If Japanese auto ﬁrms have indirectly driven the bilateral
andregionalprocessofintegrationinSoutheastAsia,inChina
theyhavelargelyreactedtomultilateralanddomesticinitiatives:
wto entryandChineseindustrialpolicy.emoveofJapanese
autoﬁrmsintoChinawasslowandreluctant,despitearequest
forassistancefromDengXiaopingattheendofthe0s.Asa
result,theyfellbehindVolkswagenandthenGeneralMotors.
Inthelate0s,ToyotaestablishedaninitialbaseinTianjin,
and in 2002 Nissan took a leading stake in Dongfeng, then
China's second largest auto producer. Since then, the major
developmenthasbeentheconglomerationofJapaneseﬁrmsin
Guangdong,arichcoastalprovincefarfromthecentralgovernment. China now hosts more Japanese parts ﬁrms than does
theUnitedStates,andGuangdongisovertakingthetraditional
leader,Shanghai.In200,Chinaproducednearlyninemillion
motor vehicles, surpassing Japan as the second largest auto
marketintheworld.Byconservativeestimates,itwillpassthe
UnitedStateswithinadecade.
Building on their overall competitive strengths, Japanese
autoﬁrmsaregainingmarketsharesinChina,andnowcontrol
about one-third of the market. Led by Honda’s Guangzhou
operation, they have already begun small-scale shipments to
Europe and Japan, and they see more exports as inevitable.
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Japaneseautomanufacturersexpressdissatisfactionwithmany
aspectsoftheChineseautoenvironment,includinginadequate
protectionoftrademarks,designs,andpatents;excessive,arbitrary,andunstableregulation;controlsonforeigninvestments
and joint venture arrangements for assembly operations; and
thethreatofoverinvestmentbystate-owneddomesticcompanies.eyalsoworryaboutinstabilityinChinesepoliticsand
Sino-Japanese relations. To counteract these dangers and
tensions, they have worked to establish good relations with
local governments—municipal oﬃcials in both Tianjin and
GuangzhouseeToyotaandotherJapaneseautomakersascrucial
contributors to the local economy—and to inﬂuence central
governments in China and Japan. Concerns and reservations
notwithstanding,theyclearlyrecognizethecurrentandfuture
centrality of China to the auto industry and the necessity for
regional cooperation (author interviews, Tianjin 2002; jama
BeijingOﬃce,November2006).
FortheJapanesesteelindustry,Chinaisnotonlyacrucial
market,itisalsoanincreasinglydominantforceintheglobal
industry. rough 3, the Japanese steel industry was a
remarkablesuccess.SecondonlytotheSovietUnioninsize,it
ledtheworldineﬃciency,quality,andtechnologicalsophistication.eoilshocksbroughtthegrowthofdemandtoanend,
butafterabrieflag,theJapaneseindustryrespondedeﬀectively.
Itconcentratedonhigher-endproducts,shedtensofthousands
ofjobswithoutlayingoﬀcoreworkers,andincreasedproductivity. In the 0s, it added almost no new capacity, but by
focusing on high quality sheets for the triumphant Japanese
auto industry, it further improved productivity and regained
proﬁtability.
At ﬁrst, China was a positive factor for Japan. As China
began to reform and open up, demand for Japanese steel
boomed.AconsortiumledbyNipponSteelusedJapaneseloan
aid to construct Baoshan, China’s most advanced mill, in
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Shanghai. e extraordinary expansion of the Chinese steel
industry was mostly positive for Japan. True, China began to
displacesomeimportsfromJapan,and,bybiddingupthecost
of iron ore and other inputs, it pressured Japanese steel producers,particularlysmallerﬁrmsproducingordinarysteelfor
theconstructionmarket.Butahugewaveofdemandforsteel
in China drove up prices for steel products throughout the
world.Startingin2003,“Chinademand”helpedpropelJapanese
integratedsteelproducerstorecordproﬁts.
By 2006, however, the rise of China, the consolidation of
thesteelindustryinEurope,andthelackofinvestmentinnew
plants at home made it clear that Japan was no longer in the
driver’sseat.Chinaproducedone-thirdofglobaloutput—three
and one-half times as much as Japan—and emerged as the
world’slargestexporter.AlthoughtheChinesemillsremained
far behind Japan in quality assurance, product diversity, and
technological sophistication, they made steady progress, and
increasingly supplanted imports of cold-rolled steel for auto
bodies and appliances. Posco, the leading steel producer in
South Korea and a vital alliance partner for Nippon Steel,
rapidlyexpandedproductionofsteelinChina,mainlyforautos.
eChinesemarkethasalsobecomecrucialfortheJapanese steel industry. In 2004, Nippon Steel took a 3 percent
share in a 6.5 billion yuan (roughly 50 million dollars) joint
venture in Shanghai with Baoshan Steel (50 percent) and
Europe'sArcelor(2percent),toproduce.milliontonsannually of cold-rolled coated sheets for car bodies. Demand has
beensostrongthattheventureislikelytoexpandproduction.
Baoshan is also producing cold-rolled steel on its own. JFE
Steel,Japan’ssecondlargestproducer,hassoughtforyearsto
obtain permission to build an integrated mill in Guangzhou,
neartheJapaneseautojointventures.In2006,whilewaiting
for the license, it took a majority share in a more modest 20
billionyenfacilitytocold-roll400,000tonsofsheetsperyear,
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mainlyforauto(DevelopmentBankofJapan2006).In200it
announcedplanstoinvestanother0milliondollarstoproduce
. million tons of cold-rolled sheets and 400,000 tons of
surface-treatedsteel,mainlyforsaletoJapanese-aﬃliatedauto
producersinGuangdong(Asahi Shinbun,March,200).Projectstoreduceemissionsandenergyconsumptionbythegigantic
Chinese steel industry, some funded by Japanese aid, are also
important markets for Japanese steel producers and their
suppliers.ebottomline,though,isclear:Chinaisnowthe
dominantforceintheworldsteelindustry.Japaneseﬁrmsstill
enjoy a long lead in technology, but their domestic market is
barely growing. Having sacriﬁced investment for proﬁtability,
theirplantsandworkersareaging,andtheirtechnologicallead
isgraduallyshrinking.Already,theirprosperitydependscriticallyonhowtheyinteractwithChina.
“Human talents” and vitality
IfonerecurringthemeinbusinessreportsonEastAsiaisthe
needtoparticipateinAsiangrowthandintegration,anotheris
thedesiretouseAsianenergytoignitedynamismandinnovationathome.Japanesebusinesscirclesexpressacuteconcern
about the aging population. ey worry not only about the
contractionary pressures on aggregate demand and tax revenues,butalsoabouttheneedtoupgradetheskillsandoutlook
oftheJapaneseworkforce.Withoutnewblood,Japanesecompanieswillﬁnditdiﬃculttomaintainthevitalityofthedomestic
workforce,muchlesssupplytheever-growingarmyofJapanese
subsidiaries in Asia with Japanese-speaking locals capable of
supplementing and replacing managers and executives dispatchedfromJapan.
Keidanren’s45-pagereport“LandofHope,Japan,"issued
in200,providesadetaileddiscussionofhumancapital.ough
thereportattractedconsiderableattentionforitsstrongaﬃrmation of Prime Minister Abe’s call to increase the teaching of
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patriotismintheschools,fewerreadersseemtohavenoticed
itsforthrightproposalsontheinterchangeof“humantalents”
(like most political discourse in Japan, the report studiously
avoidswordssuchas“immigration”and“foreignlabor”;Keidanren 200:2, 2, 05). Keidanren urges the government to ()
increasetheshareofforeignstudentsinJapan’stertiaryeducationsectortotheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationand
Development (oecd) average of 6.5 percent from the current
2. percent; (2) create a system of permanent residency to
provide greater stability for foreign workers; and (3) mobilize
Overseas Development Administration (oda) and other resources to expand Japanese language training overseas, and
prepareforeignprofessionalsinnursingandotherﬁeldstopass
Japan’s professional qualiﬁcations. Keizai Doyukai has issued
severalreportswithcomplementarythemes,includingonewith
the sprightly title “How to Make Japan a Place Where NonJapanese People Want to Visit, Study, and Work” (Keizai
Doyukai2002).
Labor issues have been a signiﬁcant component of epa
negotiationswiththePhilippines,ailand,andIndonesia,but
theyarenottherealinterestofJapanesebusinessassociations.
ePhilippineagreementincludesprovisionsfortheentryof
upto400nursesand600caregivers(介護師)overtheﬁrsttwo
years. e agreement mandates three or four years of work
experience (respectively) prior to arrival, stipulates that the
workersbepaidatleastasmuchasequivalentJapanesehealth
employees,andrequiresthatthePhilippineworkerspassprofessional exams in Japanese to maintain their right to reside in
Japan.11 Interviews with Philippine nurses and care givers
suggestthatevenifnursescouldlearnenoughJapanesetopass
theexams,mostwouldﬁndJapanlessattractivethantheUnited
States or the Gulf states, where they could speak English and
earn much higher salaries. e care givers, who have fewer
internationalalternativesandfacelowerlicensingrequirements,
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might ﬁnd Japan somewhat more attractive (Asahi Shinbun
October 26, 2006). Either way, the numbers look to remain
extremelylimited.Similarly,looseningentryrequirementsfor
aicooks,dancers,andboxersisunlikelytocontributesigniﬁcantlytostemmingthedeclineinJapan’sworkforce.12
erealinterestofmajorJapaneseemployersdoesnotlie
in expanding the supply of relatively unskilled labor or even
nurses.atismerelyaminorpricetopayforcompletingepas
that facilitate Japanese exports. Indeed, to the extent that
unskilled workers, such as the South Americans of Japanese
descent,haveadiﬃculttimeﬁttingintoJapanesesociety,large
employerswouldratherlimitordecreasetheirnumberssoas
to reduce the social backlash against increasing the supply of
thehighlyeducated,Japanese-speakingforeignerstheydowant
(Keidanren200b;Keidanren2006b;Newsweek International,
September,2006;ap January20,200).ebusinessassociationscallontheJapanesegovernmenttoincreasefundingfor
scholarships,studenthousing,andJapaneselanguagetraining,
and they urge Japanese universities to establish new Englishbasedcoursestoattractforeignstudents.Inearly200,Prime
Minister Fukuda and the education ministry responded with
planstotriplethenumberofforeignstudentsinJapan'stertiary
educationsystemto300,000.13 ebusinessassociationsalso
urgemembercompaniestoundertakeavarietyofreformsboth
abroad and in Japan, including changes to evaluation and
compensationsystems,tomakethemselvesmoreattractiveto
foreign students in China and Southeast Asia, who currently
prefertoworkforEuropeanandAmericanmultinationals.
In practice, the foreigners that ﬁll Japanese employment
needsathomeandabroadoverwhelminglywillbeAsian,particularlyChinese.Asof200,over0percentofforeignstudents
in Japan came from Asia, almost 0 percent of them from
NortheastAsia.Chinesealoneaccountedforover60percentof
thetotal,upfrom44.5percentin,whileKoreansmadeup
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another 5 percent. Chinese and Koreans also dominate the
totalforeignpopulationinJapanandthemostskilledvisapositions, such as engineer, professor, and intracompany transfer.
On average, Korean students master spoken Japanese most
easily, whereas students from China and Taiwan (the third
largestgroupatfourpercent)havethestrongestcommandof
kanji. Chinese and Koreans are far more likely to blend into
Japanesesociety,dominatingtherollsofnewlynaturalizedcitizens and spouses of Japanese citizens.14 In sum, as Japanese
corporations accelerate their search for foreign students and
professionalswhocanenlivenJapanesecompaniesathomeand
easecommunicationsbetweenJapaneseheadquartersandoverseas subsidiaries, they will ﬁnd the majority of them coming
fromNortheastAsia,particularlyChina.

Conclusion
Afterinitialreluctance,theJapanesebusinesscommunityhas
embracedthenotionthatJapanmustactivelyparticipateina
process of East Asian regional integration. Although many in
JapanremainwaryofChinaandskepticalofregionalcooperation,executivesfromthesteel,electronics,trade,andespecially
automobile industries, often working through Keidanren and
KeizaiDoyukai,andwiththesupportofmeti,havetakenthe
lead in pushing for economic partnership agreements and
regionalcooperationwithintheasean+3framework.
estanceofJapanesebusinessleadersrespondstoincreasinglevelsofregionalinterdependence,mostdramaticallymanifestedintheAsianﬁnancialcrisis,toregionalizationinother
parts of the world, and most of all to China’s economic rise.
ChinaloomseverlargerasaﬁnalmarketforJapaneseﬁrmsand
hasexertedapowerfulinﬂuenceonvitalJapanesetradepartners
inasean andKorea.asean countriesseeregionalcooperation
asawaytomaintaintheirunityandbargainingstrengthandto
drawinandsocializeChinaratherthanconstrainandalienate
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it.eJapanesebusinesscommunityhascometoacceptthat
whileAsiancountrieswanttobalanceChina,theyalsowantto
balanceotherpowersandwillshowChinaadegreeofdeference
(cf.Vuving2006).Japanhasattemptedtomaintainaninclusive
andﬂexibleapproachtomembershipinregionalorganizations
andtoinfusethemwithuniversalvaluesofdemocracy,human
rights,andmarketeconomics,butthebusinesscommunityhas
acceptedthattheasean+3countrieswillconstitutethecoreof
regional cooperation, and that values will serve as goals and
normsratherthanpreconditions.
eseconclusionsraisesomequestions.
. IstheJapanesebusinesscommunityreallysopro-Asiaand
pro-China?Solis(2006),forexample,reportsthat,ininterviews,Japanesebusinessesexpressdecidedlymixedfeelings
about China. While unquestionably true, this conclusion
doesnotnegatethelargerpoint:whetherornottheJapanese
likeit,Chinahasalreadyarrivedasamajoreconomicforce.
e key point is not the degree of emotional closeness
(which,asnotedabove,hasﬂuctuatedwidely),ortheabsence
ofconﬂict,butperceptionsofinterestsandlong-termtrends.
Atonepoint,manyJapanesehalf-wishedChinawouldfall
apart.Someontherightwingstillholdontothatdream,
butbusinesseshaveconcludedthatthecollapseofChinais
unlikely.Moreover,itwouldbeextremelyunwelcomenow
that China accounts for a rapidly increasing share of the
exportsofJapananditsmostimportanttradepartners.
2. Will business challenge the mainstream consensus on the
necessity of maintaining and strengthening the US-Japan
securityallianceinfavorofamoreexclusivelyAsianorientation? e documents and interviews reveal no sign of
that.Rather,thebusinesscommunityistryingtocarveout
more space for intensive interaction with China and a bit
moreroomtomaneuvervis-à-vistheUnitedStates.Busi-
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nessleadersaretryingtomakeregionalinstitutionsmore
usefulandarecertainlyleaningtowardengagementrather
than containment. And the business community is
remindingeveryonethat,inthelong-run,Japanwillhaveto
adjusttoamultipolarworld.
3. Will East Asia drop the dollar and move toward a uniﬁed
regionalcurrency?ekeyvariableistheChineseﬁnancial
system. If and when China can reform its banking system
and build up at least a modest bond market, it should be
abletorelymoreonﬂexibleinterestratesandlessonquantitativecontrolsandarigidforeignexchangerate(Kroeber
200). Once China loosens or breaks the quasi-peg to the
USdollar,andliberalizesrestrictionsoncapitalﬂows,other
Asiancountrieswillbemuchmorelikelytocutawayfrom
the dollar, probably initially to a basket of currencies in
which the Euro will compromise a much higher share,
possibly even surpassing that of the dollar (Shimizu 2005;
ChinnandFrankel200).esigniﬁcanceoftheAmerican
marketasaﬁnalabsorberofEastAsianexporters,already
slowlydeclining,willdropsharply,andtheyenandtheyuan
will play more important roles in East Asian commerce.
Giventhehugeregionaldisparitiesinlevelofdevelopment
andthereluctanceofsovereignnationstorelinquishmonetaryautonomy,EastAsiaisunlikelytoconvergeonasingle
currencyintheforeseeablefuture(cf.Cohen2003),although
many Japanese academics and policy-oriented economists
point to currency uniﬁcation as an ultimate goal (Shirai
2005). Still, pressure for regional cooperation on ﬁnancial
andmonetarymatterswillincrease(Eichengreen200).As
the regional ﬁnancial structure evolves, developments in
Beijing will loom at least as large as those in Washington.
Japanesebusinessesarepreparingforthatday.
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Notes
 AmnestyInternationalJapan,http://secure.amnesty.or.jp/multiculture/
f_crime.pdf;HamaiandEllis200.
2 http://www.yoronchousa.net/result/445,accessedFebruary200.
3 http://www.php.co.jp/bookstore/detail.php?isbn=-4-56-6000-.
4 Japan and asean in East Asia: a sincere and open partnership.
4 January2002(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv020/
speech.html).
5 http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/2005_seisaku/20yakusoku/index.html.
6 http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/daily/06_0/0/00a.shtml.
 http://www.ceac.jp/e/e-membership.html.
 Available at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/index.html
andhttp://www.doyukai.or.jp/policyproposals/list200.html.
 http://www.doyukai.or.jp/about/committee.html.
0 http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/index.html.
 http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/koyou/other0/0-2.html.
2 http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/JTEPA_gaiyo.pdf,
p..
3 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hukudaspeech/200/0/housin.html;
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chukyo/chukyo4/gijiroku/
0/0020606.htm.
4 JapanStudentServicesOrganization200(jasso);http://www.moj.go.jp/
NYUKAN/nyukan6-4.pdf.
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Japan’s New Nationalism:
e International and Domestic Politics
of an Assertive Foreign Policy
Frances Rosenbluth
Saito Jun
Annalisa Zinn

eworldhaswonderedwhattomake
ofthegrowingsupportinJapanforamoreactiveforeignpolicy.
Successiveprimeministershavebravedabarrageofcriticism
fromChinaandKoreaandpaidannualvisitstotheYasukuni
War Memorial on August 15, the date of Japan’s surrender in
World War ii and for Japan’s war victims the most sensitive
dateonwhichsuchavisitmighttakeplace.AlthoughJapanese
publicopinionismildlycriticalofstatevisitstotheshrine,the
same public also shows increasing irritation with China’s and
Korea’ssteadydrumbeatofcriticismofanysignofinsuﬃcient
contrition,inshrinevisitsorinhistorytextbooks,forJapan’s
wartime aggression ﬁfty years ago. Popular comic books that
bashChinaandKoreaarealsotroublingsigns(e.g.,Kobayashi
18; Yamano 005). is chapter seeks to understand the
nature of Japan’s new nationalism and the reasons behind it.
What,ifany,istheconnectionbetweenJapan’swrangleswith
its neighbors over wartime history and the Japanese public’s
growing inclination to throw oﬀ the paper constraints of the
constitution’speaceclause?
ereareseveralexplanationsfortherisingtideofnationalist feeling in Japan. e ﬁrst stresses changes in Japan’s
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i nternationalenvironmentthathaveputtheJapanesepublicon
edge,includingtheendoftheColdWar,theriseofChinaasa
militarypower,andNorthKorea’serraticbehavior(e.g.,Nakanishi006).Asecondexplanationfocusesondomesticpolitics.
Somescholarsthinkitissigniﬁcantthattheleadershipmantle
is passing to a new generation that is unencumbered by war
guilt(e.g.,Mikuriya007).Othersnotethatthecollapseofthe
JapanSocialistPartyhasmutedaconsistentvoiceagainstmilitarization(Yamaguchi004).Stillotherssuggestthatgrowing
incomeinequalitygivespoliticiansanincentivetoseekelectoral
support on nonmaterial grounds, such as national pride and
identity(Chua00;Shayo005).
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permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council.
Source: Cabinet Oﬃce (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-sha.html).
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Both international and domestic levels of analysis aﬀord
trenchant insights into changing Japanese attitudes towards
foreign policy. But there is a puzzling asymmetry in public
opinion across diﬀerent dimensions of foreign policy that
remainsunexplained.AlthoughJapaneseshowgrowinginterest
in an active foreign policy, proxied in this ﬁgure by the percentageofrespondentswhothinkJapanshouldbeapermanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, this is not
matchedbyagrowingnationalprideorwillingnesstosupport
thegovernment’sforeignpolicy,“rightorwrong.”
Japan’s national pride, moreover, has not only remained
stable over recent decades, but it is not particularly high by
internationalstandards.ByOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentstandards,Japanesecitizensarelukewarminpopularsupportfortheirgovernment“throughthick
andthin,”andthepercentagehaschangedverylittleinthepast
decade.
Webeginourinvestigationofthispuzzlewiththeobservationthat,althoughinternationaleventspromptassessmentsof
changingsecurityinterests,votersdevelopopinionsaboutthese
eventsinthecontextofnationaldebatesaboutdesirablepolicy
responses.WehavegrownaccustomedtothinkingofJapanese
votersasuninterestedinforeignpolicyissuesbecausepotential
globalthreatsinthepasthavenotproducedspikesinJapanese
foreign policy interest since the parties on the left mobilized
studentstodemonstrateagainsttheUS-Japantreatyrevisionin
170. We suggest that voter passivity was the norm because
Japan’s electoral rules until 1 gave politicians of the ruling
partyincentivestocultivatedonorsandloyalgroupsofvoters
withregulatoryandpersonalisticfavorsratherthantoappealto
them on the basis of broad policy issues. e electoral rule
changein14didtwothings.Itismoreeﬃcientininterparty
competition for single-member-district or party-list seats to
take a stance on policies, domestic and international. e
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competitionbetweenthetwolargestpartiespushesplatforms
towardsthemiddleofthepoliticalspectrum,creatingamoderate bias. It is not so much that a resurgent Japanese national
identityisbeingstoked,buttheprocessofinformationprovision
anddebateisdrawingvotersintoforeignpolicydecisionmaking
innovelways.
If our argument is right, Japanese voter support for an
active security policy reﬂects a new public engagement with
foreignpolicyissues,whichhasnotbeenpartofthescenein
Japaneseelectoralpoliticsformanyyears.

Sizing up Japanese Nationalism
In common usage, nationalism means something like patriotism—an allegiance to one’s nation state, perhaps, but not
necessarily overlaid with identiﬁcation with an ethnic people
whomakeupthatnation’spopulation(Smith1).Scholarsof
nationalism, including Benedict Anderson (18) and Ernest
Gellner (17), have noted that nationalism is a distinctly
modernphenomenon,becausetheliteracyandcommunication
requiredto“imagineanationalcommunity”werenotpresent

Table 10.1: Cross-national comparison of pride in history
Country

Agree 1995 (%)

Agree 2003 (%)

Change (%)

Germany-West

33.7

39.1

5.4

Germany-East

30.9

40.5

9.6

GreatBritain

89.3

88

-1.3

UnitedStates

87.6

92.2

4.6

Sweden

67.3

68.3

1

Russia

81.8

82.6

0.8

Canada

83.8

91.8

8

Japan

76.8

75.6

-1.2

Note: The questionnaire asks if the respondent is proud of the country’s history.
Source: International Social Survey Programme (1995, 2003).
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over large territorial spaces in times past. Michael Hechter
(000) and Keith Darden (006) point to the crucial role of
modern governments to inculcate national sentiments that,
once absorbed, are never lost. Maruyama Masao (146) drew
thesameconclusionabouttheJapanesesenseofnation:thatit
wascreatedonlywiththeMeiji’sconsciousprogramofbinding
localallegiancestoanew,centralizingstate.Japan’sgeographic
insularity made it relatively easy to create and sustain the
culturalhomogeneitythatsupportsasenseofnation(Wilson
001).
Ohnuki-Tierney (00) points out, however, that nationalismisadeceptivelyobscureconcept,forourcomfortwiththe
word in ordinary parlance blinds us to the multiple ways the
term is used. Sometimes nationalism refers to the patriotic
supportofapolityinwhichonelives,regardlessoftheparticular
governmentinpower.Nationalismmayalsomeanidentiﬁcation
with an ethnic people that can border on xenophobia. Still
others mean by nationalism an expansionist ideology that
impliesthewillingnesstouseforceagainstothernationsshould

Table 10.2: Public support for the government even when it is wrong
Country

Agree 1995 (%)

Agree 2003 (%)

Change (%)

Germany-West

16.7

25.5

8.8

Germany-East

25

26.4

1.4

GreatBritain

24.4

20.7

-3.7

UnitedStates

32

36.4

4.4

Sweden

23.9

14

-9.9

Russia

61.7

57.9

-3.8

Canada

15.3

19.1

3.8

Japan

22.8

24.7

1.9

Note: The questionnaire asks if the respondent should support the government even
if it is wrong.
Source: International Social Survey Programme (1995, 2003.)
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theopportunityarise.echallengeinstudyingJapanesenationalismistograspwhatsortsofsentimentsJapanesehaveabout
theirnationandseehowthesesquarewiththeperceptionsof
Asianneighborsaboutthosesentiments.
Japan’sAsianneighborsciteanumberofindicatorsofrising
Japanesenationalism.Inthissectionwefocusonthreeofthe
mostprominent:Japanesetextbookrevisionism,statevisitsto
the Yasukuni war shrine, and growing popular support for
revising Article ix. To anticipate our results, we ﬁnd little
evidencethatthesephenomenasignifymountingxenophobia,
resurgentmilitarism,orananti-statusquoforeignpolicyorientation.Rather,thepublic’sviewsofJapan’sforeignpolicyremain
moderatewhileshowingawillingnesstoacceptalargerresponsibilityforJapan’sowndefenseinthefaceofgrowinginternationaluncertainties.Japan’snewdomesticpoliticalclimate,we
suggest, has brought these strategic issues to the forefront of
electoralpoliticsfortheﬁrsttimeindecades.
e textbook controversy
Japan’sMinistryofEducation,Culture,SportsandTechnology
(mext)reviewsandauthorizestextbookseveryfouryearsfor
use in Japanese public and private school curricula. is is a
role the government education bureaucracy has undertaken
since the Meiji Restoration. Although the Japanese Supreme
Courtruledin17thatthegovernmentoughttointerferewith
thewriters’viewsandschoolboards’choicesaslittleaspossible,
theauthorizationprocessitselfwasnotunconstitutional.1 e
government’soversightofschooltextbookshasbeenalightening
rod for Asian countries’ ire at what they perceive as Japan’s
anemic remorse for the devastation and horrors wreaked on
neighboring countries by the Japanese military during World
Warii.In18,aparticularlyrancorousexchangeoverJapanese
textbooksledtheJapaneseMinistryofEducationtoincludea
provision in textbook guidelines that the sensitivity of Asian
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nations to wartime history be taken into account. But China
and Korea, in particular, have often objected to textbook
passagesthatunderstatethehorrorsofthewar,includingthe
RapeofNanking,thetestingofbiologicalwarfareonChinese
citizens,andtheforciblerecruitmentofAsianwomentoservice
thesexualneedsofJapanesesoldiers.
Recently,Asianfeelingswereinﬂamedbyanew“revisionist”
textbook approved by the Japanese government in 001 and
again in 005 that explicitly rejects a “masochistic view” of
history and portrays Japan’s war in Asia in largely defensive
terms.2 In005,theChina Daily calledtheoﬀendingtextbook
“anunﬁtteachingtool,”a“politicalprovocation,”andwenton
tocommentthat“withoutaconsensusonthehistoryissueand
other disputes, the Asian peoples cannot place their trust in
Japan’sdesiretoplayabiggerroleinworldaﬀairs.”(BBCNews
005).Undeterred,theLiberalDemocraticParty(ldp)government approved legislation in April 006 that would make
“nurturingloveofcountry”anexplicitaimofpubliceducation.
Forourpurposes,thequestionsarewhetherJapan’stextbook
revisionism is a harbinger of renewed nationalist fervor in
Japan, and how we would know if it were. Note that only
eighteenschoolsoutofmorethan40,000nationwidechoseto
adopttheparticulartextbookthatprovokedsuchfurorin001
and005.ismeansatmost0.04%ofJapanesemiddle-school
studentslearnhistorythroughthislens.Tothedisappointment
oftheright-wingpublishingcompanythatproducedthebook,
the vast majority of Japanese school boards have rejected the
textbookinfavorofothersthatgiveamorefull-bodiedaccount
of Japanese brutality in Asia. In most of the municipalities
where the new textbook was adopted, groups of parents and
concernedcitizenspetitionedagainstthebook’suse.Someldp
politicians and Japanese government oﬃcials are sympathetic
toself-congratulatoryhistory,tobesure,butoppositionparties
intheDiethavechallengedthegovernmentateveryturn,and

6 FrancesRosenbluth,Saito Jun,andAnnalisaZinn

the textbook disputes do not appear to signal a rising tide of
militaristnationalismamongtheJapanesepublicatlarge.
Yasukuni visits
IfChinaandKoreataketextbookrevisionismasasignofcallous
disregard for the feelings of Asian populations victimized by
Japanesemilitaryexpansion,theyviewoﬃcialvisitsbyJapanese
politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine as bald endorsements of
Japan’s militarist past at the highest levels of power. Prime
MinisterKoizumiJun’ichirovisitedYasukuniShrineeveryyear
whilehewasinoﬃce,from001to006.Moreexasperatingly
to Japan’s Asian neighbors, he often paid an oﬃcial visit on
August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s surrender, which also
happenstobethedayAsiancountriescelebratetheendofthe
war.egovernmentsofChinaandKoreaissuedformalprotests
at each of Koizumi’s oﬃcial visits, and, in 005, Korea temporarily withdrew its ambassador to Japan to underscore the
point.
Itmaybe,assomeobservershavenoted,thattheChinese
and Korean governments enjoy the popular support in their
countries that Japanese insensitivity generates for them (Widome 006). But, at a minimum, oﬃcial visits to Yasukuni
Shrine seem to signify a government willingness to irritate
neighboringcountriesthatseethemselvesaswarvictims.e
YasukunivisitsraisethebroaderquestionofwhethertheJapanesegovernmentwaspanderingtonationalistpublicopinionat
home,orwhethertheldp wastryingtocookupanewbatchof
nationalism. If support for Yasukuni visits was already high,
politicians could score easy points by braving foreign ire to
makethetrip.Alternatively,perhapsthegovernmentsoughtto
stoke nationalism as a way of distracting the public from
economicwoes,particularlythoseatthelosingendofeconomic
restructuring, if economic losers are more likely to identify
with nationalist causes. Perhaps Japan’s prolonged economic
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malaisehasgivenrisetospontaneousexpressionsofnationalism
byeconomicloserswhogainpsychicsatisfactionfrombelonging
to a winning cause, or perhaps politicians have managed to
stokenationalistopinionasawaytogeneratepoliticalsupport
aroundnonmaterialissues.
at Japanese public opinion, particularly among urban
voters,hasremainedmildlynegativetowardstheseoﬃcialvisits
casts doubt on broader claims about playing the nationalism
cardtoabroaddomesticaudience.Businessleaderswerealso
concernedaboutincitingtheantagonismofneighboringtrading
partners.In006,OkudaHiroshi,aToyotaexecutiveandhead
oftheJapanBusinessFederation(Keidanren)oﬃciallyexpressed
misgivingsabouttheprimeminister’soﬃcialvisitstoYasukuni
Shrine. Hojo Kakutaro, chairman of the Japan Association of
CorporateExecutives(KeizaiDoyukai)followedsoonthereafter
withasimilarstatement.
e majority of ldp Diet members do not, in fact, visit
YasukuniShrine.ldp Dietmembers’visitstoYasukuniinrecent
yearsdonotindicateanupwardtrajectory,anditseemsclear
that ldp members are sensitive to the range of views within
theirconstituenciesaboutYasukuni.Considerthebehaviorof
ldp incumbents in the summer of 004. e portion of ldp
Dietmemberswhoshowedupinpersonorsenttheirproxiesto
the shrine on August 15 for the war defeat anniversary event

Table 10.3: Public opinion concerning prime ministers’
visits to Yasukuni Shrine
Date

yes

no

Don’t know/
not applicable

number

September 21–22, 1985 51.7%

24.9%

23.5%

2,257

52.6%

39.1%

8.3%

1,104

August 15–6, 2006

Note: The questionnaire asks, “Are you in support of the recent prime minister’s
visit to Yasukuni Shrine?”
Source: The Yomiuri Shimbun, October 7, 1985; August 17, 2006.
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wasabout40%.eldp isalong-standingcatch-allparty,and
Dietmembersrepresentmixedconstituentsintermsofreligious
faith.eseincumbentsarenotonlysupportedbyShintoists,
who are enthusiastic about increasing governmental involvementinYasukuni,butalsobyothercompetingreligioussects
thatadvocateestablishmentofanonreligiouscommemorative
facility for war casualties. Soka Gakkai is among the largest
non-Shintoist group and the organizational cornerstone of
Komei Party, the ldp’s junior coalition partner since 1. A
signiﬁcant portion of ldp legislators sent their proxies to the
shrine instead of showing up in person: 5.7% of lower house
single-memberdistrict(smd)incumbentsand.5%ofupper
house district incumbents. By sending a proxy, the legislator
wastryingtomaintainafriendlyrelationshipwiththeShintoists.
By not appearing in person, they avoided blame from Soka
Gakkaiandotherreligiousgroups.3
Former Prime Minister Koizumi had cultivated the USJapanalliancethroughouthistermsinoﬃce,whichgavehim
roomtosnubthefeelingsofAsianneighbors.Hischampioning
oftheinterestsofurbanvotersalsoboughthimsomefreedom
on symbolic issues, such as the Yasukuni Shrine, which had
deepandspecialmeaningforruralvoters.PrimeMinisterAbe
ShinzowasamoregenuinebelieverinwhatHarveyMansﬁeld
would call “a manly history” of Japan. But the voting public
chastised him in the 007 Upper House elections for overemphasizing foreign policy, which put future prime ministers
onnotice.
Article IX
Articleix isaproductofinstitutionaldesignthattheAmerican
occupierssooncametorue.Chapterii,Articleix oftheconstitutionisentitled“RenunciationofWar”andreads,
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justiceandorder,theJapanesepeopleforeverrenouncewar
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as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
forceasmeansofsettlinginternationaldisputes.Inorderto
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained.erightofbelligerencyofthestatewillnotbe
recognized.

A peace pledge made sense to the victors in 147 seeking to
avoid the possibility of resurgent Japanese militarism, but, by
150 when the United States had changed its priority to
combatingcommunismworldwide,theAmericanswouldhave
preferred for Japan to put considerable resources into USdirectedmilitaryspending.But,unlikeotherdemocratization
measures such as economic deconcentration, constitutional
entrenchment of the peace pledge in the form of Article ix
made remilitarization diﬃcult for the Americans to demand.
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru won his place in history by
using the American-made constitution to rebuﬀ American
requestsforfull-scaleJapaneseremilitarizationandsavingthe
governmentbudgetforcivilianpurposes(Yoshitsu18).
e“YoshidaDoctrine,”whichcalledforspendingaslittle
as possible on defense while paying as much as necessary to
keep the United States willing to hold the nuclear umbrella,
allowed Japan to keep defense expenditures within more-orless1%ofgdp fortheentirepostwarperiod.Buteven1%isa
staggeringamountofmoneywhenthedenominatorisasenormousasJapan’seconomy.Measuredintermsofcurrentdollars,
Japan’sdefenseexpendituresarenowthesecondlargestinthe
world, after the United States. To be sure, Russia and China
havefarmoremilitarypersonnelunderarms,andJapanlacks
their oﬀensive capability. But Japan long ago ceased to be a
paciﬁstcountryinanymeaningfulsenseoftheword.
Publicopinioninfavorofrevisingtheconstitutionhasbeen
increasingsincethemid180sandﬁnallytippedintoamajority
positioninthemid10s.
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Figure 10.2 Public opinion concerning constitutional revision
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Along with an openness for constitutional revision is
growingpublicapprovalforteachingaboutdefenseandforeign
policyinschools.Butmainstreamopinionstillopposesnuclear
armamentorgoingitaloneoutsidetheUS-Japansecuritytreaty
framework.eJapanesepubliciswillingtoownuptoareality
that is already here: Japan is an enormous, but defensive and
status-quo-favoringmilitarypower,andArticleix isaﬂagrant
falsehood. e groups that favor going nuclear or preach the
glories of military aggrandizement have never been more on
thefringethantheyaretoday,buttheirvoicesareheardinthe
unfamiliarcacophonythatispublicdebate.

Competing Explanations
einternationalenvironmentistheﬁrstplacetoseekexplanationsforJapan’schangingdomesticmood.eendoftheCold
WarraisesquestionsaboutAmericancommitmenttoJapanese
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interests in the Asian/Paciﬁc region. Meanwhile, the rise of
China as an economic and military power may outpace the
abilityofeconomicengagementandintegrationtosustainstakes
inmutualprosperity.NorthKoreaisanadditionalwildcardin
thewholemix.
Intheviewofneorealist(orstructuralrealist)theory,states
competeconstantlyforpowerandsecurity,andtheirpursuitof
thesegoalsisshapedexclusivelybythestructureoftheanarchic
internationalsystem,namelythenumberofstateactorsinthe
system and the relative distribution of capabilities or power
amongthem(Waltz17).NeorealistKennethWaltzpredicted
that Japan would possess a nuclear weapon sooner or later
(Waltz 1). States with similar capabilities seek to balance
oneanotherinanattempttoavoidwar,whereasweakerstates,
againinanattempttoavoidwar,eitherbandwagonwiththeir
stronger rivals or pass the buck by relying on the balancing
eﬀortsoftheirstrongerallies.
Whileabalancedsystemisgenerallystable,itisnevertheless
markedbyinterstatecompetitionwiththeever-presentpotential
forwar,asillustratedbytheconceptofthesecuritydilemma.
esecuritydilemmaexistswhenmanyofthemeansbywhich
a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of
others.Itconsistsofanaction-reactionprocessinwhichstates
builduptheirmilitarycapabilitiesinresponsetobuild-upsby
theiradversaries(Herz150;Jervis176).
Unbalanced systems can also be marked by the security
dilemma. ere are two main reasons why such systems are
supposedlymorepronetowarthanbalancedsystems.First,in
theviewofdefensiverealists(Waltz17),thelargernumberof
greatpowersanddiﬀerencesincapabilitiesinunbalancedmultipolar systems translate into more uncertainty about relative
capabilitiesand,consequently,agreatlikelihoodthatdeterrence
willfailtopreventawar.Second,intheviewofoﬀensiverealists
(Mearsheimer001),themorepowerfulstatesinanunbalanced
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multipolarsystemarelikelytomakeabidforhegemony,and
thisbid,beingexpansionistandachallengetothestatusquo,is
likelytoconstituteoratleastprovokeinterstatewar.
It may be that Japan increasingly views China’s quest for
regional hegemony in Asia with alarm because rising powers
tend to be “revisionist” or inclined to change the status quo
throughterritorialoreconomicexpansionism.isyieldsthe
following Neorealist Hypothesis: Japan’s quest for “normal
country”statusismotivatedbyitsdesiretocreateabalanced
multipolar system in East Asia. We should therefore observe
thatJapan’smilitarybuilduphasbeenatemporalandsubstantiveresponsetoChina’smilitarybuildup,signsofthreatfrom
NorthKorea,andindicationsoftheUnitedStates’sdiminishing
roleastheoﬀshorebalancertoEastAsia’spotentiallyrevisionist
states.Japan’sinterestincreatingabalanceofpowerwithChina
may be heightened by the growing tensions between the two
countries,whichhavefocusedoncompetitionforrawmaterials
andmarkets,andforwhichJapanesetextbooksandothersigns
ofJapan’sperceivedlackofremorsearemerelyalightningrod
forChinesecompetitiveness.Asacorollarytothehypothesis,
we should observe that Japan’s military build up has been in
responsetoincidentsoftensionwithChinaandNorthKorea.
e rising public support in Japan for an active foreign
policy does indeed coincide roughly with these changes in
Japan’sgeopoliticalposition.But,oddlyenough,Japan’sdefense
spendingseemsunrelatedtoeitherone.eldp government
hasheldJapan’smilitaryexpendituressteadyat1%ofgdp before
andaftertheColdWar,andbeforeandafterChina’sdebuton
the international scene as a great power. e government, it
would seem, remains suﬃciently conﬁdent of the US defense
commitmenttoavoidamilitarybuilduponanevenbiggerscale
thatwouldonlyalarmJapan’sneighborsandfuelanexplosive
regionalsecuritydilemma.isfact,ofcourse,servestoendorse
ratherthanrefutetheJapanesegovernment’sneorealistcalcu-
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lations about the costs and beneﬁts of going it alone without
theUnitedStates.Whatneorealismcannotexplain,however,is
whytheJapanesepublichasbecomemoreinterestedinthese
issuesandiswillingtotakeamoreactivepartinforeignpolicy
debates.4 Forthat,wemustabandontheneorealistﬁctionofa
unitaryrationalactorandconsiderthedomesticlevelofanalysis.
Analternative,prominentdomesticexplanationrestsona
conception of the temporality of culture. Postwar paciﬁsm is
passing from the scene along with the generation that most
keenlyfeltthestingofdefeatandmiseryofrebuildingoutofthe
rubbleofwartimedevastation.eyoung,unburdenedbytraumaticwarmemories,havegrownupinanageofprosperityand
seeonlytheanomalyofmilitarymightsheathedinaconstitutionalclausethat“foreverrenounce[s]therighttowagewar.”
e ﬂaw in this argument is that support for an active
foreign policy has been growing across age cohorts in Japan
and,indeed,oldervotersaresomewhatmoreratherthanless
supportiveofanactiveforeignpolicy.
Table 10.4: Public opinion concerning Self-Defense Forces’ capacity
(February 2006)
Age

Increase

Remain
same

20–29

9.8%

62.1%

8.5%

19.6%

235

30–39

15.4%

62.1%

11.1%

11.4%

298

40–49

10.6%

64.7%

13.3%

11.4%

360

50–59

18.5%

62.3%

6.3%

12.9%

459

60–69

17.2%

60.5%

7.7%

14.6%

466

70+

20.5%

59.1%

3.9%

16.6%

308

Allages

16.5%

65.7%

9.4%

8.3%

Total

Shrink

Don’t know

number

2,126

Note: The questionnaire asks, “Should the capacity of the Self-Defense Forces be increased, stay the same, or be reduced?”
Source: Cabinet Oﬃce (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-bouei/2-3.html).
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Electoral Competition and Political Discourse
While there may be elements of truth in both the externalist
and cultural explanations of Japanese nationalism, the “cool
nationalism”wehaveoutlinedpointstoathirdfactor:therules
ofelectoralcompetition,inplacesince14,thatpushpoliticians
to take a stand on issues of national signiﬁcance, whether
foreignordomesticpolicy.Before14,Japan’smulti-member
districtelectoralrulesforcedanypartyseekingtogainormaintain a legislative majority to run multiple candidates in most
districts. Politicians of the majority Liberal Democratic Party
couldnotrunforoﬃceonacommonpartyplatform,forthat
wouldfailtoprovidevoterswithawaytoallocatetheirvotes
acrosstheco-partisans.Instead,thecandidatesranforoﬃceby
appealingtonarrowgroupsofvotersbasedonpersonalfamiliarity and pecuniary favors of various kinds. e result was
corruptpoliticsinwhichpoliticiansoftensoldregulation,tax
breaks,orbudgetsubsidiestothehighestbidderandusedthe
ensuingcampaigncontributionstorunlabor-andmoney-intensiveelectoralcampaigns.enameofthegameforpoliticians
wastobeonthepartycommitteesinchargeofconstruction,
agriculture,commerce,orbudget.Bycontrast,therewaslittle
enthusiasmforforeignpolicyordefense,becauseinvestingin
foreign policy expertise had scant electoral value to Japanese
politicians. To an odd degree for one of the world’s largest
economies,foreignpolicyanddefensedebateswereabsentor
deﬁcientinnationalelectioncampaigns(Nagahisa14).
Japanesepoliticsisnolongerdevoidofforeignpolicydebate
anddiscussion.Since14,electoralcompetitionhasredirected
attentiontodiﬀerencesamongpartiesfromdiﬀerencesamong
candidates of the same party. In the place of the old multimemberdistricts,thenewsystemcombines00single-member
districts with 180 seats allocated to party lists according to
proportional representation. In the single-member districts,
thecandidatewhogainsmoresupportthanthenextcandidate
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winstheseat,placingapremiumoncandidateswhocanpresent
voterswithbroadlyappealingpolicyplatforms.Similarly,parties
winseatsonproportionalrepresentationlistsaccordingtohow
well they convince voters of the merits of their policies for
advancingJapan’ssecurityandwelfare.
Priortoelectoralreform,themostpopularldp committees
onwhichtogetmembershipandleadershipassignmentswere
thoseassociatedwithregulatoryorbudgetaryfavorstodispense
in home districts: agriculture, construction, and commerce.
erewaslittledemandamongldp memberstositonforeign
aﬀairs or defense committees because they came with little
access to electorally vital resources (Inoguchi and Iwai 187).
Nowthatpoliticiansmustwoovoterstoagreaterextentonthe
basisofissues,thesecommitteeswithjurisdictionovernational
policyhavetakenonmoreimportanceforpoliticallyambitious
politicians.Evidenceforthischangeishardtomeasuredirectly
becausecommitteeassignmentsarenolongerrationed.Because
anyoneintheldp canattendanycommittee,wedonothave
records of committee membership. But a look at committee
chairmanships suggests that, unlike prior to electoral reform
whencommitteechairmentendedtobesecond-tierldp leaders,
foreign aﬀairs and defense committees today are chaired by
politicians,suchasShiozakiYoshihisa,whoareconsideredto
beofprimeministerialtimber.
Ideally,wewouldruntwoexperimentstotestourargument.
First,howwouldJapan’s“newnationalism”diﬀerinapost-Cold
Warworldwithoutelectoralreform?Second,wouldtheforeign
policy discourse diﬀer had geopolitics remained relatively
constant while electoral rules changed? Obviously, we cannot
knowtheanswertoeitherquestionforcertain,whichcautions
againstdrawingtightinferencesinacomplexworld.Muchelse
matters, but circumstantial evidence points to a discernible
impactofelectoralrules.
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Conclusions
Japan’s new nationalism, we have argued, is a decidedly “cool
nationalism” that reﬂects the calculations of a newly engaged
citizenryaboutappropriateresponsestoJapan’schanginginternational environment. Japan’s geopolitical circumstances provide grist for domestic debate, but it is the new electoral
environmentathomethatgivespoliticiansanincentivetodraw
voters into this debate. As a result, voters have grown accustomedtothinkingaboutJapan’sforeignpolicychoicesandhave
expressedpreferencesforanopen-eyedandself-consciousbut
clearlydefense-orientedposture.WhatisnovelaboutJapanese
foreignpolicymakingisnottheoutcomes(gettingridofArticle
ix willnotopentheﬂoodgatesofpentupmilitaristlongings).
Opinion polls show no signs of growing national pride or an
edgydiscomfortwiththegeopoliticalstatusquothatcouldspill
over into support for a new round of military adventurism.
Voterpreferencesarechangingatthemargintowardsamore
proactiveroleinforeignpolicyandinfavorofchangingArticle
ix toﬁtwiththerealitiesofJapanesemilitarypowerandroles.
But support for the US-Japan security alliance also remains
strong,and,fornow,thepublicfavorsonlyincrementalincreases
indefensespendingalongthelinesoftheoldformulaofkeeping
theUnitedStateshappy.
Politics is not only about cool calculations; it is of course
possible that Japan’s nationalism could turn hot under some
conditions. Although there are few signs yet of politicians
stoking emotional ﬁres under national identity, it is possible
thatgrowingincomeinequality,forexample,couldtemptpoliticianstoinvokenationalistsymbolismtocurryelectoralfavor.
Inaddition,someworrythatJapan’sirritationwithChina’sand
Korea’s constant harping could grow into full blown fury.
Nationalism in China and Korea, by comparison with that in
Japan,is“hot”inthesensethatittranslatesintohighvaluesof
national pride and is easily mobilized for angry protests and
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denunciations of countries such as Japan. There is some
danger, perhaps, that persistent anti-Japanese rhetoric could
turntheJapanesepublic’scurrent“apologyfatigue”intovirulentxenophobia.
ere are, nevertheless, reasons to doubt the hot nationalism scenario. In the ﬁrst place, Japan’s new electoral rules
pushthetwolargestpartiestotargettheirappealstothemiddle
ofthepoliticalspectrum.Althoughthereisavocalminorityof
right-wingfanaticsinJapanthatwantstorelivetheglorydays
of regional expansion, this voice is ridiculed in mainstream
discourse.Second,mostvotersappreciatethatJapan’sgeopoliticalsituationisextremelyconstraining.Ventingpublicrageat
China’sorKorea’sopportunisticuseofwartimehistorywould
notexpandJapan’ssecurityorlivelihood.Fornow,andforthe
foreseeablefuture,Japaneserecognizethelimitsoftheirroom
formaneuver,butaremovingtogetridofparchmentpledges,
suchasArticleix,thatareoutoflinewiththeexistingrealityof
a massive, but defensive, Japanese military presence in the
world.

Notes
1 eSupremeCourtrulingcameinresponsetoachallengefromthe
historian,IenagaSaburo,againstthegovernment’scensorshipofhis
depiction of Japanese military brutality in the war against China
from 17 to 145. e Court was characteristically diplomatic by
agreeingtotheministry’soversightrolewhileurgingforbearance.
 Ishiyama00.eprincipalauthorofthisnewtextbookisaformer
leftisthistorianwhorejectedJapan’sself-abnegatingviewofhistory
during a sabbatical year in the United States. For more about this
unapologetic textbook, see the publishing company’s web page at
http://www.tsukurukai.com.
 erearenineupperhouseproportionalrepresentation(pr)incumbentswhovisitedtheYasukuniShrineonAugust15inperson.ey
areincumbentsendorsedbytheIzokukai,Shintoists,andSelfDefence
Force aﬃliates. ere is only one pr incumbent who sent a proxy.
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Noneoftheremaining5pr incumbentssenttheirproxyorshowed
upinperson.
4 Forthatmatter,onemightalsoaskwhytheJapanesepublicwasnot
visiblyworriedabouttheSovietthreatduringtheColdWar.InJapanese opinion polls, the Soviet shooting down of a Korean civilian
aircraft in 18 did not translate into a desire for a more active
securitypolicy.
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Japan’s New Executive Leadership:
How Electoral Rules
Make Japanese Security Policy
Margarita Estévez-Abe
Hikotani Takako
Nagahisa Toshio

Japan’spoliticalleadershiphasassumed
anewcharacter.Rankingpoliticiansarebecomingincreasingly
visible,“extroverted”ﬁgures,enamoredofcamerasandsound
bites,andseekingconstantmediaexposure.Althoughformer
PrimeMinisterKoizumiJun’ichirodidnotcreatethistrend,he
certainly perfected it, introducing a practice of twice-daily
appearancesinfrontoftelevisioncameras.Subsequentprime
ministers, Abe Shinzo and Fukuda Yasuo, have inherited this
legacy.Indeed,theJapaneseprimeminister’simagenowappears
everywhere.Atelectiontime,moreldp candidatestodaywant
tohavetheimageofapopularprimeministerintheirelection
posters. Even when there is no election, we see fashionably
dressedprimeministersmodelingingovernment-issuedadvertisementsaboutenergyconservationandthetourismindustry.
More importantly, however, Japanese political leaders are
becoming more assertive and vocal on security and foreign
policyissues.Sincetheendofwwii,Japan’slevelofactivityin
thesphereofinternationalsecuritycommitmentshasbeenquite
low.However,withtheendoftheGulfWarandespeciallythe
period during the Koizumi administration, Japan has substantiallyincreaseditssecuritycommitments.Recentdevelopments
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in Japanese defense policy, including the deployment of Self
DefenseForces(sdf)toIraqin003,wouldnothavehappened
wereitnotfortheleadershipofPrimeMinisterKoizumi.More
politiciansappeartoactivelydebateforeignpolicyinthemedia,
making frequent appeals to, of all things, their foreign policy
expertise.
ereareseveralreasonsforthischange:theendoftheUSSoviet bipolar system; the emergence of external threats,
including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; the decline in the Japanese public’s anti military
sentimentandtheriseofanewtypeof“nationalism,”especially
amongyoungpeople.Allofthesechangesaregoodexplanations
fortherecentupturninJapan’ssecurityeﬀorts.However,they
donotfullyexplainwhyJapanhaschosentoactatthispointin
time, given that Japan has always faced pressure to do more
bothinternationallyanddomestically.
Thischapterarguesthattwodifferentsetsofinstitutional
reformsarecrucialforexplainingtheemergenceofwhatwe
call“extroverted”leadersinJapanandJapan’sincreasedparticipationontheglobalsecurityfront.Thefirstsetofinstitutions
concernselectoralrules;thesecond,legislativerulesthataffect
therelativepoliticalcapacityoftheprimeminister.InJapan,
both institutions have experienced major reforms since the
mid-990s, significantly altering the parameters of politics.
We attribute the recent emergence of increasingly “extroverted”JapanesepoliticalleadersandtheexpansionofJapan’s
globalsecuritycommitmentstothenewinstitutionalcontext
that emerged as a result of these changes, and to the rise of
political leaders who were able to take advantage of these
institutions.1
Obviously,issuesofnationalsecurity,defense,andforeign
aﬀairs have been foremost considerations for Japanese politicianssincetheendoftheColdWarandhaveincreasedsince
theﬁrstGulfWar.Moreover,Japanhasfacedaseriesofexternal
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shocks in recent years that might explain the more assertive
characterofitsdefensepolicies.eseincludethelaunchingof
NorthKoreantestmissiles,theviolationofJapaneseterritorial
watersbyChineseandNorthKoreanvessels,increasedtensions
withNorthKoreaoverabductioncases,andtheterroristattacks
ofSeptemberth.
Sincethe990s,Japanhastakenlegislativeactionstoexpand
the role, functions and geographical scope of its Self Defense
Forces(sdf)anddevelopedaframeworkforsecurityactionsin
a national emergency. Japan is also considering establishing a
newsystemforintelligenceandstrategicplanning.ereasons
forJapan’sexpandedsecuritycommitmentsandassertiveforeign
policyaretwofold:majorinstitutionalchangesandtheriseof
politicalleaderswhowereabletotakeadvantageofthosenew
institutions.Structuralreformshavealsoaﬀectedsecurityand
foreign policy issues have come to be regarded by Japanese
politicians.Forpoliticianswhoaspiretoascendtotheleadership
positionsintheirrespectivepartiesortobecomeprimeminister,
security and foreign policy issues have taken on a distinctly
diﬀerentimportanceinthechangedinstitutionalcontext.
ereformin994oftheoldelectoralsystem—inparticular,
thecreationofsingle-memberdistricts—hasmadeitpossible
forLiberalDemocraticParty(ldp)electoralcandidatestotalk
more openly about their positions on security concerns and
foreignpolicyissues.Undertheoldelectoralrules—mediumsized,multi-memberdistrictscombinedwithasinglenontransferable vote—these issues were totally disjointed from any
electoral eﬀorts. Any engagement with security and foreign
policyissuessimplymeant“wastedeﬀorts”asfaraselectioneering by the ldp politicians was concerned. Security and
foreign policy issues were also secondary concerns for any
ambitious political leader aspiring to become prime minister.
Foralongtime,theracetothethronehadbeendeterminednot
bypolicyexpertise,demonstratedcapacitytoleadthenation,
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or even eﬀective communication skills, but simply by the
dynamicsofintrapartyfactions(habatsu).
enewelectoralsystem,however,haschangedtheincentivesoftherank-and-ﬁle,favoringmoreeﬀective,charismatic
leaderswhocanbetterattractvoters.ischange,inturn,has
madeitworthwhileforprimeministersandthosewhoaspireto
join the ranks to speak of national interests and demonstrate
their“leadership”skills.Mediaexposureandapolitician’simage
asastrongdefenderofJapan’snationalinterestsindealingwith
othercountriesandpotentialforeignthreatshavebecometwin
attractions for the ambitious. e introduction of singlememberdistrictsandproportionalrepresentationintheLower
Housemadeitpossiblefortheldp leadertocontroltheparty
nominationprocessinwaysthatwereimpossibleundertheold
system.Inshort,bytheearly000s,Japan’sleadersfoundthemselvesinaverydiﬀerentinstitutionalcontext.Notonlydidthey
encounter new incentives that favored “extroverted” leaders,
buttheyrealizedthatleaderswhowerewillingtotakeadvantage
oftheirnew,expandedpositionhadnewinstitutionalresources
attheirdisposal.

Politics Under the Old Electoral System
Almost twenty years ago, Kent Calder observed in his classic
bookonJapanesepolitics,Crisis and Compensation,thatJapan’s
oldelectoralsystemwasnotconducivetopoliticians’involvement in security and foreign policy issues.2 His chapter on
foreign policy, appropriately titled “e Residual: Defense,”
discusseshowitwasnotintheinterestofJapanesepoliticians
toinvesttheirtimeandinﬂuenceindefensepolicymatters.e
old electoral system combined medium-sized multi-member
districtswithasinglenon-transferablevote(mmd/sntv).Under
thissystem,avotercouldcastonlyonevoteforonecandidate
in an electoral district where there are plural winners. Votes
once cast for one candidate were not transferable to others,
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evenwhentheformeralreadyhadenoughvotestowin.Fora
politicalparty,gainingmorethanonewinnerfromalmostevery
district was necessary to form an absolute majority of the
House.However,onlytheldp wasinapositiontotakeadvantageofthissystem.Becauseitwasabletoﬁeldmultiplecandidates in almost every district, the party enjoyed suﬃcient
supporttobeabletosendalltheldp candidatestotheDiet.
Undertheoldelectoralrules,morethanoneldp candidate
typicallyranfromthesamedistrict,generatingﬁerceintraparty
competition.Insuchanelectoralcontext,individualldp politicianswerepressedtodistinguishthemselvesfromtheirfellow
ldp candidatesinthesamedistrict.Talkingaboutforeignpolicy
andsecurityissuesatelectiontimesmadelittlesense.Candidates either had to state a position in accordance with their
party’splatform,whichpreventedthemfromemphasizingtheir
diﬀerences,oradheretodiﬀerentforeignandsecuritypolicies
and risk making the party incoherent. For politicians campaigninginammd/sntv system,discussionsofforeignaﬀairs
and security policies added little in the way of advantage to
one’scampaign.
Medium-sized, multi-member districts and the single,
nontransferable vote
Electorallyspeaking,thewinningstrategyunderthemmd/sntv
involvedorganizingloyalpoliticalmachinesbasedonpersonal
networks.Atthelevelofindividualldp candidates,thedevelopmentandmaintenanceofsuchpoliticalmachinesconsisted
ofenactingpoliciesthatfavoredthekeyindustriesandactors
thatmadeupthosepoliticalmachines.Attheleveloftheldp
asawhole,itwasmoredesirablethatindividualldp members
should specialize in “divisible” policy areas to maximize the
overallldp’sseatshare.Suchastrategypermittedmultipleldp
Diet members within the same electoral district to co-exist:
they could either develop their own political machines in
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diﬀerentgeographicalareaswithinthesamedistrict(centered
in their home towns, for example), or specialize in sectoral
policyareas,suchasagriculture,construction,orcommerceto
divide up the conservative constituencies within the same
district.3 In general, however, under this system, legislators
tendedtobecomeindiﬀerenttolarge-scalenationalandglobal
policies, involved as they were in providing “pork-barrel”
programstotheirlocalelectorate.Securityandforeignpolicies,
considered to be more “indivisible” policies, simply did not
generateelectoraladvantageundertheoldelectoralsystem.
e old electoral system also decentralized power within
theldp,weakeningtheroleofthepartypresidentoftheruling
party—theprimeminister—andhiscabinet.eldp,inpractice,waslikeafederationofsmallpartieswiththepresidentas
asymbolofthefederationandthesecretarygeneralasacoordinator among the small parties. e combination of mmd/
sntv meant that party nominations were secondary to individualcandidates.Candidatesneededmorethanapartynomination,becausetheyhadtoseekpersonalvotesunderasntv
system.Often,backingfromafactionleaderwassuﬃcientto
enteranelectoralraceagainstldp incumbents.Factionleaders,
intheirturn,possessedstrongincentivestoexpandthemembershipbaseoftheirfaction intheDietasameansofincreasing
their inﬂuence over the selection of the next party president
(that is, the prime minister). e faction not only aided individualcandidatesinelectoralcampaigns,butalsohelpedthem
infundraisingandtheallocationofpositionswithintheldp
and the cabinet. Habatsu factions functioned essentially as
mini-partieswithintheldp.
Despite their usefulness under the mmd/sntv, factions
came at a price. ey weakened the ldp party leadership and
thus, by extension, the prime minister and his cabinet. e
absenceofapartyleader’scontroloverthepartylabelresulted
inhisinabilitytosanctionrank-and-ﬁlepoliticianswhodisagreed
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with him. Faction leaders directly controlled the rank-and-ﬁle
butnotthepartyleadership.ismeantthatnodecisioncould
bereachedwithouttheirconsent.Factionleaders,inturn,made
sure that their inﬂuence was institutionalized in three ways.
First,theyinstitutionalizedunanimityrulesforthemostimportantpolicydecisionswithintheldp.Second,theyensuredthat
allpostallocationswithinthepartyandtheCabinetwerejointly
determined. ird, they imposed selection rules for the party
president,whichmagniﬁedtheinﬂuenceoffactions.
Itisironicthatfactionleaders,whothemselvesaspiredto
becometheldp partypresidentandprimeminister,triedtheir
best to tie the hands of the party president and the prime
minister by institutionalizing the presence of multiple veto
playerswithintheldp government.Duringthepostwarperiod,
the selection of the ldp president typically took the form of
back-stage negotiations among faction leaders or elections
whose rules favored votes by habatsu factions. ese rules
included restrictive requirements for candidacy and voting
methodswherebyDietmembers’votesbecamethedetermining
factoroftheresult.ldp Dietmemberswererequiredtoenlist
theendorsementsofmorethantwentyDietmemberstosecure
their candidacy for the Party Presidential race. Although the
rules changed from time to time, for most of the postwar
period,theelectionoftheldp partypresidentinvolvedvotes
bylocalldp branchesandDietmembers.Intheactualcounting
of the votes, Diet members’ votes were given heavier weight.
is ensured that faction leaders who controlled the votes of
their members gained a disproportionate power to inﬂuence
theoutcome.
By facilitating the entrenchment of numerous political
factions and interests, the mmd/sntv system allowed small
parties to win seats in the Diet, thus rendering it diﬃcult to
replacetheexistinggovernment.Liketheproportionalrepresentation system, which distributes seats to parties according
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to numbers of votes they gained, the sntv made winners of
candidateswhohadplacedthirdorevenfourthinanelection.
Asaresult,althoughsmallpartieseasilymaintainedtheirseats
intheDiet,itbecamediﬃcultforthemtoincreasetheirshare
ofseats.Ontheotherhand,sincethebiggestpartytendedto
monopolizepower,itseemedthatcollusionbetweenpoliticians,
bureaucrats,andbusinessmentookplacemorefrequently.
eabove-mentionedrulesofthegameshapedtheincentive
structureof“veryambitious”politicalleadersanglingtobecome
prime minister one day. It was not a photogenic face, policy
expertise, or communication skills that recommended one to
becomeaprimeminister;ratheritwasamassingpoliticalcapital
within the conﬁnes of habatsu factions that increased one’s
chance of making it to the top. e complex set of rules for
electing an ldp party president—the prime minister—also
ensured that there was no link between a voter’s choice of a
candidate in her own electoral district and the actual Prime
MinisterelectedbytheDiet.

Electoral Reform and the Electoral Campaign Law
enewelectoralrulesintroducedin994andimplementedin
99changedtheinstitutionalparametersofhowonebecamea
Dietmember,ldp partypresidentand/orprimeminister.Firstof
all,reformseliminatedsntv fromtheLowerHouse,givingway
insteadtoamixedsystemwherebyvotersaregiventwovotes—
oneforthesinglememberdistrict(smd)andtheotherforthe
proportionalrepresentation(pr)district.Ofthe00LowerHouse
Dietmembers,300and00areelectedinthesmd-tierandthe
pr-tier,respectively.e00pr seatsareallocatedtoregional
pr districts (=district magnitude ranging from  to 9). e
LowerHousepr systempermitsvoterstocasttheirvoteonlyfor
aspeciﬁcpartyratherthananindividualcandidate.
Although the Lower House began implementing a mixed
systeminthe99elections,theUpperHousehadalreadybeen
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using a similar system since 93. As a result of the changes
implementedinthatyear,roughlyone-ﬁfthoftheUpperHouse
was elected in smd, with the remaining four-ﬁfths elected in
mmd using two diﬀerent methods: two-ﬁfths of the Upper
Housewereelectedintheoldmmd/sntv districts,whereasthe
remaining two-ﬁfths were elected by the proportional representationrulewithaclosedpartylist.4
e elimination of intraparty competition at the polls—
completelyfromtheLowerHouseandthree-ﬁfthsintheUpper
House—signiﬁcantlyaﬀectedintrapartydynamics.Itremoved
institutional obstacles that had weakened the previous ldp
party leadership vis-à-vis rank-and-ﬁle politicians and, more
importantly,factionleaders.Aftertheintroductionofthenew
mixedsystem,theldp leadershipbegandevelopingbasicrules
aboutcandidatenomination.eldp hasrestrictedthecandidacyofthosewhohavelosttheirsmd seatsfortwoconsecutive
elections.osewholosttheirsmd seatwerenotincludedin
thepr listinthefollowingelectoralcycle.eldp alsointroduced strict age restrictions in the pr-tier. Unlike in the
medium-sized, multi-member districts, where individual ldp
politicians “owned” their home grounds, the party began to
assert its “property right” over smds. Whereas factions could
formerly ﬁeld their own candidates without seeking oﬃcial
partynominations,underthenewsystemtheywereforcedto
competeforthesingleoﬃcialnominationineachdistrict.is
istosay,thepresidenthadtheﬁnalsaywhenitcametochoosing
acandidate.us,theroleofthefactions incandidatenominationdrasticallydeclined.
Moreover, political parties began buckling down, issuing
new types of pledges and “manifestos” that covered many
diﬀerentpolicyﬁelds,includingnationalsecurity.Withmanifestos,voterseﬀectivelygainedastandardofaccountabilityby
whichpartiescouldbejudged,basedonhowwelltheyimplementedstatedpolicies.Sincethe003generalelection,party
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manifestoshavebecomeareliableguideforvoterstochoosea
candidate,althoughofcourse,manifestosarenottheonlycriterionthatdeterminesvotingbehavior.5 Today,electionswithout
manifestosdonotexistonthenationalandthelocallevels,and
hence, the activities of politicians seem more policy oriented
andconsistentwithpartyplatformsthanbefore.6
roughlegislationofthePoliticalPartySubsidiesLaw,the
presidentgainedthepowertoprovidegovernmentsubsidiesto
partymembers.Furthermore,politicaldonationstoindividual
politicianswerestronglyregulatedbythePoliticalFundsControl
Lawin994.WiththerevisionoftheElectoralCampaignLaw,
state subsidies were introduced to be paid to political parties
accordingtothenumberoftheirDietmembers.7 isprovision
strengthenedtheﬁnancialroleofthecentralpartyorganization
vis-à-visitsmembers,attheexpenseofthefactions.Eventually,
thesefactionslosttheirroleasfund-raisinginstitutions.8
Nothing demonstrated the full impact of the institutional
change and the newly strengthened power of the executive
more than what happened in the 00 general elections.
Koizumi Jun’ichiro, the ldp president at the time, refused to
nominateldp incumbentswho,asoﬃcialldp candidates,had
opposed his postal service-privatization policies.9 Instead, he
recruited new faces from the bureaucracy, academia, and the
business community, ﬁelding them as shikaku—assassins—in
theelection.estrategyworked,andmanyofKoizumi’sopponentswereforcedoutoftheldp andfelltotheshikaku.After
theelection,theprimeministerwentaheadwithhisprivatization plans, to be decided in the Diet by newcomers who had
replacedhisoldantagonists.isbolddecisionreﬂectsthenew
institutionalcontextatleastasmuchastheuniquepersonality
ofKoizumiasaleader.10
Althoughtherehavebeendynamicpartyrealignments,an
administrationwithouttheldp hasnotyetappearedafterthe
newelectoralsystemwasputintoplacein99.Furthermore,
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therearestillsixpartiesintheDiet,althoughthenewelectoral
systemwassupposedtocreateatwo-partysystem.However,it
ispossibletosaythattwoparties,themajorityparty(ldp) and
theoppositionDemocraticPartyofJapan(dpj),almostconstituteatwo-partysystembecausetheyoccupy%oftheseats
inbothHouses.Whatismore,thepoweroftheSocialDemocratic Party of Japan (sdpj) and the Japan Communist Party
(jcp)intheDiethassharplydecreased.isimpliesthattheir
powertoopposeanypossibleincreaseinsecuritycommitments
has also declined. Although some former sdpj members who
later joined the dpj hold considerable policymaking power
within the party, they promised in the process of forming a
jointparliamentarygroupin99tofollowpoliciesproduced
by the mainstream dpj members when it came to security
issues.11 ispointsuggeststhat,onthesecurityfront,theldp
anddpj donothavesigniﬁcantideologicaldisparities.
Politicalreformhasmadelegislatorsmorepolicyoriented,
strengtheningthepowerofthepartypresidentandweakening
the resistance of leftist parties toward security enhancement.
esefactorshavecombinedtogivetheprimeministeramore
favorable environment in which to expand security commitmentsifhedeemsitnecessary.

New Incentives for Rank-and-File and Ambitious Politicians
Sincethe99elections,themajorityofpoliticianshaverunas
the single oﬃcial party in smd or purely on the party ticket.
(e Upper House changed its rules in 003 to reintroduce
sntv inthe0-member-seat,nationwidedistrict.)reeimportantchangesoccurredasaresult.One,rank-and-ﬁlepoliticians
developed a strong preference for a popular policy platform
andpartypresident.echangeintheincentivesoftherankand-ﬁleeventuallyledtochangesinthemethodstoelectthe
ldp partypresident.Two,thenewsmd andtheclosedpartylist
pr removedoldconstraintsonindividualpoliticians,makingit
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electorallyviabletospecializeinnondivisiblepolicyissues,such
assecurity,defenseandforeignpolicy.ree,thenewrulesalso
aﬀectedthemostambitiouswithintheparty.enewinstitutional context has also changed the calculations of ldp Diet
members who are aspiring to become party president (i.e.,
primeminister).
e new preference for “popular” party leaders
enewelectoralsystemhasincreasedtheelectoralimportance
ofthepartyleader.Nowvoterscasttheirvotenotonlyforone
of multiple ldp district candidates on the basis of personal
connections,butalsoforaspeciﬁcparty(asintheclosedparty
listpr-tier)orforasinglepartycandidate(inthesmd-tier).In
the closed party list pr-tier, voters have only cues from the
partyleader’sstatementsandanyformalorinformalpartyplatform that a speciﬁc party puts out. In the smd-tier, even a
popular,well-knownindividualcandidatehastorunasanoﬃcial party candidate if she is to be eﬀective at all as a Diet
member.Forlesswell-knowncandidates,thereputationoftheir
party becomes a crucial factor in determining their electoral
chances.Apopularpolicyplatformandapopularleader’sface
thusbecomeimportantassetsatthepolls.Inmanyways,casting
avoteforaspeciﬁcpartyinthepr-tierandcastingavotefora
particularcandidateinthesmd-tiermeansvotingfortherespectivepartyleadertobecomeprimeminister.
Rank-and-ﬁlepoliticians,fortotallyselﬁshreasons,developedanincentivetochooseapopularpartyleadercapableof
becoming both a good prime minister and appealing to the
electorate. e increased importance of the party president
with regard to the electoral fortunes of the rank-and-ﬁle also
broughtaboutafurtherweakeningofthefactionsasamechanismtoselectpartyleaders.In99,fortheﬁrstldp presidential
election that took place after the 994 electoral reform, the
rank-and-ﬁle strongly opposed the usual behind-the-scenes
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negotiationsamongfactionleaderstoselectanewpartypresident.Electionswerethuscalled,andcandidatessuchasKoizumi
Jun’ichiro ran without faction backing. e factions’ role
declinedmorevisiblywhenKajiyamaSeirokulefttheObuchi
factioninthe99roundofthepartyleaderselectiontorunfor
partypresidentagainsthisformerfactionleader,ObuchiKeizo.12
atKajiyamagatheredmorethanonehundredvotesfromhis
fellowldp Dietmemberssuggeststhatsomemembersignored
theinstructionsoftheirfactionleadersandvotedforKajiyama
instead. In the process of selecting a party president, policy
debates also surged in importance. Again, this is consistent
withthefactthattherank-and-ﬁleneedeitherapopularleader
or a popular policy platform to advance their own electoral
chances.Figure.showsthatpublicdebatesamongcandidates
fortheldp partypresidencybecameanewnormafter99.

Figure 11.1 Media coverage of LDP presidential race

Overall TV
Coverage
Televised Debates

1993

1995

1998

2001

2003

Note: The black bar represents the number of times debates among candidates for
the LDP presidential race were televised. The gray bar represents the overall TV coverage of the presidential race, as listed in TV Guide. Only those years in which the
LDP held elections to select their leader are included.
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e removal of disincentives for cultivating security-related
policy expertise
Policyareassuchasdefense,securityandforeignpoliciesused
to be very unpopular among ldp Diet members. is was
becausepoliciesthataddressedthecollectivegoodofthewhole
nation were “nondivisible” and so gave zero electoral returns
under the mmd/sntv mechanism, which required constant
oilingofone’spersonalpoliticalmachinebydistributing“pork.”
Undertheoldelectoralrules,anytimeandeﬀortspentcultivating expertise in these areas was seen as time wasted. e
994ElectoralReformremovedthedisincentivesforeﬀortsto
cultivateexpertiseinnondivisibleissueareas.AftertheLower
Houseelectionsin99,Japanesepoliticians,asarule,became
freertopursuetheirinterestsintheissuesofsecurity,foreign
policy,anddefense.Inotherwords,Japanesepoliticianstoday
facefewerpenaltiesagainstengaginginpolicydebatesinthese
areas.eupgradingofministerialpositionsrelatedtodefense/
security and foreign policies that have taken place since the

Table 11.1: Comparison of experience of the posts related to the policy of
which minister takes charge
Japan
Defense
Agency

Ministry of
Foreign
Ministry of
Affairs
Finance

Ministry of
Economy,
Trade, and
Industry

9–99

30.0%

36.4%

60.0%

33.3%

Post-electoralreform,
99–999

33.3%

66.7%

66.7%

66.7%

Post-abolishingof
GovernmentCommissionerSystem,000–

75.0%

60.0%

75.0%

20.0%

Source: Kokkai Binran.
Note: The ﬁrst period is from the Suzuki Zenko cabinet to the ﬁrst Hashimoto
Ryutaro cabinet. The second period is from the second Hashimoto Ryutaro cabinet
to the ﬁrst Obuchi Keizo cabinet. The third period is from the ﬁrst Obuchi Keizo
cabinet (reshuﬄed) to the Abe Shinzo cabinet.
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institutional reforms also support the view presented here
(Table .andTable.).
Furthermore,thedemiseofthefactionsandnewpolitical
reforms that strengthened the position of politicians vis-à-vis
the bureaucracy also increased the political value of gaining
policyexpertise.Recallthatundertheoldmmd/sntv system,
electoral needs necessitated the presence of factions. As was
previously argued, with the main institutional infrastructure
eliminatedasaresultofthe994reforms,factionscontinuedto
weaken.ismeantthatfactionsalsobegantolosecontrolover
the allocation of positions within the ldp and the cabinet.
Under the faction-based allocation of positions, one’s policy
expertise mattered very little. As the political fortunes of the
factionswaned,otherimportantpoliticalreformswereimplementedthatfurtherweakenedfaction-basedpolitics.Putsimply,
these reforms increased possible political return on policy
expertiseandweregenerallyaimedatconcentratingpowerin
thehandsofelectedoﬃcialsratherthanbureaucrats.

Table 11.2: Four indicators of the Japan Defense Agency ministers
in four periods
Number
of terms
elected

Experience Experience
of
of
minister
Sanyaku

Defenserelated
posts

9–99

6.05

20.0%

0.0%

30.0%

Post-electoralreform,
99–999

5.33

33.3%

0.0%

33.3%

Post-abolishingof
GovernmentCommissionerSystem,000–

6.38

37.5%

25.0%

75.0%

Source: Kokkai Binran.
Note: The ﬁrst period is from the Suzuki Zenko’s cabinet to the ﬁrst Hashimoto
Ryutaro’s cabinet. The second period is from the second Hashimoto Ryutaro’s
cabinet to the ﬁrst Obuchi Keizo’s cabinet. The third period is from the ﬁrst Obuchi
Keizo’s cabinet (reshuﬄed) to the Abe Shinzo’s cabinet.

 MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio

As part of these reforms, the government commissioner
(seifu-iin) system was abolished, whereby bureaucrats were
appointedasspecialcommissionerstotakepartinDietsessions
to answer questions in lieu of their ministers. Instead, the
cabinetwassigniﬁcantlyexpandedtoappointmoreDietmembersasjuniorministers.enewemphasisontheimportance
ofpolicyexpertisewashighlycompatiblewiththeremovalof
disincentives for policy specialization. Furthermore, in the
context of a new power struggle between faction leaders and
thepartypresident,thelatter,inhiscapacityasprimeminister,
begantousepolicyexpertiseasarequirementforappointing
hiscabinetministersandadvisors—anewlycreatedpositionin
thewakeofpoliticalreformsinthelate990s.
New incentives for the ambitious
echangesdiscussedsofarhavealsoaﬀectedthemostambitiousoftheDietmembers—thepartyleaderorprimeminister
and those next in line. e new demands from rank-and-ﬁle
politiciansforapopularleaderchangedthetermsofcompetitionfortheprimeministership.Asuccessfulcontenderhadto
clearthehurdleofaseriesofpublic,televiseddebatesinwhich
fellowpartymembersattemptedtoevaluatehowhemightfare
inthepubliceye.Anew,aspiringleaderthushadtobeaphotogenic,skilledcommunicator.Onceelectedpartypresidentand
primeminister,hehadtomaintainhispopularitytosecurehis
ownreelectionasprimeministerand,moreimmediately,help
his party win the election. Figure . illustrates how prime
ministers have become increasingly exposed to the media,
providing evidence to the claim put forth here that the new
institutional context is making Japanese leaders more extroverted.
eneedtoattractmediaattentionintermsofleadership
styleandpolicycontenthasmadecertainsecurityandforeign
policyissuesahighlydesirabletoolforcandidatestodemon-
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Figure 11.2 Media exposure of prime ministers
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Source: Ikuo Kabashima Seminar’s data on the number of times Prime Minister and
his cabinet was listed in the program guide for the four major news shows. The
ﬁgure was provided to Estévez-Abe by Taku Sugawara, and is based on the data collected by students in Ikuo Kabashima’s seminar.
Note: Tokudane, Za Waido, NewsStation (Ni) and News23 are all names of TV news
programs. The ﬁgure was provided to Estévez-Abe by Taku Sugawara, and is based
on the data collected by students in Ikuo Kabashima's seminar.

stratetheirleadershipqualities.Itisimportanttonoteherethat
the top-down nature of certain policy issue areas has made
them attractive policy areas for the leader to fall back on.
FormerPrimeMinistersKoizumiJun’ichiro’sandAbeShinzo’s
attentiontotheissueofthekidnappingofJapanesenationalsby
North Korean authorities in the 90s and 90s provides a
goodexampleofthisnewextroversioninresponsetointernational demands. In this context, the greater concentration of
powerintheprimeministerandhiscabinet—theresultsofthe
politicalreformsinthelate-990s—meansthatpoliticalleaders
notonlyhaveanewincentivetobeextrovertedinsecurityand
foreignpolicyissues,butalsoagreatercapacityforexercising
leadership.
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Institutional Resources
and the Prime Minister’s New Capabilities
JohnCampbelloncecalledJapanesedefensepolicy“thepolitics
of indecision.”13 e 99 Gulf War was one example of this
indecisiveness,whenJapan’sﬁnancialcontributionstotheAllied
forces (in excess of $ billion) were criticized as being “too
little,toolate.”Alackofprimeministerialleadership,theinattentionofrank-and-ﬁlepoliticians,andbureaucraticturfbattles
were cited as primary reasons for the Japanese government’s
failuretorespondtothecrisis.
Japan’sresponseafterthe9/attackscameinstarkcontrast
to the case of the Gulf War. Within a week, Prime Minister
KoizumiannouncedtheSevenBasicMeasuresoftheJapanese
government, which included sending the Self Defense Forces
(sdf) to Afghanistan in support of US and coalition forces.
Withintwomonths,theAnti-TerrorismSpecialMeasuresLaw
passedtheDiet,enablingtheSevenBasicMeasurestobeimplemented.Soonafterthelegislation,Japandispatchedsdf vessels
to the Indian Ocean and began supporting the United States
andotherforcesinfuelingandinradiodetectionandranging.
Althoughthelawwasenactedastemporarylegislationwitha
two-yeartermlimit,theDietextendedthetermfortwomore
yearsin003,anotheryearin00,andagainin00.
Whydidsuchamajorchangeinpolicyoccur?NewincentivesforJapanesepoliticianstobemore“extroverted,”together
withtheirenhancedcapabilitiestoexerciseleadership,arethe
keyfactorsthatbroughtaboutthischange.epoliticalreforms
inthelate990sconcentratedpowerintheprimeministerand
cabinetandbroughtaboutchangesinthelegislativeprocess.
Enhanced statutory authority of the cabinet and its secretariat
AlthoughtheJapanesegovernmenthadundergonecontinuous
small administrative reforms since the 90s to enhance the
powerofthecabinetandtheprimeminister,itwasHashimoto
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Ryutarowho,asprimeminister,plannedadramaticreformand
implementeditin99astheministerforadministrativereform.
epurposeofthereform,clearlyarticulatedintheﬁnalreport
fromtheAdministrativeReformConference,wastoestablish
an administrative system better able to make comprehensive,
strategicandagiledecisions,primarilybycreatingamechanism
toenhancetheleadershipoftheprimeminister.14
erevisionsoftheCabinetLawin000furtherstrengthenedtheinstitutionalauthorityoftheprimeministerandthe
cabinet secretary, giving them the “right to propose (hatsugi
ken)”importantbasicpoliciesatcabinetmeetings15 andto“plan
and draft plans (kikaku ritsuan).16” ese changes gave the
cabinet secretariat legal authority to initiate policy independentlyfromministriesandtopresideoverthepolicy-makingand
coordinationprocess.
Since then, more than ten pieces of legislation have been
initiatedandadministeredbythecabinetsecretariat,including
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of 00.17 Before
000,onlytwolawswereadministered(shokan)bythecabinet
secretariat—the Cabinet Law, and the Law on the Security
Council of Japan. From the point of view of the individual
ministries, giving up the authority to “initiate” laws is not a
smallmatter:the“initiation”oflawsmeansthattheministryin
chargewillwritethedraftofthebillitself,whicheventuallywill
deﬁnethelaw’sbureaucraticscope.atministerswouldgenerallyprefertokeepmattersrelatedtowhattheyseeastheirown
“turf”intheirownhandsisunderstandable.Sowastheirstrong
resistancetothischangeduringthedeliberationofHashimoto’s
administrativereform.18
eimportanceofthechange,ontheotherhand,extended
notjusttotheministries,buttopoliticiansaswell.Givingthe
cabinetsecretariattheauthoritytoadministerlawsmeantthat
oldlegislativeprocessescouldbechanged.Traditionally,when
the government initiated a bill, the relevant ministry would
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negotiatewiththerulingpartypriortocabinetapproval.is
meantthatdiﬀerentzoku politicianshadachancetoinﬂuence
thecontentofthebillbeforeitwasintroducedtotheDiet.19
Incontrast,underthenewrules,theprimeminister’sleadership in the legislative process is enhanced, whereas the old
zoku inﬂuence is diminished. e cabinet secretariat, with its
new statutory authority and with the blessing of the prime
minister,could()gaininformalcabinetapprovalbeforenegotiationwiththeparty,()dealwithmultiplezoku atonceand
diminish one zoku’s leverage, and (3) prior to introduction of
thebilltotheDietandevenpriortonegotiationwiththeldp,
negotiate with coalition partners and opposition parties as a
representativeofthecabinetandtheprimeminister.Although
notallbillswouldbeorshouldbeintroducedinthisfashion,
thattheprimeministerhasgainedalegislativecapacity,tobe
usedathisdiscretion,isofgreatsigniﬁcance.
Enhanced organizational capacity of the cabinet secretariat
Strengthenedstatutoryauthoritydoesnotguaranteeenhanced
cabinetleadershipunlessthosewhosupportthecabinet,politicians, and bureaucrats, have the capacity to fulﬁll their role.
Initiatingandadministratingalawisnotaneasytask,sinceit
requiresenoughexpertisetodraftabillandtobeabletodeal
withtheDietdeliberations.eincreasedattentiontothepositions of Chief Cabinet Secretary (kanbo chokan) and Deputy
ChiefCabinetSecretary(kanbo fukuchokan, seimu)isanadmissionofthefact.Whenthecabinetsecretariatadministersalaw,
theChiefCabinetSecretarymustrespondtoquestionsatthe
Diet.Inaddition,hemustalsoserveasthecabinetspokesperson,
givingpressconferencestwiceaday.Areﬂectionofhisincreased
importance,theChiefCabinetSecretaryisnowoﬃciallylisted
abovetheﬁveremainingcabinetmembersinorderofsuccession
to the prime minister and has, in eﬀect, become the deputy
primeminister.20
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eroleoftheadministrativeDeputyChiefCabinetSecretary (kanbo fukuchokan, jimu) has increased alongside the
expanded role of the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Administrative
DeputyChiefCabinetSecretariesareusuallyselectedfromthe
MinistryofHomeAﬀairsandhaveamuchlongertenurethan
primeministers.erefore,theirinstitutionalmemoryhasbeen
crucialtoprimeministers,especiallyatthebeginningoftheir
administration.
However,itisobviousthatthesethreepeoplecannotdothe
jobofsupportingtheprimeministerbythemselves,especially
giventheenhancedstatutoryauthorityofthecabinetsecretariat.
estaﬀmembersworkingforthecabinetsecretariat,mostly
bureaucrats seconded from ministries, were generally consideredtobeﬁghtingontheirhomeministry’sbureaucraticturfin
thesecretariat,andsuchorganizationalarrangementswerenot
conducivetoovercomingtheturfbattlestoworkfortheprime
ministerandhiscabinet.Anumberofmeasuresweretakento
overcomethisproblem.
eﬁrstwastheestablishmentofacabinetoﬃcetosupport
thecabinetsecretariatinmakingplansandarrangementstointegratethepoliciesofeachministryaswellasthepoliciesofnew
councilswithinthecabinetoﬃce,suchastheCouncilonEconomic
andFiscalPolicy.Furthermore,anumberofnewpoliticallyappointedpositionswereintroduced.Withanexecutiveorder,the
primeministercouldnowappointmanypersonalassistantstothe
prime minister.21 In addition, the prime minister could now
appointuptoﬁvespecialadvisorsinsteadofthree.eappointment of Okamoto Yukio, a former Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs
(mofa)oﬃcial,tobeinchargeofIraqreconstructionduringthe
Koizumi administration is one example. Even more signiﬁcant,
perhaps,isthatthethreenewpositionsofassistantchiefcabinet
secretarieshavebecomepoliticallyappointedpositions.
e second measure to assist the prime minister was a
drasticorganizationalreshuﬄing.ethreeoﬃcesofInternal
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Aﬀairs (headed by a Ministry of Finance oﬃcial), External
Aﬀairs (Foreign Aﬀairs), and National Security Aﬀairs (Japan
DefenseAgency)wereabolishedandreplacedbythreeAssistant
ChiefCabinetSecretary(naikaku kanbo fukuchokan ho)positions, under whom would work about 00 staﬀers. Although
somedivisionoflaboramongthethreedoesstillexist,andonly
formerbureaucratshavebeenappointedastheAssistantChief
CabinetSecretaries,ithasbeenarguedthatthefactthatthey
can be politically hired and ﬁred has heightened the sense of
loyaltytotheprimeminister.Furthermore,adhocpolicygroups
were established for issues involving more than one ministry.
esegroupsareformedanddissolvedasnecessary,andtheir
legalstandingsvarybylaws,governmentorders,orwithoutany
legal basis. For example, in the case of Iraq policy, the “SupportingIraqiReconstruction”roomwasestablished.eestablishmentoftheadhocgroupcontributedtotheincreasedsize
ofthesecretariat,whichiscurrentlyapproximately00.
ird, the Security Council of Japan, long considered an
ineﬀective,rubber-stampinginstitution,gainedanewlife.Established in 9 as the Defense Council, the Security Council’s
role, as written, was “when asked by the Prime Minister, to
deliberateonimportantmattersrelatedtothesecurityofJapan
andtorespond(presentaplan)tothePrimeMinister,”aswell
asto“voluntarilyoﬀeradvicetothePrimeMinisteronmatters
relatedtonationaldefense.”In9,theroleof“respondingto
national emergencies” was added to its job description, when
PrimeMinisterNakasoneYasuhirotriedtorevampthemoribundinstitution,renamingittheSecurityCouncil.
e Security Council, however, did little of that. Defense
Council (later Security Council) meetings were not held at
times when important security policy decisions were made,
such as the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, or in
criticalemergencysituations,suchasthedefectionofaSoviet
ﬁghterpilottoHokkaidoin9.Instead,theywereheldtwoor
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three times per year, primarily to discuss matters concerning
thedefensebudget.Furthermore,duetoitsinstitutionallegacy
of having been established to restrain the power of Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru and the pre-war military, it was
considered not a means to enhance the power of the prime
ministerortoutilizetheSelfDefenseForcesbutinsteadtokeep
awatchfuleyeoverthetwo.
e00centralgovernmentreformopenednewpossibilitiesfortheSecurityCouncil.estatutoryauthorityandorganizational capacity of the cabinet secretariat, which had long
been in charge of administrating Security Council meetings,
wasenhanced.Moreimportantly,PrimeMinisterKoizumiand
hisstaﬀbegantoconsidertheSecurityCouncilanimportant
mechanismnotonlyforbuildingconsensusamongitsmembers
but for creating momentum for the government to come up
withaconcreteplanandannounceitsintentionstothepublic.
Furthermore,althoughrelativelyunnoticed,theLawonthe
SecurityCouncilofJapanwasrevisedalongsidethepassingof
theEmergencyLawin003.Ithasnowbeenwrittenintolaw
that the Security Council is in charge of identifying an emergency situation and coming up with basic guidelines (taisho
kihon hoshin)todealwiththesituation.Toeﬀectivelyfulﬁllthis
role,theContingencyResponseCommittee(jitai taisho senmon
iinkai),22 acommitteeconsistingofbureau-chiefleveloﬃcials
ofrelevantministriesandtheJointChiefofStaﬀofthesdf,was
established.Although(fortunately)thiscommitteehasnotyet
convenedinanemergencysituation,committeemembershave
metonaregularbasis(onceamonth).Memberssaythatthe
meetings have been successful and contribute to interagency
coordination.23
Insum,thecapacityoftheprimeminister,thecabinet,and
thecabinetsecretariathasbeenstrengthened,bothintermsof
institutional (statutory) authority and organizational capacity.
ishasmadepossiblemajorchangesinthelegislativeprocess.
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ecabinetsecretariatisnowinchargefromthebeginningto
the end, giving the prime minister more capacity to exercise
top-downleadership.
Japan’s ideal circumstances for reform
It is important to point out that although these institutional
changes would not have happened without the desire of the
politicalleaderstobecomemore“extroverted,”Japanwasina
particularlygoodpositiontoachievereform.First,theﬁnancial
crunchfacedbythegovernmentaftertheburstoftheeconomic
bubble was great enough to drive the public, the politicians,
andthebureaucratstobelievethatJapanneededto“trimthe
fat”fromthegovernmentandreorganizeittobemoreeﬃcient
and productive. Although there were many methods recommended,almostallpoliticalparties,themedia,andpolicythink
tanksbelievedadministrativereformwasanecessity.
Second, Hashimoto Ryutaro, who became prime minister
in99,waswell-versedinpolicymatters,especiallyinadministrative reform, since he had ﬁnished privatization of the
nationalrailwaysin9astheMinisterofTransport.Hashimoto once stated that he would achieve the administrative
reformevenifhewere“coveredwithﬂames.”
On the other hand, it is unclear whether he was able to
takeadvantageoftheenhancedpoweroftheprimeministership and presidency provided by the administrative and the
electoralreforms.Hefacedseriousstruggleswithldp members
whose vested interests would be damaged by the reforms.
ese struggles were often reported through the media, but
the public could not see how they would be settled as the
reformsprogressed.
atHashimotopreservedtheinstitutionoffaction-based
appointmentsinorganizinghiscabinetimpliesthathisleadershipwasundertheinﬂuenceoffactions.Hemighthavemuddled
throughbyadoptingandbalancingdemandsfromthefactions
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whosoughttomaintaintheirvestedinterests.Itisalsoconceivablethatalthoughfactionsweresuperﬁciallysupportiveofthe
reforms in public where no one would dare to oppose them,
they resisted the leader when the reforms brought them substantialdetriments.Atanyrate,Hashimotosuccessfullylaidall
thegroundworkforthereform.However,becauseheleftoﬃce
after a loss in the Upper House election in 99, he did not
enjoythebeneﬁtsofthenewsystemcreatedthroughthereforms
hehadlaboredtoinstall.24
But these institutional changes will not matter if political
leadersdonotutilizethenewcapacitynowattheirdisposal.In
thenextsection,wewillexaminehowextrovertedleadersactuallyutilizedthenewsetofinstitutionsintheDietandexpanded
Japan’ssecuritycommitments.

Extroverted Leaders:
Administrative Change and Increased Security Commitments
e power of the ldp president and the prime minister was
enhancedbyelectoralandadministrativereforms.eseinstitutionalchangesalone,however,donotguaranteestrongleadership.Aninstitutionisnomorethanatool.Howwellorpoorly
itisuseddependsontheintentionandcapabilityoftheuser.
It is hard to tell whether Obuchi Keizo, who succeeded
Hashimoto, and Mori Yoshiro, who succeeded Obuchi, masteredthenewsystems,becausetheirtermsinoﬃceweresimply
tooshort.Incontrast,itwouldbehardtodenythatKoizumi
Jun’ichiromadeskillfuluseofthenewsystemsinadvancinghis
reformsandimplementinghispledges.25
KoizumiwasamemberofMori’sfaction.Asacandidate,
Koizumi always maintained a relatively independent position,
earning a reputation for being ruthless—a “henjin” or strange
fellow—withintheldp.Heranunsuccessfullyforldp president
twicebeforeﬁnallywinningin00.Inhislosses,hehadthe
smallestnumberofvotesamongthecandidatesbecausehedid
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not or could not depend on the power of the factions. He
becamepresidentbecausehetookadvantageofthenewelectoralsystemforldp president.26
In00,afterthechangeinelectoralrulesforthepresidency,
ldp chapters, except those in Hiroshima and Yamaguchi,
decidedthattoselecttheirtopleaderbehindcloseddoors—as
theyhaddoneintheselectionofMoriYoshiro—woulddamage
theldp’spopularity.eyagreedtoconductvoluntarypreliminaryelectionsintheirprefecturesandaccordinglygainedthree
ballotseachinthemainelection,whereeveryDietmemberhas
one ballot. Whereas other candidates placed less signiﬁcance
onthepreliminaryelections,Koizumiseizedthemasanopportunitytoinitiateremarkablecampaignsaimedatthepublicas
wellasldp members.HechoseasanassistantTanakaMakiko,
who enjoyed almost as much popularity among the public as
Koizumi himself.27 He ﬁnally won ﬁrst place in 43 out of 4
prefectures in the preliminary elections and became the ldp
presidentwithtwiceasmanyballotsasHashimoto,whocame
insecondinthemainelection.
AfterKoizumitookoﬃce,hemadeskillfuluseofthesystem
Hashimoto and his successors had created. He ﬁrst took the
unprecedentedstepoforganizinghiscabinetwithnoconsiderationoffactionaldemands.eappointmentofTakenakaHeizo
totheCouncilonEconomicandFiscalPolicyisanevenmore
dramaticexampleofKoizumi’sleadership.Asaspecialminister,
Takenakaeﬀectivelyplayedmanagerwithdirectionsfromthe
chairofthecouncil,Koizumihimself.ecouncilestablisheda
basicpolicyfor,andtooktheinitiativeofcompiling,thebudget,
ataskthathadlongbeenpartofthedutiesoftheMinistryof
Finance.Furthermore,thecouncilplayedacontrollingrolein
majorpolicies,suchasﬁnancialsystemreform,promotionof
administrative decentralization, regulatory reform, reform of
thetaxationsystem,privatizationofthepostalsystem,economic
growthstrategies,andsoon.
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Decisionsinthecouncilwereoftenmadewithouttheagreementoftherulingparties,includingtheldp,andevenwithout
discussionwiththeparties.Koizumi,inshort,hadestablisheda
top-down decision-making style.28 Although he often faced
resistancefromtheldp aswellasfromoppositionparties,he
overcame it with his authorized power and strong public
support.29 ldp Dietmemberswereafraidthatstrongresistance
toKoizumiwouldpotentiallykeepthemoﬀthelistofoﬃcial
nominees and lead to the erosion of their public support. In
fact, this did happen in 00 after privatization of the postal
systemwasvoteddownbylegislatorsintheUpperHouse.30
Koizumialsotookstronginitiativesintermsofforeignand
securitypolicy,althoughnothingtooconspicuous.einitiative
hetookindiplomacywithNorthKoreawaswellreceived.e
processofgettingbacktheabductionvictimsfromNorthKorea,
which included Koizumi visiting Pyongyang on two separate
occasions,waslednotbytheForeignMinistrybut,infact,by
thecabinetsecretariat.31 IntheprocessoflegislatingtheSpecial
Anti-Terrorism Law, Koizumi gained the consent of the ldp
without a party review and before submitting the bill, which
hadbeenpreparedbyaspecialteamwithinthecabinetsecretariat.32 Furthermore,whenJapandispatchedthesdf toIraq,
KoizumidecidedunilaterallytosupporttheUnitedStatesand
organizedaspecialtaskforcetoprepareabillwithoutpreliminary explanation to the ruling parties.33 All of these actions
were considered departures from the traditional bottom-up
andconsensusstyleofpolicyformation.
AlthoughitwasrealizedduringtheAbeadministration,the
upgradeoftheDefenseAgencytotheMinistryofDefensehad
longbeenapendingissueandwaslargelyimplementedunder
Koizumi. Within the Minister of Defense’s new, expanded
responsibilities were the right to call cabinet meetings, make
budget requests to the Ministry of Finance, and even enact
ministryordinancesunderhis/herownname.
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Moreover, it was under Koizumi that the possibilities of
establishing a National Security Council of Japan (tentatively
jnsc)modeledafterthatoftheUnitedStates,andofdeveloping
high quality intelligence services, began to be discussed. Although they have not yet been realized, the government, the
ldp,andeventhedpj arecurrentlydevelopingstudiesonthese
issues.34 If the jnsc and intelligence community were established, the power of the prime minister would be further
enhanced,althoughagain,theperformanceofthesystemwould
dependontheexecutive’sabilitytoutilizethem.35
Itisnoteworthy,atanyrate,thatmostdistinctshiftsinthe
security policies of Japan were achieved under Koizumi’s
administration, from 00 to 00. is might be simply
becausehistermwaslongerthanthoseofhispredecessorsor
because a cluster of external demands occurred during the
period.However,itisalsoplausiblethathisinitiative,powered
by the institutional changes, made quick decision-making
possible and helped resolve pending issues. His performance
mayalsohaveinspiredpolicymakersandbureaucratsengaging
insecurityissues,whohadbeenwearyofthecomplicatedand
slow-moving decision-making process. Koizumi actually utilizedthenewsetofinstitutionstorespondtotheattackson
September,00.

Antiterrorism Legislation after 9/11: A Case Study
eJapanesegovernmentrespondedtotheattacksonSeptemberinwaysunthinkableinthepastintermsofspeed,content,
performance, and, most importantly, in terms of who “took
charge.” e top-down legislative procedure instituted by
Koizumi was almost the reverse of the traditional legislative
procedure.eprocessmaybeexaminedintwostages:immediateresponseandpre-Dietnegotiation,andDietsessionand
policyimplementation.36
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Stage I: Immediate response and pre-Diet negotiation
ree aspects are worth noting in the initial stage of policy
making:
• ecabinetsecretariat(FurukawaStudyGroupandstaﬀ ),
ratherthanindividualministries,draftedtheinitialresponse
plan.
• e Security Council was eﬀectively used by the prime
ministertospeedupthelegislativeprocedure.
• e inﬂuence of ldp politicians was intentionally minimized.
First,thestaﬀofthecabinetsecretariatrespondedswiftly
and eﬀectively immediately after news of the attack came in.
is response was facilitated by the newly enhanced organizationalcapabilities.FurukawaTeijiro,theDeputyChiefCabinet
Secretary (administrative), initiated what was later called the
Furukawa Study Group, bringing together two bureau chiefs
from mofa, the administrative vice minister of the Defense
AgencyandtheDefensePolicyBureauchief,theviceminister
oftheCabinetLegislativeOﬃce(clo),andthetwoAssistant
ChiefCabinetSecretaries(onefrommofa,onefromtheJapan
Defense Agency [jda]). e inclusion of the clo oﬃcial was
especiallycrucialbecauseitpreventedtheclo fromintervening
inlaterstagesandcreatingapoliticalnightmare.37 isgroup
wasespeciallyinstrumentalindraftingthesix-pointresponse
plan(September)andthesevenmeasures(September9).
Second,ontheeveningofSeptember,ShinzoAbe,then
DeputyChiefCabinetSecretary,proposedtoholdanemergency
SecurityCouncilmeeting.Asurprisetomany,itwastheﬁrst
timethattheSecurityCouncilhadconvenedinthecaseofan
international emergency situation. According to author interviewswithoneoftheAssistantChiefCabinetSecretaries,Abe
hadbeeneagertorevamptheSecurityCouncilevenbeforethe
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9/attacks.AnotheroﬃcialmentionedthatKoizumiwasalso
thinkingaboututilizingtheSecurityCouncil,especiallyinlieu
ofafullcabinetmeeting,tospeedupdecisionmaking.Healso
suggested that this process—convening the Security Council
immediately after a crisis, drafting guidelines for a response,
seeking full cabinet approval of government measures, establishingofresponseheadquartersinthecabinetsecretariat,and
coordinatingimplementationpoliciesbyheadquarters—should
becomethede-factoresponsescenarioforlatercontingencies.
ird,ldp politicianswereintentionallyexcludedfromthe
initialresponseprocess.Infact,thecabinetsecretariatstaﬀhad
explainedthegovernment’splanstothetwocoalitionpartners
andtheoppositionbeforeeventuallypresentingtheplantothe
Bukai within the ldp. In addition, because everyone agreed
that speed was important, a joint council meeting (including
Defense, Foreign Aﬀairs, and cabinet committees) was held,
eﬀectively minimizing opposition from committee members.
iswasKoizumi’sstrategy,giventhathewaswellawareofthe
strongsupporthehadfromthepublic.However,thisstrategy
wasmainlypossiblebecausetheinitialresponsehadbeenquick
and the government plan had been eﬀectively drafted within
thecabinetsecretariat,ratherthaninseparateministries.
Stage II: Diet deliberation and policy implementation
Inthesecondstage,thefollowingtwoaspectsareworthnoting:
• thecabinetsecretaryandtheprimeministerrespondedto
themostimportantquestionsinthepolicydebate;
• intheproceedings,speedwasvaluedoverconsensus.
Within the Diet, the cabinet secretary and the prime
minister himself ﬁelded the most diﬃcult questions on the
responseplan,whereastheDefenseAgencyandmofa oﬃcials
provided information on the details. is happened because
thecabinetsecretariatsponsoredthebill(inhiscapacityasthe
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bill’sinitiatorandadministrator),buttheprocesshadtheadded
eﬀect of giving the impression to the public that the prime
ministerandhiscabinetwerefullyincharge.
Second, speed was prioritized over full consensus. Once
again, Koizumi and his staﬀ did not try very hard to gain
support from unsatisﬁed ldp party members or to come up
with a compromise with the dpj. In the end, public opinion
polls show that this strategy did not hurt the prime minister
much. In both Stage i and ii, Prime Minister Koizumi took
everyopportunitytospeakdirectlytothepublic,givingspeeches
ateveryturnofevent.ishelpedsecurepublicsupportforhis
top-downleadershipinawaythatformerprimeministerswere
typicallyreluctanttodo.

Conclusions
AlthoughitisundeniablethatJapanhasenhanceditssecurity
commitments in this decade, theories diﬀer markedly as to
why.SincetheGulfWar,Japanhasfaceddynamicchangesin
internationalstructuresandfrightfulevents,suchastheSeptemberth bombingsandmissilelaunchingsbyNorthKorea.
Eventssuchasthese,combinedwithdiminishingantimilitary
sentimentamongaJapanesepublicbornlongafterWorldWar
ii have likely pressured Japan to increase its security eﬀorts.
Most Japanese people feel external threats and express their
support for the sdf and the US-Japanese Security Treaty in
ordertodefendJapan.
Nonetheless,inthischapterwehavearguedthatthemost
essentialfactorfavoringJapan’snewinternational“extroversion”
hasbeendomesticinstitutionalreform.Politicalleaders,especiallytheprimeminister,havegainedanewcapacitytotakea
stronghandandbeactivelyinvolvedinforeignpolicymaking.
Withanew,streamlineddecision-makingprocess,theJapanese
government has gained an improved capability for quick,
eﬀectiveaction.Furthermore,theprimeministercanaccentuate
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certain issues over others, as Abe did with the North Korean
abductionissue,andcanevendeterminepolicydirectionifhe
wishes.Inadditiontoelectoralreforms,whichhavemeantthat
politicians must increasingly be able to seek and win public
support,thisincreasedcapacityforinstitutional“extroversion”
hasgivenpoliticiansfurtherincentivestobecomemore“extroverted”intermsofbothpolicystyleandpolicypreference.is
factwillacceleratethepoliticizationofthedefensepolicymaking
process in Japan and has a few notable implications for the
alliancerelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.
First,theshiftfrombureaucratictopoliticalleadershipin
defenseandforeignpolicymeansthatmoreactorswillbeinterested in getting involved in defense matters. Although more
attentionshouldgenerallymeananincreasedappreciationfor
the alliance, there is a risk that Japan’s actions will be less
predictableandpossiblymorevolatile.Whenbureaucratsran
theshow,forbetterorworse,continuitywastherulenotthe
exception.38 Fromnowon,however,whenthereispoliticalwill,
foreign policy decisions will be made more quickly and more
decisively (as in the case of sending sdf troops to Iraq). e
downside may be that the volatility may not be desirable in a
stablealliancepartner.
Second,publicopinionwillmattermoreindecisionmaking,
apossibleconcernfortheUS-Japanalliance.Aswehaveargued,
politicalleadershave,outofnecessity,becomemoresensitiveto
whatthepublicwants.AccordingtotheCabinetAdministrative
Oﬃce Poll and a survey of sdf oﬃcers and the civilian elite,
conductedbyHikotani,39 althoughthegeneralpublicisgenerally
supportiveoftheUS-Japanalliancerelationship,theirsupportis
notasstrongasthatofelitesorsdf oﬃcers,whostandasguarantorsofthe“administrativealliance.”erefore,aspublicopinion
beginstomattermoreandmore,oﬃcialsinbothcountriesmust
maintainanawarenessofitspotentialpoliticalconsequences.
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Notes
 SpecialthankstoFrancesRosenbluth,YaleUniversity,fortheopportunitytowritethischapter,andPeterLi,theNationalUniversityof
Singapore,KanekoMasafumiandMoharaJun,PHPresearchInstitute,whohelpedthechapterfromvariousaspectsofJapan.
 SeeCalder(9),chapter0.
3 Tatebayashi (004) provides empirical evidence to show that this
kindof“dividing”votesindeedoccurred.AlsoseeCox,Rosenbluth
andies(999)onfaction.
4 epr wasintroducedtothelargenationwidedistrictafterthe93
elections.Priortothischange,sntv applied.
 e National Council for Building a New Japan, a volunteer group
that consists of business people, academics, labor union members,
journalists,andbureaucratsbeganin004toholdasymposiumto
evaluatepartymanifestosbeforeeverynationalelection.Manyother
organizations,includingthemedia,inauguratedsimilarevents.ese
activitieshavefocusedpublicattentiononmanifestos.
 SeeNagahisa(99),especiallychapter.
 is reform also increased the penalty on politicians for violating
campaignregulations.
 TakenakaHarukatashowsthattheﬁnancialroleofhabatsu almost
immediatelydroppedasaresult.(Takenaka00,).isreform
had little eﬀect on highly concentrated parties such as the Japan
CommunistParty(jcp)andtheCleanGovernmentParty(Komeito).
ejcp inparticularhasalwayshadasoundﬁnancialbasisbasedon
its revenue from subscriptions to its party paper, e Red Flag
(Akahata).
9 Formoredetailsonthe00election,seeEstévez-Abe(00).
0 Foraviewthatemphasizestheroleofpoliticalleadership,seeRichard
Samuels,Machiavelli’s Children (003).
 SeeUesugi(00),p..
 SeeOtake(003).
3 SeeTomitaandSone(93),pp.–00.
4 eﬁnalreportfromGyosei kaikaku kaigi (theAdministrativeReform
Conference)publishedinDecember99.
 RevisedArticle4ofCabinetLaw.
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 RevisedArticleofCabinetLaw.
 e99InternationalPeaceCooperationLawwasinitiatedbythe
CabinetSecretariat,butwasnotadministeredbythem.
 Shinoda(004).
9 A zoku politician is one who has served in one or more politically
appointedpostsatagivenministry,usuallyoﬀeringvaluableexpertise
tofactionswithintheldp.
0 Formerly,theupperlimitwasﬁve.
 Jitai taisho senmon iinkai consists of a Deputy Cabinet Secretary
(political),aDeputyCabinetSecretary(administrative),naikaku kiki
kanri kan, naikaku kanbo fukuchokan ho, naikaku joho kan,bureauchief (kyokucho) level bureaucrats from the Ministry of Defense,
NationalPoliceAgency,CoastGuard,MinistryofLandandTransportation,ResourceandEnergyAgency,MinistryofEconomicsand
Industry, Ministry of Finance (Director of Customs Bureau and
zaimukan),mofa,MinistryofJustice,shobocho,andtheChiefofthe
General Staﬀ Oﬃce. ere is also a subcommittee (director level),
calledtherenraku chosei kaigi.
 eproposalbytheformerPrimeMinsterAbe’sexpertstudygroup
to establish a “National Security Council” is not so much a radical
departurefromthepast,asoftenreported,butratheracontinuation
oftherecentchangesdiscussedabove.emaindiﬀerencesare:()
fewer oﬃcial members of the Security Council (prime minister,
cabinetsecretary,foreignminister,defenseminister,plusmoreministers as deemed necessary); () politicians as National Security
Advisors (instead of politically appointed Assistant Chief Cabinet
Secretaries with former defense bureaucrats currently playing that
role);(3)meetingsonaregularbasis(twiceamonth);(4)asecretariat
ofabout0to0,includingprivatesectorexpertsandsdf oﬃcers
(possiblysmallerthanthecurrentstaﬀsize).
3 He left the oﬃce because of the bad performance of the economy
andanincreaseintherateofunemploymentcausedbyariseinthe
consumptiontax.
4 Otake(00)arguesthatastrongprimeministermakessystemsto
strengthenhispowerbutthesystemdoesnotstrengthenthepower
oftheprimeminister.Heiscorrectbecauseastrongmancanmakea
systemtoempowerhim;butheisalsowrongbecausethisdoesnot
explainwhyheisasstrongassuchasystem.
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 Iijima(00),p..Takenaka(00),p.4.
 Iijima(00),pp.3–4,arguesthatsuchacampaignwastheonlyway
forKoizumi,apoliticianwholackedstrongsupportwithintheDiet,
tohaveachancetowin.
 Manypoliticalscientistsandjournalistspointoutthisasaproofof
theenhancedpoweroftheprimeminister.SeeOtake(00),p.,
Takenaka(00),pp.3–,Iijima(00),p.39,forexample.
 Otake(00)arguesthatKoizumitookadvantageofpoliciesandthe
mediatogetpublicsupport.SeealsoIijima(00),p.3andMikuriya
(00).
9 eoﬃcialnominationasatoolwasusedtodiscouragedisaﬀection
oftheKatogroupin000.Takenaka(00)arguesthatKoizumi,as
the leader of Mori faction that discouraged the defection, learned
howtousethetool.
30 Shinoda(00).Iijima(00),pp.43–.Uesugi(00),pp.–4.
3 Shinoda(00).Otake(00)p..
3 Otake(00),p.9.Suzuki(00),pp.–.
33 Abe Shinzo advocated establishment of the jnsc in August 00,
onemonthbeforebeingelectedasprimeminister.Aftertakingoﬃce,
heorganizedaspecialconferencetoestablishitin00.According
toanoﬃcialinthesdf,themainpurposeofthejnsc istostrengthen
poweroftheprimeministerindecisionmakingonsecurityissues.In
99,004,and00,threeseparategovernmentcouncilssubmitted
papersstressedtheimportanceofcreatinganintelligencecommunity.
epapersubmittedin00focusesparticularlyonthisissue.e
PHP Research Institute also published an original report on the
subjectin00.
34 Inthisregard,Otake’sargumentthatastrongprimeministercreates
systemstostrengthenhispowerisquitereasonable.
3 Shinoda(00),Ina(00).
3 InterviewwithFurukawainShinoda(00),pp.–9.
3 Masahiro Akiyama, then Director of Defense Policy Bureau of the
Japan Defense Agency (jda), calls this shift “from administrative
alliance to political alliance.” He reﬂects that he wrote a letter to
JosephNyein99duringtheSpecialActionCommitteeonOkinawa
(saco) negotiations mentioning that it may be the last time that
bureaucrats have the “silent leadership” over defense policy, given
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the increasing tendency of politicians to take the lead in defense
policy.Itisinterestinginretrospectthathehadpredictedwhatwas
likelytohappennext.SeeAkiyamapp.,00.
39 Reisen go no Jieitai to Shakai: Jieikan Bunmin Elito Ishiki Chosa no
Bunseki (e self defense forces and society after the Cold War:
analysisofthesdf oﬃcer-civilianeliteopinionsurvey),withHitoshi
Kawano.Boei Daigakko Kiyo 9:March00.
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